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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
In today‟s turbulent and competitive environment, innovation fostering and 
development is more and more realized outside the company boundaries. In recent 
years, the rate of formation of inter-firm relationships, especially in high-tech and R&D 
intensive industries, significantly increased (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Dyer et al., 2004); in other respects, the diffusion of external financial backers, such as 
Venture Capitalists (VCs), played a fundamental role in fostering innovation in modern 
society. The main reason is that even the largest companies are not able anymore to 
develop all the new knowledge and technology they need to compete within the 
company boundaries. All the more so, young and innovative start-ups are not able to 
enter and stay into the market without external financial and competences support.  
As concerns to external technology sourcing, recently, Chesbrough (2003) coined the 
term „open innovation‟ to indicate how big companies changed their traditional way of 
new business development by opening the firm‟s boundaries and combining external 
and internal technology development. Namely, it is a new definition of what in literature 
is historically addressed as inter-firm relations (IFRs); firms sign licensing agreements, 
alliances, joint venture or even merger and acquisitions with others firm in order to gain 
the access to new knowledge or technology.  
As concerns to external financing of new high-tech start-ups, that are often too small to 
turn to equity markets and too risky to qualify for bank debt, they usually obtain 
financial capital through two different sources: Venture Capital (VC) financing or 
entering strategic deals with other firms (Pisano, 2006).  
This thesis attempts to contribute both the issues anticipated above. On the one hand it 
discusses the dynamics of R&D inter-firm relationships, with the main aim of 
investigating how firms manage the risk embedded in the creation of such relationships 
through the choice of the most suitable governance form. On the other hand, it studies 
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the role of Venture Capital investors in fostering innovation and how VCs manage the 
risk in the investor-investee relation through the design of investment contracts.  
This chapter gives an overview of both the topics addressed in this thesis and of the 
structure of the study. Specifically, section two briefly presents existing research and 
the gap identified in it. This gap is transformed into research objectives presented in 
section three. Finally, the following two sections introduce the methodology applied 
and the structure of the study that should give a quick overview of the content. 
 
1.2 Theoretical background, motivations and research questions 
Starting with the first topic object of the thesis, namely the governance and management 
of IFRs, I reviewed the most influential theoretical and empirical research on the topic 
and I noticed that basically researchers have tried to find reasonable explanations for 
two main issues. The former concerns the motivations for creating such relationships, 
how to choose the most suitable partner and, above all, how to formalize the 
relationship, namely what type of contract and governance form to choose in order to 
manage the relation. Whereas, the latter issue regards the performance evaluation of the 
relationship and the identification of those factors that may lead to the success (failure) 
of an alliance.  
My attention has been particularly captured by the first research issue that is surely the 
one having received more contributions in the strategic management literature. Indeed, 
every day firms enter into strategic alliances, joint ventures and even undertake mergers 
or acquisitions for various reasons, and the formation of these relations is one of main 
research subjects in the field. I was especially attracted by the body of literature 
investigating the reasons that push firms to choose different governance modes in 
organizing their relationships, mainly because, despite the huge amount of existing 
literature, there are still many unclear aspects.  
In particular looking at the drivers influencing the choice of the governance forms, 
researchers often limited themselves to analyze the problem from one or two theoretical 
point of views. The most adopted perspectives are: Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
(Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1991), Resource-Based View (RBV) (Kogut and Zender, 
2002; Zollo et al., 2002), Property Right Theory (PRT) (Hart and Moore, 1990) and 
Real Options theory (RO) (Folta, 1998; Kogut, 1991). Instead, I believe that analyzing 
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the problem in the light of different perspectives at the same time could provide new 
and interesting insights. This was one of the motivations that prompted the first research 
work presented in this thesis (see chapter 4). Furthermore, I noted that several authors 
concentrate their studies on the motivation for selecting a specific governance from; 
surely, alliances received more attention than the other governance modes. Other 
scholars instead compare the choice between two or three governance modalities; 
mainly they investigate the choice between equity and non-equity alliances. Whereas, 
the aim of my research is to analyze all the spectrum of possibilities between pure 
market transactions and totally integration. For the aforementioned reasons, I developed 
a theoretical framework derived from the analysis of all the theories underling the 
formation of IFRs, that detect the main drivers that my influence the governance form 
choice and I link them to a particular governance mode. 
Thus, the research presented in chapter 4 regarding the drivers influencing the choice of 
the governance form try to answer to the following research questions: 
 
 Why sometimes are contract-based alliances preferred to joint ventures or 
mergers and acquisitions? What are the drivers, if any, influencing the choice of 
the governance form of inter-firm relationships? 
 
Moreover, a second and in-depth literature analysis, led me to see the problem of the 
governance choice from another point of view. Thus, I started investigating which are 
the main causes determining a high perception of the partners relational and 
performance risk in IFRs. Thus, in chapter 5, I develop a new theoretical framework 
linking the perception of the above mentioned relational and performance risk to the 
governance forms. I provide reasons for which the extent of factors increasing relational 
risk perception leads firms to choose more hierarchical governance modes, whereas 
high perception of performance risk leads to more market oriented transactions. Finally, 
I show how the extent of both relational and performance risk perception is more related 
to hybrids governance forms.  
With this research I try to answer to the following research questions: 
 
 Does the perception of a high relational risk in the IFRs lead companies to 
choose more structured and integrated governance forms (i.e. equity alliances, 
M&A)? Does the perception of a high performance risk in the IFRs lead 
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companies to choose more market-oriented governance forms (i.e. licensing 
agreements, non-equity alliances)? How the presence of both factors influence 
this choice?  
 
Both the frameworks on the decision of the governance of IFRs presented in chapters 4 
and 5 have been empirically tested through two different datasets consisting of firms 
from the same industry, the bio-pharmaceutical one. This particular industry has been 
selected as research field, as it is one of the industries that are experiencing the highest 
number of inter-firm relationships; indeed, alliances between pharmaceutical and 
biotech firms are very frequent. Moreover, as I‟ll explain in detail in chapter 2, I‟m 
particularly interested in inter-firm relationships involving an external technology 
sourcing, and again this industry is an ideal test-bed. Finally, the first dataset comes 
from primary data collected through a survey conducted within the Italian bio-
pharmaceutical industry, thus it examines relationships signed in a specific country; 
whereas, the second one, is a secondary dataset examining IFRs signed worldwide.  
 
As concern as the second object of this thesis, namely the investigation of venture 
capital investments contracts, the review of the main contributions of both theoretical 
and empirical research have shown that instead, this research stream is still poorly 
investigated. In particular, my point of view in analysing the issue was to investigate the 
main risk factors the investor faces during the entrepreneurial investment, namely 
agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard, and in which way, namely 
through which kind of contract rights and covenants, he manages these agency conflicts.  
Financial contracting literature stream is the main theoretical approach used in studying 
the issue and it has examined how typical principal-agent scenarios can be adapted to 
the relationship between VC and entrepreneur, that is characterized by an extraordinary 
high potential for agency conflicts resulting from information asymmetries between the 
two parties. Theoretical research tried for years to develop models of optimality 
between different securities combinations and financial instruments; these models have 
found only partially empirical support.  
In particular, the motivation of my research comes from the observation that no research 
has focused on how the use of different mitigatory mechanisms, both contractual and 
pre-contractual, is associated to the perceived degree of agency conflicts. It is also not 
clear how pre-investment screening activities, such as syndication, are better used 
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alongside or as a substitute to the design of contractual rights and post investment 
activities. Thus, the literature review on the topic that is presented in chapter 3, was the 
starting point for the theoretical framework developed in chapter 6. Indeed, I firstly 
study from a theoretical point of view how Venture Capitalists use pre-investment 
screening mechanisms and contractual rights and covenants to mitigate agency conflicts 
(characterised by adverse selection and moral hazard problems) in the investor-investee 
relation with entrepreneurial companies.  
Thus, the research presented in chapter 6 try to contribute to the VC contracting 
literature by answering the following questions: 
 
 How better selection of ventures through the use of pre-investment screening 
mechanisms, such as syndication, relates to the subsequent design of financial 
contracts provisions such as use of higher ranking equity financial instruments, 
cash flow and control rights in financial contracts? Does superior screening 
result in the use of covenant rights as complements or substitutes to the 
screening results?  
 
Furthermore, a tested the developed hypotheses through a hand collected dataset of 
worldwide VC investments in order to find empirical confirmations on the above-
mentioned issues.   
 
1.3 Methodology 
The main aspects of each research are the theory and the empiricism. The interaction 
between these two elements is the core process for the production of knowledge. This 
process is also followed in this study. First, a solid theory is created. Without a solid 
theoretical understanding of how to answer to the research questions the study would 
lack to solve the problem statement. On the other hand, if the theory is created just on a 
stand-alone basis, it would lack to support the real world. Here is where the empiricism 
comes into play. It tries to draw on conclusions based on what is observable and actual 
data. The empiricism side in this thesis is based on the selection of data, as well as tests 
on predetermined hypotheses. 
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As regards as the selection of the data in the research works presented in this thesis, I 
use two main types of data: original data and secondary data. Original data, also known 
as primary data, are data collected at source. Secondary data is data which already-
exists, such as books, documents, journals and databases.  
As far as primary data, I participated in a work team composed by colleagues of the 
DICGIM department of the University of Palermo, with which I conducted a survey 
within the Italian biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies associated to 
Farmindustria, that is the main Italian Association of Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
companies. The survey was conducted through the use of a questionnaire. It is the most 
common method to collect primary data and it is a most useful method when large 
numbers of people are to be reached in different geographical regions (Sekaran, 2003). 
These data is presented and used in chapter 4.  
Also the dataset presented in chapter 6, on Venture Capital financing contracts, consists 
of hand-collected data, primary data, that were collected in the scope of a broader 
research project titled, “Governance and Contractual Structures in the European Venture 
Capital Industry”. The project received funding from the German Research Foundation 
and the data collection was carried out by several researchers at the European Business 
School (EBS); then, through a collaboration with Professor Kamuriwo at Cass Business 
School during my staying there, I had the possibility to access this dataset with the main 
aim of investigating the issue presented in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
As concern as secondary data, they can be obtained from various sources (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997) and they are one of the cheapest and easiest means of access to 
companies‟ information. In this thesis I use secondary data in the research presented in 
chapter 5 on the risk assessment as rational for the governance mode choice in IFRs. 
This data were collected by using the BioWorld Industry Snapshot database, in 
particular the Biotech & Pharma Collaboration section. This data source was used for 
identifying worldwide inter-firm relationships among biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies during the period January 2007 to December 2010. I selected the BioWorld 
database because it is a new and reliable source of records specific for the 
biotechnology industry.  
Finally, as regards as the methods that enable to make tests and determine relations they 
are found in the statistical theory. Specifically, a multinomial logit regression model 
was developed for each of the empirical analysis presented in this thesis.  
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1.5 Thesis outline 
This study is organized into seven chapters. In here, I briefly report contents of the 
following chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the theoretical background and of the existing literature 
on the governance of inter-firm relationships. In particular, it clarifies what researchers 
mean with inter-firm relationships and which are the governance modalities within the 
market-hierarchy continuum considered in this thesis. Then, it examines the main 
theoretical approaches underling IFRs literature. Finally, Chapter 2 briefly presents 
existing research literature on the drivers influencing the choice of the governance form 
of IFRs and the research context of this study, namely the biopharmaceutical industry. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical background and literature review on venture capital 
contracting. First, it presents some definitions of the venture capital industry and of its 
characteristics. In particular, the focus is on the agency conflicts existing in the 
relationship between the venture capital investor (the principal that provides funds to a 
venture) and the entrepreneur (the agent with a venture that needs financing). Finally, 
Chapter 3 offers a detailed review of the most relevant literature on pre-contractual 
mechanisms and contractual rights and covenants used to reduce these agency conflicts.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the first theoretical framework of this thesis and its empirical test. By 
reviewing the relevant literature and the theoretical approaches underlying the choice of 
the governance of IFRs in the biopharmaceutical industry, I locate some drivers that 
might influence this choice and I develop a set of hypotheses. Such theoretical 
framework is then empirically tested through data collected from a survey in the Italian 
context. Empirical results provide interesting insights on how shaping bio-
pharmaceutical deals. Then, discussion, conclusion, managerial implications and 
limitations are presented. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the second theoretical framework on the choice of the governance of 
IFRs. It differs from the one presented in chapter 4, because it is based on the analysis 
of risk factors perceived by companies when they start a new relationship. In here, I 
detect factors influencing the perception of a relational risk and those determining the 
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perception of a performance risk. Then, I provide reasons for which the extent of these 
factors lead firms to controversial decisions on the governance of their relations; 
namely, relational risk factors push toward more hierarchical governance modes, 
whereas performance risk factors push toward more market oriented transactions. 
Finally, the set of hypotheses  is empirically tested through the analysis of a sample of 
IFRs signed worldwide in the period 2007-2010 between pharma and biotech 
companies. The results strongly support the theoretical framework; thus, discussion, 
conclusion and managerial implications and limitations are presented. 
 
Chapter 6 concerns the research on venture capital contract design. In here, I first 
develop a set of hypotheses linking the perceived degree of agency conflicts existing in 
the relation between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur with the use of pre-
investment activities and contractual rights and covenants. In particular, I investigate 
how the use of syndication, the choice of equity financial instruments, the staging of the 
investment and the VC board rights are employed by the venture capitalists in order to 
manage adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The developed hypotheses are 
then empirically tested through the analysis of a sample of venture capital investments 
covering both European and US entrepreneurial firms. The empirical analysis shows 
very interesting results, supporting the hypotheses. Then, discussion, conclusion and 
managerial implications and limitations are presented. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the main theoretical, empirical and managerial contributions of the 
studies discussed in this thesis. Finally, it outlines the limitations of the studies and 
suggests further research development. 
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Chapter 2 
UNDERSTANDING INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS: 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
ON THE GOVERNANCE OF IFRs 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Inter-firm relationships (IFRs) have received an enormous attention in the strategic 
management literature (Das and Teng, 2000); in the literature, some authors refer to 
these collaborations using the term “alliances”, others use “strategic alliances” or “inter-
firm alliances”. With the term IFRs, in this thesis, I refer to any type of arrangement that 
one finds in between standard market transactions of unrelated companies and 
integration by means of mergers and acquisitions. In particular, the focus of this work is 
on strategic technology partnering, namely those collaborations between two 
independent firms, formalized through a proper agreement, where joint technology 
development or technology sharing is at least part of the collaborative effort. Of course, 
in R&D intensive industries, the intensity and the number of alliances is much greater 
than in other contexts (Freeman, 1991; Hagedoorn, 2002).  
This chapter presents a review of a part of the „IFRs literature‟, or as it is more often 
labelled, of the „alliance literature‟ with a particular focus at R&D alliances. In general, 
the „IFRs literature‟ is roughly divided between: a) those papers who analyze inter-
organizational relationships and networks as a class of phenomenon such as Gulati 
(1995) and Oliver (1990); b) those papers who try to detect variables associated with 
alliance success, failure, and stability (Doz, 1996; Parkhe, 1993b; McCutchen et al., 
2008); c) and those papers that focus on the choice of a specific kind of IFRs, such as 
strategic alliances, compared to alternative governance mechanisms (Kogut, 1988; 
Powell, 1990; Das and Teng, 2001a).  
Thus, in accordance with the focus of this thesis, the literature review here presented 
mainly concerns this last literature strand, namely the analysis of those papers that 
examine factors that influence managers choice between different governance forms of 
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an inter-firm relationships; thus, I mainly review the following theories: Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1991), Resource-based View (RBV) 
(Kogut and Zender, 2002; Zollo et al., 2002), Property Right Theory (PRT) (Hart and 
Moore, 1990) and Real Options theory (RO) (Folta, 1998; Kogut, 1991).  
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follow: in section 2.2 I present the most 
adopted definitions of inter-firm relationships; then in section 2.3 I analyze the market-
hierarchy continuum of governance forms highlighting the ones that are object of this 
thesis; section 2.4 is a review of the theories underling IFRs; section 2.5 contains the 
literature review of drivers influencing the choice of the governance form of IFRs; in 
section 2.6 I introduce the research context, namely I explain why I choose the 
biopharmaceutical industry as the test-bed of my research and finally section 2.7 
discusses conclusions.  
 
2.2 Defining inter-firm relationships 
Firms usually enter into strategic alliances, joint ventures, equity investment, or M&A 
for the purpose of strengthening their ability to compete. They choose one or more of 
these alternatives depending on their strategic purposes, market environment, products, 
and technological capabilities (Doz and Hamel, 1998).  
Collaboration between firms is an old phenomenon, companies have entered into 
alliances for centuries; however, the increasing diffusion of such collaborations 
occurred from later eighties (Draulans et al., 2003). Consequently, the rapid growth of 
the number of alliances in the 1980‟s and 1990‟s is reflected by the prosperity of the 
literature and by the different views and definitions of what an alliance/partnership is. 
There are many definitions of strategic alliances, or more generally of inter-firm 
relationships, in literature; some of the most influential are chronologically presented 
below.  
According to Forrest (Forrest, 1989) “strategic alliances are those collaborations between firms 
and other organizations, both short-term and long-term, which can involve either partial or 
contractual ownership, and are developed for strategic reasons”.  
 
Parkhe (Parkhe, 1993a) defines strategic alliances as “relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative 
arrangements, involving flows and linkages that use resources and/or governance structures from 
autonomous organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the 
corporate mission of each sponsoring firm”. 
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Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and Mocker (1997) defined strategic alliances as “inter-firm 
relationships that two or more independent firms use on a continuing basis to contribute to one or 
more key strategic goals. The firms share the benefits of their teamwork while remaining 
independent”.  
 
According to Contractor and Ra (Contractor and Ra, 2000) an alliance is “any cooperative or 
joint action between two companies on contractual and/or equity joint venture basis”. 
Das and Teng (Das and Teng, 2000) define strategic alliances as “voluntary cooperative inter-
firm agreements aimed at achieving competitive advantage for the partners”. 
 
Interesting for the purpose of this thesis is also the definition provided by Hagedoorn 
(2002) for R&D partnerships, that is the specific type of collaborations I‟m interested 
in. 
Hagedoorn (2002) refer to R&D partnerships as the specific set of different modes of inter-firm 
collaboration where two or more firms, that remain independent economic agents and 
organizations, share some of their R&D activities. 
 
As the reader can note from the previous definitions, one common view of what an 
alliance is does not exist. Moreover, a number of taxonomies of different modes of 
inter-firm relationships were introduced in both the economics and business and 
management literature.  
However, as concerns to the definition of „alliance‟, it is possible to recognize several 
common key points that define a strategic alliance. Firstly, most of the definitions use 
the words cooperative inter-firm agreements; namely, the word „cooperative‟ implies 
there must be resource sharing among all the partners, and „agreements‟ implies that 
firms sign a formal contract that must regulate the relationship. Secondly, several 
authors point out that alliances must be strategic, i.e. they must have a significant 
impact on corporate future position and competitiveness. Finally, alliances can involve 
equity investments, determining a partial ownership of a part in the other firm.  
The reader should note that some confusion about the terminology used in literature to 
refer to strategic alliances does exist.  
The main point is that some authors, with a more inclusive view, use the terms 
„alliance‟, „strategic alliance‟, „inter-firm relationship‟, „strategic partnerships‟ or 
„strategic network‟ as synonymous (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Lei and Slocum, 1991; 
Forrest, 1992; Murray and Mahon, 1993; Stafford, 1994). Instead, other researchers 
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adopt a more restricted view, as they make a distinction between „strategic alliances‟ 
and other cooperative arrangements (Devlin and Bleackley, 1988; Yoshino and Rangan, 
1995). According these authors strategic alliances are only those deals in which the 
parent firms are tied to each other in a long-term interdependence, with shared control, 
and continued contributions by the parents. Following these narrowed view seems that 
only a few kinds of cooperative arrangements would qualify as strategic alliances, that 
is joint ventures, equity investment, joint R&D, and joint marketing.  
For the main purpose of this study I believe that it is not fundamental makes this 
distinction between restricted and inclusive view. Therefore, in this study, like others 
authors in the field, I use the term „strategic alliance‟ as a common term to encompass 
all the previous inter-firm relationships (Harrigan, 1986; Ohmae, 1989; Parkhe, 1991). 
More generally, I use the term „inter-firm relationship‟ to refer to a broad range of 
collaborations including bilateral licensing agreements, outsourcing agreements, 
bilateral contract-based alliances, equity investments, joint ventures, and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) and so on.  
Finally, I encompass also Merger and Acquisition (M&A) as a distinct alternative 
between strategic alliances and other inter-firm relationships (Barney, 2002). M&A is 
considered a “make” solution because of is a governance form that internalises the 
assets or the activities to be accomplished during the inter-firm relationship.  
The definition of „alliance‟ or „inter-firm relationship‟ is also strictly linked to the 
numerous taxonomies present in literature that try to classify all the different 
governance modes of these partnerships by using different criteria.  
In the next paragraph I briefly analyze some of these classifications and I give a 
definition of the governance modes discussed in this thesis.  
 
2.3 The market-hierarchy continuum: analysis of different governance forms. 
As explained in the previous section, existing research shows that alliances can take a 
variety of forms those represent different approaches that partner firms adopt to control 
their dependence on the alliance, different legal forms which enable firms to control the 
resources allocation, and different distribution of benefits among the partners. Prior 
research has described differences in alliance governance structure as being similar to 
the differences between markets and hierarchies (Gulati, 1998).  
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However, along the market-hierarchy continuum (Williamson, 1995), several 
classifications of the alliances governance modes do exist. Traditionally, researchers 
have retained the distinction between equity and non-equity alliances (Gulati, 1995; 
Lambe and Spekman, 1997; Hagedoorn and Duyster, 2002; Dunne et al., 2009 
Vamhaverbeke et al., 2002). Equity relationships include both minority equity 
investments and joint venture agreements, whereas non-equity alliances are all the 
contractual agreements that do not involve an equity investment. Following Gulati 
(1998) they consider a non-equity alliance as the closer governance form to a market 
transaction, whereas equity alliances resemble more to hierarchical forms of 
governance. On the other hand, other researchers have searched for more sophisticated 
classifications, adding for example licensing agreements as a separate organizational 
form and distinguishing between minority equity alliances and joint ventures (Gulati 
and Singh, 1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005.  
From my point of view one of the clearest and most comprehensive taxonomy is the one 
by Das and Teng (2001), since they attempt to explain all the complexity and variations 
of alliance structure beyond the equity-non equity dichotomy. They propose a 
framework of four kinds of alliances: unilateral contract-based alliances, bilateral 
contract-based alliances, minority equity alliance and joint ventures. They define a 
unilateral contract-based alliance as an agreement in which there is a well-defined 
transfer of property rights, such as in licensing or distribution agreements. Instead, 
bilateral contract-based alliances are those partnerships in which partners share 
resources for the creation of a common property or knowledge; i.e. joint R&D alliances, 
joint marketing and joint production alliances.  
For the purpose of this work and to explain the conceptual framework of this study, I 
follow Das and Teng (2001) classification; thus, in the continuation of this thesis I will 
consider the following range of inter-firm organizational modes:  
 
 Unilateral contract-based alliances: arm‟s-length transactions, in which there is 
a unilateral knowledge/technology flow and a clear exchange of property rights 
from one firm to another one. Within this category I include licensing 
agreements, subcontracting and distribution agreements. 
 Bilateral contract-based alliances: partnerships in which two or more firms 
cooperate and share resources for the achievement of a common objective. Some 
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specific forms of bilateral contract-based alliances include joint production, joint 
marketing and promotion and joint R&D.  
 Minority equity alliances: alliances in which one firm makes an equity 
investment in his partner.  
 Joint Ventures: alliances in which two or more firms create a jointly owned legal 
organization that serves a limited purpose for its partners, such as R&D or 
marketing. 
 Mergers or Acquisitions: one firm takes full control of another‟s assets and 
coordinates actions by the ownership rights mechanism. 
 
As is possible to notice, the governance forms here presented are ordered following a 
TCE logic; namely, they reflect, from the top to the bottom of the list, an increase of the 
level of integration.  
Unilateral contract-based alliance is the governance form closer to the market, it has a 
very low degree of integration, indeed firms still work separately. It does not involve 
shared ownership and it has generally a short to medium term. Bilateral contract-based 
alliance is still a non-equity governance form, not involving shared ownership, but it 
requires a moderate level of integration since firms have to work together for a common 
goal. It has a short- to medium-term, and although it is regulated by a contract it 
requires reciprocal control between partners. Then, minority equity alliance represents a 
more integrated governance mode, an „hybrid‟, because of the equity participation, that 
entails a one-way or cross-equity ownership with a consequent interest alignment. 
These kinds of alliances are generally medium- to long-term. Joint ventures imply a 
higher degree of integration, since firms work together for the new legal entity and 
jointly make the equity investment. Finally, firms use totally integrated governance 
forms, namely mergers and acquisitions, when they desire to take full control of 
another‟s assets and coordinate actions by the ownership rights mechanism.  
Thus, inter-firm relationships can be ranked on a continuum between free market 
transaction and complete internalization solutions (Lorange and Ross, 1993). Even if it 
is difficult to be specific, concrete and detailed regarding the ordinal ranking of this 
range, it is safe to state that equity-based agreements represent more integrated 
governance forms and require an higher inter-firm interdependence in comparison to  
non-equity agreements. It is also safe to take M&As as the most integrated governance 
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form in the market-hierarchy continuum. Therefore, in this study I consider that IFRs 
are ranked on a continuum that varies for various degrees of interorganizational 
interdependency and levels of integration (Hagedoorn, 1990).  
 
2.4 Theories underlying inter-firm relationships 
In literature several theoretical strands have examined the rationales for signing 
collaboration agreements and the factors influencing the choice of the governance of 
such inter-firm collaborations, including Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
(Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1991), Resource-based View (RBV) (Kogut and Zender, 
2002; Zollo et al., 2002), Property Right Theory (PRT) (Hart and Moore, 1990) and 
Real Options theory (RO) (Folta, 1998; Kogut, 1991).  
All these approaches and theories, that are only some of those who faced the issues, try 
to explain the creation of alliances suggesting that market uncertainty, increasing 
competition, efficiency requirements, resource complementarities and so on drive 
companies to engage in strategic alliances to reach competitive advantages. Also, these 
theories try to detect the factors that managers must take into account when they have to 
design the governance of the relationship. In particular, investment specificity and 
transaction uncertainty, partner‟s resources and capabilities, the protection of strategic 
assets and the possibility to create and exercise an option in a point on time.  
Among all the theoretical approaches, I choose to review the most used theories that try 
to explain how to structure the governance form of the relationship: Transaction Cost 
Economics, Resource-based view, Property Right Theory, and Real Option Theory.  
 
2.4.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
The transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975; 1985) is surely the most adopted 
perspective by those researchers that try to understand the rational of inter-firm 
relationships. According to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1991b), 
transactions can take place in markets, within the organisation or hierarchy, or in the 
middle between the market and hierarchy. The theory emphasizes that organizations try 
to minimize the coordination costs of economics exchanges with other organizations; 
and these costs depend on the presence of transaction-specific investments, the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour and the frequency of interactions. Thus, different organizational 
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choice depends on the analysis of these cost factors. In pure market exchanges, 
transaction costs mainly depends on factors such as search, selection, negotiation, 
fulfilment and enforcement. Within firm boundaries, costs generally include agency and 
control costs. From a TCE perspective, alliances represents an intermediate governance 
form, between market and hierarchy, a „hybrid‟ (Gulati, 1995); the TCE argument 
suggests that strategic alliances are more efficient than market or hierarchical solutions 
when they minimize the firm‟s transaction costs (Jarillo, 1988). 
Summarizing, according to TCE scholars (Williamson, 1979), market transactions 
might be highly efficient as governance forms in different situations, since they are 
flexible and reversible forms and they minimize organizational costs of hierarchical 
structures, but on the other hand when opportunistic behaviour is likely to occur 
(because of asset specificity, lack of trust between partners, differences in terms of 
bargaining power etc.), the theory suggests to reduce this relational risk by choosing a 
more structured and hierarchical governance mode. Alliances contribute to reduce the 
opportunistic behaviour of partners (Pisano et al., 1988), arising when transactional 
conditions lead the firm to desire some degree of control over the transaction without 
fully internalizing it. 
 
2.4.2 Resource-based view 
The resource-based view (RBV) assumes that firms can be conceptualized as a bundle 
of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993), that those resources are heterogeneously 
distributed across firms and that resources difference persist over time (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). In particular, Wernelfelt (1984) defines a resource as “anything, 
which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm. More formally, a 
firm’s resources at a given time could be defined as those (tangible and intangible) 
assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm”. Thus, a firm resource can be a 
financial asset or a technology, as well as reputation or managerial skill.  
The core idea of RBV is that a strong strategy should be based on the resources, 
competences and capabilities of the firms. When the resources of a firm are valuable, 
rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (the so-called VRIN resources), they then provide 
a competitive advantage over rivals (Barney, 1991).  
The resource-based perspective is also often adopted when researchers study inter-firm 
relationships; indeed, this perspective emphasizes how firms can get the access to 
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valuable resources and capabilities of other firms through IFRs or by engaging in 
mergers and acquisitions (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Chung, et al., 2000). In 
this sense alliances are, therefore, cooperative relationships driven by logic of strategic 
resource needs. However, a firm that is interested in acquiring their partners‟ valuable 
resources through a inter-firm collaboration, at the same time must be careful to protect 
their own resources during the alliances-making process. Thus, adopting a RBV view, 
when managers have to design the governance of the relationship they have to find a 
structure able to balance the two issues: being able to procure valuable resource from 
another party without losing the control of one‟s own resources. 
Beside the traditional resource-based theory, another perspective has received several 
contributions, that is the dynamic capabilities approach. According to Teece et al. 
(1997) in situation of rapid and unpredictable change, firms may obtain sustained 
competitive advantage if they are able to use dynamic capabilities; namely if they are 
able to rapidly integrate, build and reconfigure their internal and external competences 
according to environmental changes. 
 
2.4.3 Property Right Theory 
Starting from the seminal works of Coase (1959), Alchian (1965), Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972; 1973) etc., the property right theory (PRT) started gaining a lot of attention by 
economics and strategic management researchers. This earlier stream of research 
literature is referred as „classical property rights theory‟ to contrast with the „modern 
property rights theory‟ that is mainly due to Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
Moore (1990) (the so-called GHM model). 
In general, the „classical‟ version of PRT focuses attention on the historical and 
institutional context that shapes and changes the property rights of a firm; whereas the 
„modern‟ version of the theory develops models of ownership and incentive structures. 
The first definition of property rights is due to Alchian (1965, p.129) that states that 
property rights are the „rights of individuals to the use of resources… supported by the 
force of etiquette, social custom, ostracism, and formal legally enacted laws supported 
by the states‟ power of violence or punishment‟. Thus, a property right is the right to 
use resources sanctioned by the law, social conventions and behaviours. However, in 
this work I mainly refer to the more recent contributes to PRT; indeed, the GHM model 
wonders who, in a relation between two parties, should own what assets and introduces 
 18 
the concept of „residual control rights‟. In the GHM model, because of potential 
problems of contractual opportunism (e.g. ex post opportunism), due to relation-specific 
investments, effort measurement, incentives determination and so on, firms must 
consider the residual control rights of those assets involved in the relation. Namely, this 
model points out that what is important, is not the residual property right on the output, 
but the residual control rights over assets; indeed, when contracts are incomplete, the 
rights to residual control over assets correspond to assets ownership that subsequently 
safeguards contracting parties from contractual hazards such as ex post opportunism 
problems. Fundamentally, the assets owner determines how to use these assets.   
Thus, adopting a PRT point of view in analyzing inter-firm relationships, firms must 
consider how to protect their own assets and how to gain the access and control of 
partner‟ assets. In particular, the theory emphasizes the importance of assets‟ 
ownership, achievable through an integration solution, and the role of asset-specificity.  
A concept strictly related to PRT, and also to TCE that will be used in my theoretical 
framework, is the „appropriability hazard‟ (Teece, 1986). This kind of concern is 
especially present when inter-firm relationships involve a technology transfer. As 
explained by Oxley (1997), when contracts are incomplete, because of gaps in 
specifications, the possibility of opportunistic behaviour may arise from both partners; 
indeed, on the one hand, the owner of the technology may find a reason for which it not 
anymore convenient to transfer the technology to that particular partner and so he 
transfer less technology than promised in the original contract. On the other hand, the 
other party, after receiving the technology, may use or modify the technology in several 
ways that were not specified in the agreement and that may damage it or decrease its 
value from the developer point of view. These risks are called appropriability hazard 
and are associated with technology transfer in inter-firm collaborations. Those authors 
that analyzed the extent of an appropriability risk in IFR (Oxley, 1997; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998) agree to the fact that this risk leads firms to adopt a more hierarchical 
governance structure.  
 
2.4.4 Real Option Theory 
The real options (ROs) theory was developed as a financial method for investment 
decision. A real option is „the right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the 
future‟ (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999, p.5). Recently, real options has started to attract 
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significant interest also in the field of strategic management, especially from scholars 
analyzing inter-firm relationships, because it offers another attractive point of view for 
the governance mode choice (Kogut, 1991; Folta, 1998).  
As suggested in the literature streams on real options, certain types of investments 
might be considered as the creation of an option, which might be exercised at a later 
point in time using a more integrated solution (i.e. Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; 
Kogut, 1991; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). Indeed, ROs are usually described as an 
option creation and an option exercise, two different investments in two different points 
in time; the first is the initial decision of investment in order to create the option and the 
second is the subsequent and not mandatory decision of exercise this option.  
Real options reasoning has become so successful mainly because it highlights the 
combined importance of uncertainty and managerial discretion, and it presents a 
dynamic view of firms‟ investment and organizational governance decisions. ROs point 
of view highlights the value associated with the ability of a firm to react flexibly to an 
uncertain future. The theory conceptualizes firms as an aggregation of investment 
opportunities and emphasizes the value of investments that allow firms to manage risk 
proactively by exploiting uncertainty over time in a flexible fashion (Kogut, 1991). 
Thus, real options are specifically designed to enable firms to postpone the investment 
decision under uncertainty conditions.  
From the perspective of managers who have to structure the governance form of an IFR, 
ROs suggests that, under environmental uncertainty conditions, he must adopt flexible 
organizational forms, such as contract-based alliances. Especially, when partner firms 
are exploring new knowledge or technologies, the investing firm first have to learn from 
the partner and build familiarity with the new technological area through small initial 
learning investments that can be seen as the creation of the option. Over time, after 
reaching a good understanding of the new technology and of its business opportunities, 
the investing firm can eventually exercise the option by expanding and firming up the 
relation, for example through an equity investment or even an acquisition.  
 
2.5 Literature review on drivers influencing the governance of IFRs  
Being the focus of this part of the thesis the analysis of factors influencing managers‟ 
decisions about the governance of inter-firm relationships, I review the strategic 
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management literature on the topic. Some of the papers I analyze are only theoretical 
papers whereas the others are empirical ones.  
The interest in this field of research dates back to early nineties and the first 
contributions use a transaction-cost point of view. Pisano (1990) is the first, to the best 
of my knowledge, who started to empirically investigate the firm‟s choice between 
internal (hierarchical) and contractual (market) modes for organizing a product R&D 
program. Namely, his paper posits that transaction-cost factors influence an established 
firm‟s choice between in-house and external sources of R&D. In particular, by 
examining data on 92 biotechnology R&D projects that major pharmaceutical 
companies have sponsored, he finds that small-number bargaining hazards in R&D 
markets motivate the established firms to internalize the project, namely they choose a 
hierarchical governance to manage the relation with biotech firms, source of R&D 
expertise.  
Also authors such as Gulati (1995) and Parkhe (1993a), explore the factors that explain 
the governance structures in inter-firm alliances with an emphasis on transaction-cost. 
They point out the role of inter-firm trust that emerges from repeated alliances between 
the same partners, suggesting that trust can be a substitute for hierarchical contracts in 
many exchanges and serve as an extra-contractual control mechanism by reducing the 
perception of opportunism risk. Both authors find empirical evidence supporting that 
the familiarity established among partners mitigates the hold-up risk and leads to 
market-oriented models. Also, interesting for the purpose of this work, is another result 
of Gulati (1995); in his paper he distinguish just between equity and non-equity 
alliances and he finds that alliances encompassing shared research and development are 
likely to be equity-based. Thus, the nature of the alliance may have an impact on 
transaction costs leading to a greater hazard associated with the alliance. Pisano, Russo 
and Teece (1988) had already predicted this result. Also, Gulati and Singh (1998) focus 
on how the extent of coordination costs and appropriation concern in an alliance can 
predict the use of a particular governance structure. On the one hand, their results 
provide strong support for the importance of co-ordination costs; indeed, they find that 
the greater the anticipated coordination costs arising from interdependence associated 
with a strategic alliance at the time of its formation, the more hierarchical was the 
governance structure used to formalize it. On the other hand, also the appropriation 
concern increases the likelihood of firms choosing hierarchical structure.  
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Another paper that uses a TCE point of view is Oxley (1997); this is very interesting for 
several reasons. First, she make a step forward in this research field, because of the 
governance structures she considers; indeed, while most previous empirical research has 
focused only on the choice between contract-based and equity joint ventures (Gulati, 
1995; Pisano, 1990; Pisano et al., 1988a), she distinguishes between three different 
alliances types: unilateral contract-based alliances, (i.e. licensing agreements), bilateral 
contract-based alliances (i.e. cross-licensing and technology sharing agreements), and 
equity-based alliances (i.e. joint ventures). Second, she shows that appropriability 
hazards are an important consideration when firms establish a new relation; she finds 
that the wideness of the transaction type, the technology scope and the involvement of 
different geographical areas increase appropriability hazards, pushing towards more 
hierarchical governance forms (i.e. equity joint venture). Thus, she empirically analyzes 
some new drivers of the governance choice: (i) transaction type, i.e. the activities 
covered by the agreement, product and process design vs. production and marketing, or 
“mixed”; (ii) the technology scope, i.e. the range of products or technologies covered by 
the agreement; (iii) the geographical scope, i.e. worldwide focus vs. local focus. 
Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) focus on how international and sectorial differences 
influence the organizational mode of strategic alliances. Also these authors use only a 
TCE perspective and differ only between contractual alliances and equity alliances. 
However, they find a very interesting result; briefly, they measure the degree of 
technological intensity of the industry, that imply uncertainty and complexity, and find 
support for their hypothesis according to which contractual agreements are more likely 
in high-tech industries rather than in relatively mature industries.  
Also the research proposed by Folta (1998) is interesting for our purpose, since the 
author uses a real option perspective to compares cooperative arrangements to 
acquisitions. He concludes that, in order to maximize the value of their real options, in 
environments characterized by high uncertainty, incumbents often prefer cooperative 
arrangements to internalization through acquisition. This result seems to be quite in 
contrast with Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) results (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1979) which, in front of transactions characterized by high uncertainty, predict 
governance forms more hierarchy-oriented.  
Steensma and Fairbank (1999) study the internalization of external technology; namely, 
organizations have three basic options for acquiring technological know-how: (i) 
develop the technology independently, (ii) acquire another company that already 
 22 
possesses the technology, or (iii) enter into a technology-sourcing agreement, either 
unilaterally (licensing) or via joint development. Their paper has a number of 
differences from past efforts. From my point of view the most important one, is linked 
to the fact that they recognize that the use of a unique theoretical perspective, i.e. TCE, 
do not provide a complete framework for understanding motivations for the choice of 
different governance forms. In their paper they use in a complementary fashion, both a 
resource-based view and a real option perspective, in order to hypothesize how certain 
perceived attributes of the technology involved in the inter-firm relationship, such as its 
imitability, rarity, technological and commercial uncertainty, and dynamism, influence 
the risk/return of the relation and therefore the governance mode. For example, they 
find that the greater the perceived difficulty of technical imitation, the more likely firms 
are to choose acquisitions or joint development, as opposed to a more arms-length 
licensing arrangement. This is consistent with resource-based arguments. Another 
interesting point of this paper is that it is the first that consider M&As as an alternative 
governance form of an inter-firm relationship, since past research considers M&As as 
something deeply different and independent from alliances.  
More recently IFRs researchers started using different theoretical perspectives in 
analysing the drivers influencing the choice of the governance of inter-firm 
relationships, going beyond the classical factors linked to transaction costs. Some very 
interesting papers dealing with the issue are theoretical papers that try to develop 
models based on the risk perception of partners.  
One of the most influential theoretical model, from my point of view, is the one by Das 
and Teng (2001a); they propose an interesting risk perception model of alliance 
structuring in which they examine the antecedents of risk perception, by distinguishing 
between relational and performance risk. Antecedents of relational risk are: (i) the lack 
of a cultural understanding and responsiveness, (ii) expected inequities regarding 
payoffs in alliances and (iii) the lack of trust. On the other hand, performance risk 
depends on: (i) general environmental factors, such as political risk, (ii) competitive 
environment factors and (iii) internal characteristics, such as the lack of a competence. 
Then, they suggest which type of alliance should be preferred depending on the 
minimization of the total risk perceived. They develop several propositions, but they do 
not empirically test their model. Moreover, from my point of view, another limitation of 
this work is that they consider only strategic alliances, from licensing agreements to 
joint ventures, not considering M&As as an alternative governance form.  
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Another paper that analyzes the issue only from a theoretical point of view is the one by 
Van de Vrande et al. (2006); they examine the effect of uncertainty on governance 
mode choice of IFRs from both a TCE and ROs perspectives. In particular, they 
distinguish between factors related to endogenous uncertainty, such as technological 
distance or trust between partners, and exogenous uncertainty coming from technology 
characteristics, such as the development stage. They argue that when exogenous 
uncertainty is high companies are better off using governance modes that are reversible 
and involve a low level of commitment, namely more market-oriented governance 
forms. On the other hand, when exogenous uncertainty has decreased because of prior 
R&D investments, transaction costs considerations, namely endogenous uncertainty 
coming from relational factors, became dominant and companies will shift towards 
more hierarchical governances forms. This paper considers corporate VC investments, 
strategic alliances (both equity and non-equity) and acquisitions as alternatives for 
technology sourcing; they do not study unilateral contract-based alliances, such as 
licensing or supply agreements.  
Furthermore, Das and Teng (2000) use a RBV perspective to detect the principal drivers 
shaping the governance form. They distinguish between property-based and knowledge-
based resources; thus, although the governance form choice depends on how resource 
typologies of the two parties are mixed in the relationship, property-base resources push 
toward more market-oriented governance forms, while knowledge-based resources push 
toward more integrated governance forms. Also this paper is just theoretical and do not 
consider M&As as possible governance choice.  
Another interesting paper on alliance governance is the one by De Man and Roijakkers 
(2009); they propose a framework for designing alliance governance structure analysing 
whether control and trust are complements or substitutes depending on the level and the 
type of risk an alliance faces. They argue that in high risk situations a combination of 
control and trust is used in a complementary way; whereas in low risk situations, 
depending on the type of risk, relational or performance risk, control and trust are used 
as substitutes. They illustrate their framework through five case studies, that of course 
do not represent an empirical confirmation of the framework.    
Another interesting perspective is given by Contractor and Ra (2002); they develop a 
theoretical model examining how attributes of corporate knowledge influence the 
selection of alliance governance mode. Hypotheses are presented on the choice of 
alliance governance mode as determined by knowledge attributes (codification, 
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newness, complexity, and teachability) and partner characteristics (such as knowledge 
absorptive capacity). The continuous spectrum of alliance types they consider ranges 
from repeated discrete contracting to equity joint ventures. However, they do not test 
their propositions.  
Going back to the review of empirical papers, by following the theoretical perspective 
by Das and Teng (2000), Chen and Chen (2003) compare TCE and RBV points in 
shaping the choice between contractual alliances and equity JVs and they find that, 
whilst the transaction cost model is powerful in explaining the choice between JVs and 
contractual alliances, the resource-based perspective provides useful insights into the 
choice between two distinctive forms of contractual alliances, namely, exchange and 
integration alliances. This paper examines characteristics such as asset specificity, 
resources typology and uncertainty through a survey that is not focus on a specific 
industry. Also, Rosiello (2007) analyses the issue of the governance choice in a cluster 
of biotech companies in Scotland, both from a TCE and a RBV perspectives. He 
analyses transaction factors, such as sunk costs and uncertainty, and resources 
characteristics, such as replaceability, complexity and replicability and he shows, 
through his empirical results, how technological and demand uncertainty and resources 
complexity make collaborative agreements more likely than standard contracts, 
confirming in this way both TCE and RBV perspectives.  
Also the paper by Dunne et al. (2009) is particularly interesting for our purpose; indeed 
they use a RBV perspective to empirically study the governance choice matter in 
biopharmaceutical industry by analysing how firms‟ resources, in particular technical, 
commercial and social capital, influence the choice between equity and non-equity 
alliances.  
However, from my perspective, the most important contributes, are two recent papers 
due to Santoro and McGill (2005) and Van de Vrande et al. (2009) that investigate the 
choice of a continuum of governance forms between market and hierarchy in the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Santoro and McGill (2005) analyse the influence of asset 
co-specialization, partner and task uncertainty and technology uncertainty on the choice 
among five different governance forms: one-way licensing, bilateral cross licensing, 
bilateral not licensing, minority equity and joint ventures (JVs). Consistently with TCE, 
they find that co-specialized assets increase the likelihood of hierarchical governance 
and partner and task uncertainty increases this effect. Consistently with RO, 
technological uncertainty decreases the likelihood of hierarchical governance. On the 
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other hand, Van de Vrande et al. (2009) analyse the impact of environmental 
turbulence, technology newness, technology distance and prior ties on five different 
governance forms: non-equity technology alliances, Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) 
investments, minority holdings, JVs and M&As. Again, appealing to TCE and RO, they 
obtain a controversial support to the two theoretical strands. 
By concluding, the analysis of the literature on the drivers influencing the choice of the 
governance form of IFRs shows how several efforts have been done in order to better 
understand the issue.  
In Table 1, I synthesize the main contributions highlighting the theoretical focus of each 
paper, the main drivers detected, the operationalized measures for each drivers, the 
governance forms considered and finally the paper‟s typology, namely if it is only a 
theoretical one or also empirical and which type of data it uses.  
The literature analysis reveals several limitations and gaps; some of which are  here 
presented.  
First of all, researchers have often used different theoretical perspective combining 
them in pairs, but they have never tried to develop a comprehensive theoretical 
framework that take into account simultaneously all the identified drivers coming from 
different theories. In fact I show how the most important contributions that use more 
than one theoretical perspectives, are based just on TCE and RO theories, or TCE and 
RBV, or RO and RBV. What emerges from the empirical literature is instead that the 
main drivers influencing the governance form choice come from the analysis of 
different theories; they are: asset specificity (TCE), uncertainty (TCE, RO), 
appropriation concern (TCE, PRT), trust (TCE) and resource typology (RBV). Thus, 
following a recent literature strand on IFRs‟ governance structure (Leiblein, 2003; 
Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Patelli, 2009; Foss and Roemer, 2010) I strongly believe that 
integrate findings coming from different theoretical approaches may lead to new and 
interesting results.  
Second, the majority of the analyzed empirical papers does not consider all the 
spectrum of governance possibilities from pure market transactions to totally integrated 
solutions; most of them study just the choice between equity vs. non-equity alliances.  
Third, some very interesting papers, such as Das and Teng (2001a) and De Man and 
Roijakkers (2009) develop theoretical models that study how the level of risk perceived 
by alliance partners influence the design of the alliance governance structure. 
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Table 1. Synthesis of the literature on drivers influencing the governance choice 
Paper 
Theoretical 
focus 
Main driver Operationalized Drivers Governance modes Type of paper 
Santoro and McGill 
(2005) 
TCE 
RO 
Asset specificity 
Uncertainty 
Asset co-specialisation 
Partner uncertainty  
Task uncertainty 
Technological uncertainty 
One-way licensing 
Bilateral cross licensing 
Bilateral not licensing  
Minority equity alliances and JVs 
Empirical data bank 
analysis on the 
biopharmaceutical 
industry 
Van de Vrande, 
Vanhaverbeke and 
Duysters (2009) 
TCE  
RO 
Uncertainty 
Trust 
Environmental uncertainty 
Technology uncertainty  
Prior ties 
Non-equity technology alliances  
CVC investments  
Minority holdings  
Joint Ventures and M&As 
Empirical data bank 
analysis on the 
biopharmaceutical 
industry 
Oxley (1997) 
TCE  
PRT 
Appropriation 
concern 
Transaction focus  
Range of products or technologies 
Wideness of geographic area 
Unilateral contractual alliances 
Bilateral contractual alliance 
Equity alliances 
Empirical multi 
industry data bank 
analysis  
Gulati (1995) TCE 
Uncertainty 
Trust 
Previous ties 
Different nationality 
Different firms 
Non-equity alliances  
Equity alliances  
Empirical multi 
industry data bank 
analysis  
Gulati and Singh 
(1998) 
TCE 
 
Uncertainty 
Appropriation 
concern 
Trust 
Interdependence 
Technological uncertainty 
Appropriability regime 
Prior ties 
Contractual alliances 
Minority equity investments  
JVs 
Empirical multi 
industry data bank 
analysis  
Das and Teng (2000) RBV Resource typology 
Property-based resources 
Knowledge-based resources 
Unilateral contractual alliances  
Bilateral contractual alliances 
Minority equity alliances 
JVs 
Theoretical paper 
Steensma and 
Fairbank (1999) 
RBV  
RO 
Resource typology 
Uncertainty 
N° of previous alliances or JVs 
Resource potential economic rent 
Resource uncertainty 
Licensing 
Joint development alliances 
Acquisition 
Survey not on the 
biopharmaceutical 
industry 
Chen and Chen 
(2003) 
TCE  
RBV 
Asset specificity 
Resource typology 
Uncertainty 
Asset specificity 
Technological and environmental 
uncertainty 
Resource complementarity 
Contractual alliance 
Joint Ventures 
Survey not on the 
biopharmaceutical 
industry 
 
Rosiello (2007) 
TCE  
RBV 
Asset specificity 
Resource typology 
Uncertainty 
Sunk costs 
Uncertainty 
Resource replaceability, complexity, 
non replicability and strategicity 
Standard contracts 
Collaborative agreements 
Integrated structures 
Survey on the 
biopharmaceutical 
industry 
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On the one hand, the first paper, the one by Das and Teng, analyzes the antecedents of 
risk perception, by distinguishing between factors influencing relational risk perception 
and those influencing performance risk one. Whereas, De Man and Roijakkers, 
investigate whether control and trust are used as complements or substitutes depending 
on the level and the type of risk an alliance faces. However, these papers are only 
theoretical ones and they have never received an empirical confirmation of the 
developed propositions. 
For the reasons set out above I strongly believe that there is still much to be investigated 
in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of how firms choose the governance 
form of their relationships. 
Finally, I want to point out that a more in depth analysis of the limitations of the 
available literature and, thus, of the contributions of my research is stated in the 
introductions of chapter 4 and 5, in which I explain the motivations for the presented 
researches.  
 
2.6 Research context: the bio-pharmaceutical industry 
The study of the choice of the governance of IFRs presented in this thesis, both in 
chapters 4 and 5, has been applied to a specific research context that is the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Both the theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses 
described in the two chapters have been contextualized looking at the specific 
relationship between established pharmaceutical firms and young biotech firms.  
The most important reason that leads me to this choice is that the biopharmaceutical 
industry is surely the field with the highest rate of formation of alliances, mergers and 
acquisitions, etc. For this reason it has already been taken as test-bed by several 
researchers.  
The huge and constantly growing number of inter-firm relationships between 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies is due to the fact that the advent of 
biotechnology, in the mid 1970s, has radically changed the traditional process for new 
technology research and development; this has created a need for pharmaceutical giants 
to acquire new skills from outside the companies‟ boundaries. Indeed, the emergence of 
biotechnology brought in a new framework the process of discovery and development 
of new drugs; it has established itself as the new discovery arm of the pharmaceutical 
industry, modifying the traditional, chemical-based, pharmaceutical discovery method 
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(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Thus, biotechnology has represented a competence-
destroying technology on the R&D end, because it requires technical skills, which are 
fundamentally different from those pharmaceutical companies had developed until then. 
However, differently from other industries, the effect of this radical change has not been 
disruptive for the traditional pharmaceutical firms, since biotech companies have not 
replaced incumbent firms. Indeed, despite the considerable technological advantage of 
new entrants, incumbents still owned important strategic assets in developing such new 
biopharmaceutical products (Rothaermel, 2001), and furthermore in marketing and 
distribution.  
This situation has created positive opportunities for collaborations between the new 
sources of technical expertise and the established firms (Pisano, 1990; 2006); this is the 
reason why since the mid 1970s the biopharmaceutical industry has been characterized 
by an increasing recourse to IFRs between big pharmaceutical firms and small new 
biotechnology firms (Hagedoorn, 1993; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Indeed, when 
firms have to gain access to new resources and know-how they have three main options, 
including (1) developing them internally, (2) acquiring them from outside, i.e. through 
M&A, and (3) gaining access to them, i.e through strategic alliances and partnerships 
(Hunt, 2000; Morrow et al., 2007). 
The explanation of the increasing number of IFRs in the industry is mainly related to the 
extent of strong asset complementarities between the two types of firms. On the one 
hand, a pharmaceutical firm wishing to commercialize a biotechnology-based drug 
needs to acquire the necessary competencies by developing the required R&D 
capabilities in-house or sourcing them from outside, i.e. from a biotechnology firm 
(Chiesa and Toletti, 2004). In this regard, Mittra (2007) suggests that the significant 
challenge for strategic management is to find the proper balance between in-house R&D 
and externally sourced knowledge; but he also underlines that the best combination 
between developing in-house R&D or through merger, acquisition, strategic alliance 
and licensing activities, changes from one company to another, because it reflects the 
distinct situational contexts in which the firms find themselves embedded. On the other 
hand, a biotech company that has developed a new compound or a technological 
platform and wants to bring it into the market often lacks critical functions or 
capabilities such as drug manufacturing and marketing ones. According to McCutchen 
and Swamidass (2004) biotechnology firms are, in fact, “functionally incomplete”. 
Thus, the presence of strong complementarities initially brought pharma and biotech 
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companies to cooperate instead of compete. Furthermore, pharmaceutical firms have 
been facing with some threats, such as the increase of R&D costs and the decline of 
R&D productivity (DiMasi et al., 2003; Bradfield and El-Sayed, 2009), the expiration 
of numerous patents, the old technologies exhausting and the increasing competition 
from generic pharmaceutical firms. Conversely, biotechnology firms have technological 
assets that allow to face with such threats (Danzon et al., 2007). Finally, a very 
important source of complementarities is on the financial side. Indeed, drug 
development process is long, costly and highly uncertain: it requires 10-15 years from 
research to market and costs vary from US$ 800 million (DiMasi et al., 2003; Goozner 
2004) up to US$ 1.2 billion for a biopharmaceutical drug (DiMasi and Grabowski, 
2007). Furthermore, out of 100 drug candidates, only one or two are launched into the 
market. Thus, it is easy to understand how financing is extraordinarily important for 
high-tech industries in general and for the biotech industry in particular. As stressed by 
Gopalakrishnan et al. (2008), the financial capital acquired by the smaller biotech firm 
in exchange for technological knowledge is in fact one of the main goals of the alliance 
formation process. As also highlighted by Pisano (2006), young biotech start-ups 
usually may obtain financial capital trough two different sources: Venture Capital (VC) 
financing or entering strategic deals with other firms. When the pharmaceutical 
company takes an equity position in the biotech it can be considered as well as a VC 
investment; otherwise, as in the majority of alliances, the pharma gives moneys, without 
taking an equity position, that are accounted for as debt in the biotech‟s financial 
statement (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008). In the other respect, more mature companies 
can rely on products and technologies commercialization, as well as intellectual assets 
(i.e. patents) and services sale. But, since only products commercialization ensures a 
continuous and quantitatively sufficient cash flow to finance future R&D activities, new 
biotech companies, which have never sold any product, lack enough cash flow for their 
R&D activities. Pisano (2006) highlights how despite the commercial success of 
companies such as Amgen and Genentech, most biotechnology firms earn no profit. 
Beyond the lack of financial capital of biotech firms that is absolutely essential to carry 
out their activities, biotechs use alliances also as a signalling mechanism to the market 
of their value in order to improve their market evaluation (Janney and Folta, 2003). On 
the other hand, established pharmaceutical firms have high financial resources, due to 
their blockbusters and their long presence in the market. Thus, entering into agreements 
with pharmaceutical firms represents an extremely important strategic tool for biotech 
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companies (Pisano, 2006). This is the reason why, starting from the seminal work of 
Pisano (Pisano 1990), several scholars (Folta, 1998; Steensma and Fairbank, 1999; 
Santoro and McGill, 2005; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; 
Rosiello, 2007; Dunne et al., 2009; de Man and Roijakkers, 2009; Van de Vrande et al. 
2009) have used this industry as test-bed for investigating governance forms choice in 
inter-firm relationships. Indeed, while the aforementioned complementarities provide 
reasons of why pharmaceutical and biotech companies should cooperate, questions arise 
about the governance form of such a relation (Pisano, 1990). There are various inter-
organizational modes with which firms can develop or acquire technologies, including 
R&D partnerships, technology licensing, strategic alliances, joint ventures and 
acquisitions of other firms. This is the reason for the following theoretical framework. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the theoretical background and the literature review on the first 
topic addressed in this thesis, namely the choice of the governance form of IFRs. 
Indeed, the investigation of a problem cannot be separated from the study of the main 
theories underlying that problem and of the most influential contributions of the 
literature. This preliminary study of the most adopted theoretical approaches and 
literature review, led me to the identification of the main gaps and gave me inspiration 
for new research ideas and contributions that are objects of the two empirical researches 
presented in chapter 4 and 5. 
Thus, in this chapter, I firstly present some definitions of IFRs explaining that for the 
main purpose of this study and following others authors in the field, I use the term 
„inter-firm relationship‟ to refer to a broad range of collaborations including bilateral 
licensing agreements, outsourcing agreements, bilateral contract-based alliances, equity 
investments, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and so on. I then 
provide a clear and detailed explanation of each governance form, looking with a TCE 
logic, at their level of integration, control and flexibility. 
It follows the review of the most adopted perspectives used in the alliance literature, i.e. 
Transaction Cost Economics, Resource-based View, Property Right Theory and Real 
Options Theory. This review is of fundamental importance for understanding the 
following literature analysis.  
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Hence, I present the state-of-the-art of IFRs literature with the main purpose of 
synthesizing major efforts made by past research in identifying the drivers of the choice 
of the governance form of IFRs. In order to find and make clear the existing gaps of the 
literature, I make an in-depth analysis of each of the analyzed papers, pointing out the 
theory/theories on which it is based, the identified drivers, the governance modes it 
takes into account, the paper‟s typology, namely if it is theoretical or empirical, and of 
course the main results and contributions.   
Finally, the last paragraph of this chapter introduces the research context of my studies; 
namely I explain why I choose the biopharmaceutical industry as research field and the 
main characteristics of the relationships between pharmaceutical and biotech firms.   
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Chapter 3 
THE INVESTOR-INVESTEE RELATIONSHIP IN THE VENTURE 
CAPITAL CONTEXT: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON VC CONTRACTING 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the past three decades, the venture capital industry has grown dramatically and at the 
same time it started to attract increasing attention by academic researchers. The 
literature has indeed dealt with investigating its role for the global economy and its 
forms and functions. Researchers have increasingly shown that, despite the little 
dimension of the industry in comparison to the public market, it has an extraordinary 
positive impact on the economic landscape. 
In this section of the thesis I particularly focus on the investor-investee relationship, 
namely, the relationship between Venture Capitalists (VCs) and their portfolio 
companies, with the main objective of investigating venture capital contracts design. In 
particular, this chapter presents the main characteristics of the venture capital industry 
and of the VC-entrepreneur relationship; moreover, I present a literature review on 
venture capital contracting. I should however point out immediately that venture capital 
research still suffers from the relative opaqueness of the industry. For a long time, 
empirical work largely had to rely on survey data yielding a rich picture regarding 
general market assessment, but a potentially very subjective view of specific 
investments given the reliance on self-reporting. Hence, traditional empirical literature 
suffered from two types of biases: (i) a selection bias resulting from smaller VCs 
showing a greater willingness to participate in survey studies and (ii) a reporting bias 
due to the tendency of investment managers to overstate economic performance. It is 
therefore not surprising that for several years academics have displayed a tendency to 
stick to safer ground and to focus on aspects of the venture capital cycle closely related 
to the mainstream of corporate finance research, the selection of financial instruments 
and covenants.  
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However, in the last decade, VC research has made much more progress, especially 
thanks to the growing availability of data, both in form of commercial databases, and 
thanks to initiatives taken by researchers to build dataset based on private data.  
The literature review presented in this chapter is mainly divided between theoretical and 
empirical literature on VC contracting and has the goal of evaluate how the advance of 
the theoretical research has an empirical confirmation in the practice.  
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follow: in section 3.2 I present the most 
adopted definitions of the venture capital industry along with its main characteristics; 
section 3.3 is a literature review on the investor-investee relation based on agency-
theoretic considerations. This section provides an overview of the mechanisms and 
contractual covenants used by venture capitalists in order to manage agency conflicts. 
The last section concerns conclusions.  
 
3.2 Defining the venture capital industry 
The venture capital industry lacks a precise legal or regulatory definition. However, 
definitions of venture capital usually focus on some specific characteristics. In this 
thesis I propose some definitions that I think are better resuming the main 
characteristics of the industry.  
 
According to Gompers and Lerner (2001), “venture capital is defined as independent and 
professionally managed, dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity or equity-linked 
investments in privately held, high growth companies.” 
 
Shilit (1991) states: “venture capital can be thought of as financing for privately held companies, 
generally in the form of equity and/or long term convertible debt… The venture capitalist, like 
the banker, serves as an intermediary – or conduit – between the investors… and the 
entrepreneurs.” 
 
Kunze (1990) adds: “the combination of equity participation plus the active involvement in the 
development of the company is what distinguishes venture capital from all other investment 
vehicles.” 
 
From these definitions, the reader should note how the core activity of Venture 
Capitalists (VCs), namely those who makes venture capital investments, is to invest in 
„privately held companies‟. Thus, they finance initiatives of private individuals that 
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want to become entrepreneurs. Secondly, VCs invest in „high growth companies‟; they 
usually select companies in the seed, start-up or expansion phase of their development, 
which typically operate in new technology-driven, high-growth industries. Thus, they 
cope with high levels of investment uncertainty associated with the market‟s overall 
economic viability as well as the quality of management in place. This concept is 
strictly linked to the one highlighted by Kunze (1990), i.e. the active involvement of 
VCs in the development of the venture. Indeed, venture capitalists are „active financial 
investors‟ and their role goes well beyond the mere provision of financial capital. They 
contribute expert knowledge about the respective industry, grant access to their business 
network and carry out monitoring of their investments. Finally, the willingness to make 
an „equity investment‟ (as in Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Shilit, 1991) is another 
defining characteristic; they typically provide a mix of debt (especially convertible debt) 
and equity financing.  
Finally, I want to point out that the venture capitalist (VC) is an „intermediary‟ that 
obtains money from arm‟s-length investors, such as individuals, pension funds and 
other institutional investors, and pools this money with internal resources. Hence a VC 
is not investing his own money; he sets up „funds‟ - venture capital funds – thus, a 
single venture capitalist may have several funds.  
 
3.3 Agency-theoretic considerations and literature review on the investor-investee 
relationship  
Beyond the definition of what the venture capital industry is, in this research I mainly 
focus on the relationship between the venture capital (VC) investor (the principal that 
provides funds to a venture) and the entrepreneur (the agent with a venture that needs 
financing). Similar to typical principal-agent scenarios found in the general financial 
contracting literature, the relationship between VC and entrepreneur is characterized by 
a considerable potential for agency conflicts resulting from information asymmetries 
between the two parties. 
Theoretically, an agency relationship exists between a firm‟s shareholders – the 
principal - and its managers – the agents. The owner is assumed not to be able to 
monitor the manager‟s actions. The owner does, however, observe the outcome of these 
actions, which we will take to be the firm‟s profit (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Thus, the 
principal-agent problem arises when ownership and control are separated and the self-
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interest of managers may lead them to act not in the interest of the shareholders. The 
problem is to design monitoring or incentive systems that will make managers act in the 
best interest of the shareholders. In the VC contracting case the venture capitalist that 
provides capital represents the principal and the entrepreneur is the agent.  
The relationship between VC and its portfolio companies follows a standard life cycle 
consisting of the following stages: (1) selection of target companies, (2) appraisal of 
potential investments, (3) contracting selected companies, (4) monitoring fund 
investments and (5) exiting investments. During all these stages the investor-investee 
relationship is characterized by considerable agency conflicts resulting from the extent 
of high uncertainty, information asymmetries and incentive problems between the two 
parties.  
Unique to venture capital, however, is the extent to which these asymmetries exist
1
, as 
well as the high degree of risk on both sides. Much more than other investors from 
theory, VCs invest in projects with highly uncertain outlooks, in very dynamic and 
volatile markets and in firms with a current asset value of practically zero. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs will have superior information on the firm‟s substance and prospects and 
a lot larger array of decision options regarding its future direction due to the lack of 
established business activity. Therefore, before the investment decision, in spite of the 
fact that VCs are usually specialized and have competent managers, ex-ante information 
asymmetries create a high possibility of an adverse selection problem that results in a 
„market for lemons‟ (Akerlof, 1970), where either the best projects don‟t receive the 
funding terms they deserve or they don‟t get offered to the VCs anyway. 
Consequently, early papers modelling the VC-portfolio firm relationship focused on this 
ex-ante information asymmetry and the associated potential for adverse selection. Chan 
(1983) introduces VCs as intermediaries between uninformed investors and informed 
entrepreneurs, who, through their expertise and superior industry experience, contribute 
to the diminution of uncertainty in the market, thereby reducing the prevalent danger of 
a „lemons‟ market. Amit et al. (1990) argue, however, that factors like project quality 
and the capability of the entrepreneur are unknown ex-ante for the VCs, as well. 
Therefore, they will generally tend to offer mediocre financing conditions to all 
entrepreneurs, alienating better firms to alternative forms of financing. One of the 
                                                        
1
  External monitoring by the capital market is obviously extremely limited to non-existent. Both the 
potential of the company‟s business idea and the capabilities of the founder (team) are initially 
unknown.  
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potential loopholes out of this dilemma includes a differentiating design of contracts: by 
for example accepting more severe penalties in case of malperformance, the 
entrepreneur can signal his own degree of confidence in the success of the project and 
reduces the prevalent information asymmetry between the two parties. Therefore, 
several authors studied how pre-investment screening activities of the projects may 
significantly reduce agency conflicts. Namely, VCs use pre-contracting mechanisms 
such as syndication (e.g. Manigart et al., 2006; Tykvova, 2007), in order to access to 
potentially better quality information obtained through the social networks of other VCs 
and also have potentially increased information processing capacity through the 
involvement of more and different decision makers (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). 
Syndication is particularly important for information sharing when the problem of 
information asymmetry is particularly high and an informed second opinion enhances 
the chances that the VC reaches a better decision (Lerner, 1994). 
Also after the investment decision, VCs incur risks specific to investing in 
entrepreneurial companies that result in further agency costs unique to venture capital. 
VCs and entrepreneurs have potentially diverging interests, especially stemming from 
imbalanced financing structures
2
 and the fact that the latter associate substantial non-
monetary benefits with their role in the company and with the existence of the company 
as a whole.
3
 This can motivate the entrepreneur to make decisions outside the VCs best 
interest and to engage in „window-dressing‟ activities biasing the venture‟s short-term 
performance. This creates a moral hazard problem.  
Venture capital contracts have to account for this discrepancy and have to be adapted 
with regard to the parties‟ major goals. The entrepreneur wants the possibility for 
flexible future expansion and medium- to long-term control over his company to retain 
above-mentioned benefits. The VC is first and foremost motivated monetarily. He 
aspires to the highest possible return and needs contractual downside protection. 
Furthermore, he wants an option to take control over the company in cases of 
malperformances and full control over his own exit in case the venture develops 
positively. Contracts, therefore, have to encompass a range of eventualities unique to 
                                                        
2
  For example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) argue that the decision whether or not to continue the 
company‟s operations is implicitly made by the better informed entrepreneur, whose typically option-
like payoff structure (limited loss, but high participation in potential gains) encourages him to 
overinvest and to continue projects which should rather be abandoned. 
3
  According to Bergemann and Hege (1998), also this misalignment can in turn lead to potential moral 
hazard problems, as the entrepreneur may divert funds and effort to serve his private benefits, still 
unobservable to the investor.  
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venture financing, especially regarding the venture‟s different lifecycle stages and its 
expected degree of development over time. Their efficient design can not only help to 
align the incentives of VC and entrepreneur, but may also prevent opportunistic 
behaviour on the side of the latter and value destruction of the VC‟s investment.  
The third major unique feature in the VC-entrepreneur relationship results from the 
traditional role of VCs as active investors, which goes far beyond the traditional 
principal-agent context. Considering the usually low managerial experience of 
entrepreneurs, VC effort is essential for the investment success. Younger theoretical 
models therefore developed a double moral hazard scenario
4
, in which the VC provides 
input in the form of monitoring (Lerner, 1995) and the provision of various kinds of 
managerial advice around central issues like firm strategy, financial policy, negotiation 
with suppliers or customers, leveraging connections in the industry, the establishment of 
organizational structures and the recruitment of key personnel (e.g. Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998; Hellmann and Puri, 2002).  
Analogous to these constitutive attributes in the VC-entrepreneur relationship and the 
unique forms of agency problems resulting thereof, VCs contracts have to be uniquely 
designed to efficiently address them.  
According to financial contract theory and empirical research these agency conflicts can 
be mitigated in three ways: (i) pre-investment screening that allows the investor to 
choose good projects and/or (ii) structuring financial contracts such that cash flow rights 
and control rights are aligned to allow optimal behaviour by the entrepreneur or decisive 
intervention by the principal if need be and/or (iii) post investment monitoring and 
advising (Hart, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  
Through the correct combination of these mechanisms, VCs can design incentive-
optimal investment contracts, which largely mitigate the issues identified above. The 
use of syndication, the choice of financial instruments, the allocation of cash flow and 
control rights and monitoring activities will be discussed in-depth in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
                                                        
4
  For example Schmidt (2003), who precludes that also VC commitment has a direct impact on the 
success of high-potential ventures and can also not be contractually fixed, especially because the 
necessary amount of effort is usually unknown ex-ante. Therefore it should be taken into account 
when modelling this relationship. 
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3.3.1 Syndication as a pre-contracting mechanism 
As anticipated, agency conflicts between VCs and their portfolio companies are usually 
mitigated during the contracting phase of the life cycle of the investment. However, 
agency problems can be handled also in a previous stage, namely during the pre-
investment screening of projects through the use of syndication. Indeed, VCs use 
syndication in order to mitigate ex-ante company specific-risks due to information 
asymmetry and incentive problems. In venture capital syndication, two or more VC 
firms come together to take an equity stake in an investment. Hence, “syndication 
implies the making of common decisions under condition of uncertainty that will result 
in joint-payoffs for the investors” (Wilson, 1968).  
Several authors analyzed syndication both in theory and in practice identifying the main 
rationales for syndication. Lerner (1994) was one of the first contributions to 
syndication empirical literature highlighting the rationales for syndication of venture 
capital investments basing on a sample of 271 private biotech companies. He identifies 
one rational for syndication that is linked to the advantage deriving from having more 
than one VC in the evaluation of the project before it is selected for investment, the so-
called selection hypothesis. Namely, it is a way for the lead venture capitalist to bring 
other VCs in the selection process, since two or more VCs might screen projects more 
effectively than one. He also shows that while in first round financing, established 
venture capitalists tend to syndicate with one another, in later rounds they involve less 
established venture firms. These results are consistent with the view that syndication 
allows established venture capitalists to obtain information in order to decide whether to 
invest in risky firms.  
Brander et al. (2002) add and test a new hypothesis, the value-added hypothesis, that is 
based on the idea that venture capitalists might add value to the venture in which they 
invest. Since different VCs have different skills and information, some might be useful 
in organizing production, others might contribute with a better knowledge of the market 
etc. They test whether venture capitalists are engaged primarily in selection or in 
managerial value-added. They find that syndicated investments have higher returns, 
favouring the value-added interpretation. They also discuss risk sharing and project 
scale as possible reasons for syndication. In particular, the risk sharing hypothesis was 
first suggested but not tested by Lerner (1994) and then tested by Brander et al. (2002); 
it is based on the idea that VCs undertake syndication so as to diversify their portfolios 
and reduce overall risk. Brander et al. (2002) provide some evidence on the role of risk 
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sharing and conclude that risk sharing may be present. Moreover, they suggest another 
rational, namely syndication might arise from capital constraints since a single VC 
might not have enough resources on hand to fully finance a large venture; however they 
find that such constraints are unlikely to be a major explanation for syndication.  
Also Lockett and Wright (2001) focus on explanations for the syndication of venture 
capital investments. They compare the risk sharing motivation, namely the traditional 
financial approach that views syndication as a means of portfolio diversification, and 
the resource-based perspective, that considers syndication as a response to the need to 
share/access information in the selection and management of investments. They 
empirically prove that the finance perspective provides a strong explanation of motives 
for syndication, but the resource-based view is found to be much more important for 
those firms involved in at least some early stage transactions. The major implication of 
their work is that the use of syndication strongly depends on the investment stage in 
which the VCs operate.  
Moreover, Manigart et al. (2006) analyze four main motivations to explain syndication 
in venture capital firms in Europe: risk sharing rational, access to deal flow, deal 
selection motive and monitoring skills. In contrast with U.S. findings, they show that 
overall VC portfolio management strategy is a major driver of syndication in Europe. 
Thus, European VC managers mainly consider syndication as a means to invest in 
several deals that otherwise would be too large and to obtain access to future deal flow, 
increasing portfolio diversification.    
Finally, another possible rational for syndication detected in literature is collusion, 
indeed by banding together rather than competing, venture capitalists might improve 
their position with entrepreneurs.  
However, beyond the various motivation for syndication analyzed in literature, in my 
thesis I want to emphasize the role that syndication assumes in the pre-contracting phase 
as a mechanism to mitigate ex-ante company-specific risks due to information 
asymmetry and incentive problems. This is because by syndication, VCs not only have 
access to potentially better quality information obtained through the other VCs, but they 
also have potentially increased information processing capacity through the 
involvement of more and different decision makers (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986).  
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3.3.2 Financial instruments in VC contracts  
The most extensive body of literature on venture capital contracting deals with the 
implemented financial structure and its ability to solve or mitigate incentive problems in 
the VC-entrepreneur relationship. The superiority of convertible securities, in particular 
convertible preferred equity, has been theoretically discussed and empirically proved 
among researchers worldwide. Nevertheless, empirical studies have shown a variety of 
financing instruments being applied in practice. Obviously a VC may choose between 
debt securities, equity securities and a mix of both.  
Among debt securities, straight debt financing is not very widespread in the venture 
capital context, despite its seniority over all other instruments that provide the investor 
with better downside protection. Instead, convertible debt can be observed a lot more 
often, since it has the same seniority advantage and furthermore provide the VC with 
the option of switching from a fix to a variable claim once the venture‟s prospect 
become clearer. Finally, silent partnerships represent a special form of debt financing 
where investors participate in the venture‟s profits, even if they do not hold shares in the 
company. Silent partnerships are not very common form of VC finance internationally.  
On the other hand, through equity securities the investor participates in the upside 
development of the firm and inhibits superior information and control rights. With 
common equity, VC also accepts an equal portion of the risk, which may result in a 
misallocation of effort by the founder, as he has an incentive to accumulate private 
benefits he does not have to pay for by himself. Common stocks are subordinate to any 
debt or preferred equity. Preferred equity, instead, differs from common stock mainly 
through its superior dividend, liquidation and subscription rights. On the downside, 
straight preferred stock usually has only limited upside participation. While standard 
preferred stock in listed companies often does not grant voting rights, this is very 
uncommon in venture capital finance. Convertible preferred equity additionally 
incorporates an option to convert into common equity if the venture evolves positively 
and it is the most common instrument in the industry. The conversion ratio is 
contractually agreed ex-ante, but may often be adjusted ex-post in case of diluting 
capital increases. Also automatic conversion provisions on going public or the 
fulfilment of certain milestones are common. Moreover, a special form of this security 
is called participating preferred stock, with which investors not only receive their 
contractually agreed dividend and liquidation preference, but furthermore participate 
pro rata with all other shareholders in any remaining proceeds on top.  
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In this section I summarise the main contributions of both theoretical and empirical 
literature on the financial instrument choice; it is to be noticed that the most extensive 
body of research in venture capital finance concerns optimality considerations between 
different securities combinations.  
Several instruments or instrument combinations are perceived as substitutes in most 
models. Cumming (2001) identifies three major groups of functionally equivalent 
securities: straight debt and straight preferred equity, straight common stock and 
warrants, as well as all „convertible-preferred-like‟ securities. Note that for example 
debt-equity mixes are functionally equivalent to convertibles in some of the models 
(Marx, 1998; Bergemann and Hege, 1998), while in others they are not (Berglöf, 1994; 
Cornelli and Yosha, 2002; Schmidt, 2003).  
As theoretical research over time fully adapted double moral hazard models, academics 
have more and more reached consensus on the efficiency of convertible preferred equity 
in venture finance. Reasons identified by researchers are diverse: like convertible debt, 
convertible preferred stocks can be used as a signalling instrument that forces 
entrepreneurs to indicate their confidence in the venture‟s future potential and align the 
incentives of VCs and founders by allocating cash flow rights efficiently during the 
relationship and when approaching an exit. Moreover, they underlie a favourable tax 
treatment at least in the US and are supposed to allocate control contingent on company 
success. Especially the control right explanation should be observed with care. In 
reality, VCs apparently structure convertible preferred equity in a way that voting rights 
are determined on an „as-converted basis‟, so that control tends to be the identical 
before and after conversion. Also the rationale that conversion triggers a switch between 
a fix and a variable VC claim does at least not hold for participating preferred equity, 
which is reasonably popular in practice. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that empirical results in the US leave no room for doubt that 
convertible preferred equity is the most used financing instrument in the industry, as it 
is nearly exclusively applied in VC investments (Sahlman, 1990; Trester, 1998; Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2003). On the other respect, the overall picture in other countries is 
substantially more variegated; outside US borders, VCs apparently structure their 
investments substantially different (Bascha and Walz, 2002; Cumming, 2005a; 
Cumming, 2005b; Cumming, 2008).  Some VCs thereby implement similar incentive 
mechanisms with different instruments, but many do not. For example Bascha and Walz 
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(2002) find that German VCs use much more silent partnerships, straight equity and 
debt-equity mixes than convertible preferred equity.  
By concluding, the securities choice is surely one of the most important decisions in VC 
investments; of course the combination of equity and/or debt securities determines the 
allocation of several cash flow rights that allow aligning the incentives of VCs and 
founders; in particular, convertible securities, both debt and equity, allow allocating 
cash flow rights efficiently during the relationship and also when approaching an exit. 
 
3.3.3 Cash flow rights 
Investment contracts are obviously not limited to an incentive optimal cash flow 
allocation through the use of financial instruments; additional terms and conditions 
governing the underlying contractual relationship play a very important role in 
preventing opportunistic behaviour on either sides. In this paragraph I give an overview 
of most adopted cash flow rights examining how these rights are effectively used in VC 
contracts to reduce agency problems. 
Cash flow related covenants are generally intended to secure the VC‟s purely financial 
stakes. They are applied as a downside protection for the VC to prevent a dilution or 
reduction of his investment value and as a measure to maintain control over the 
constitution and duration of his share in the portfolio firm.  
The most applied cash flow right is staged financing. It is used to restrain VCs‟ initial 
investment amount, and to not commit the entire amount all at once by making cash 
flows conditional on the achievement of specific milestones.  
Also, to manage VCs‟ financial claims after total capital infusion, conversion options 
are used to regulate the conditional type of claim; for example, they enable a swap 
between debt and equity stakes respectively between a fix high-order claim in case of 
distress and a participating claim on high returns.  
A third group of cash flow related covenants warrants the VCs‟ ability to back down 
from their investment after a certain time period (redemption rights) and alleviate VCs 
to force an exit and satisfy own cash requirements (exit rights). In particular, exit rights 
are fundamental in the venture capital cycle since they are used to solve or at least 
mitigate potential hold problems between the VC and the firm‟s founder in the case of 
exit. In parallel, they also provide protection from unwanted entrepreneur share sales at 
their cost (registration rights and co-sale agreements).  
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Last but not least, a final group of covenants, commonly known as VC safeguards, is 
intended to protect the VC‟s financial position in cases where certain events would 
otherwise potentially dilute his share and influence in the company.  
Among the above described cash flow related covenants, the staging of capital infusion 
is surely the one that received most attention by both theoretical and empirical 
literature; through staged financing the VC cannot only abandon projects falling short of 
initial expectations, but also provides clear incentives to the founder to focus his efforts. 
Such goals often include financial performance targets, but may also correspond to the 
achievement of operational milestones, like the development of a prototype, patent 
filing or market entry.  
Neher (1999) describes a hold-up problem in a multi-stage model on a fix investment 
path under perfect certainty and symmetric information, in which the entrepreneur 
provides exclusively human and the investor provides exclusively financial capital. 
Staging, in this context, alleviates the entrepreneur‟s inability to commit not 
renegotiating down the VC‟s cash flow claims after a sunk investment by threatening to 
withdraw his valuable human capital. As stages progress, the founder‟s human capital 
becomes gradually embodied in the physical capital of the venture. Since the collateral 
for the investor thereby increases, the latter should be willing to provide more money at 
the subsequent stage. While the author provides an explanation for staging, the 
assumptions of his model remain questionable, especially with regards to symmetric 
information and the certainty of the project‟s outcome given continuous provision of 
both founder effort and VC funding. 
The paper by Wang and Zhou (2004) is particularly interesting since the authors show 
that stage financing is an effective complementary mechanism to contracting in 
reducing risks and agency costs. They investigate staging of investments in an imperfect 
capital market, in which only the VC understands the entrepreneur‟s project potential 
(its profit distribution function), but faces moral hazard and uncertainty, as the project is 
risky and the entrepreneur‟s effort unverifiable. Their model point out how many 
projects that would have possibly been abandoned under an upfront financing scenario 
become profitable through staging. However, staging may also cause VCs to 
underinvest in or abandon non-promising projects too early. Similarly, Bigus (2006) 
investigates stage financing in a real option framework and concludes that it provides 
the investor with a valuable real option under external uncertainty, as he can choose to 
terminate his investment in the venture at any time.  
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The implications of theoretical studies have been confirmed by empirical research as 
well. Firstly, empiric researches demonstrate that staging is very widespread in practice, 
but more prevalent for investments with high agency costs (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003). Also, authors such as Gompers (1995) show that actually VCs decide 
to discontinue investments in portfolio firms once they learn about negative information 
regarding their future development and profit potential.  
 
3.3.4 Control rights  
Finally, VCs use control rights to secure their operational and strategic influence in the 
portfolio firm. Through a combination of instrument choice and the implementation of 
specific control-related covenants, VCs are able to allocate control independent of cash 
flow rights. Adhering to their role as active contributors beyond the mere provision of 
financial capital, they use decision and veto rights to influence both the general strategic 
direction of the venture and to enforce or block individual decisions even after the 
contract has been designed.   
Decision rights mainly relate to the constitution and consent requirements of the 
venture‟s supervisory board, namely board rights and board seats, regulations for voting 
rights, either enforcing or offsetting the “one share one vote” principle and management 
replacement clauses. Veto rights concern instead a number of important strategic, 
financial or operative decisions, such as veto on changes to shareholder‟s agreement, 
asset sales, sales of shares, capital structure, business plan, etc.   
VCs contribute their own resources and experience to the development of the firm and 
thereby protect their investment in case of potentially conflicts with the founder. Also 
the distribution of control rights is frequently made contingent on measures of the 
venture‟s financial or non-financial performance.  
The theoretical literature mainly investigate the efficiency of a separation between 
control and cash flow rights in designing VC contracts, in order to mitigate agency 
conflicts arising from imperfect ex-ante contracting. The allocation is generally 
designed to provide optimal performance incentives for both parties involved and to 
eventually protect the value of the VC‟s investment.  
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) predict a shift of control 
to the investor in bad states and both papers emphasize the role of the capital structure 
in achieving these control shifts. Hellmann (1998) offers a more explicit explanation of 
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why entrepreneurs voluntarily relinquish control by allowing VCs to negotiate 
comprehensive control rights beyond instrument choice. Specifically, his model 
examines the right to appoint the CEO, which might obviously result in the replacement 
of the founder. According to the model, entrepreneurs will be more willing to relinquish 
control the smaller their own equity stake, the higher their wealth constraint and the 
higher the expected quality of external management. Kirilenko (2001) analyzes cash 
flow and control right dynamics comprehensively and explains why the share of control 
should be allocated independently and why most VCs‟ control rights exceed their equity 
share. The entrepreneur does not disclose the value of his private benefit of control and 
other non-contractible aspects of running the venture, which leads to an adverse 
selection problem. In equilibrium, VC‟s control rights disproportionately increase with 
higher adverse selection problems. The risk-averse entrepreneur (as opposed to a risk-
neutral investor) is compensated with better financing conditions and a lower risk share. 
Dessein (2005) differentiates between formal control and actual interference. His 
fundamental assumption implies that the entrepreneur is not necessarily worried about 
the allocation of formal control rights, but derives his private benefits from having real 
control over the direction of his firm and individual strategic decisions. He points out 
that giving up control functions as a signalling mechanism of the entrepreneur 
confidence on the venture‟s success.  
Moreover, several papers investigate control rights dynamics empirically. Lerner (1995) 
identifies indications confirming that VCs attain more control in portfolio firms with 
low performance; specifically he finds that VC‟s board involvement increases 
significantly after CEO replacements, which generally indicate a crisis. Gompers (1997) 
shows that VCs implement covenants to allocate control independent from cash flow 
rights. The use of these control covenants in his sample increases with the amount of 
agency costs, as it is higher for early stage and R&D-intensive portfolio firms. 
Both authors‟ findings are roughly consistent with Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), who 
investigate the issue in much more detail. In essence, they confirm that VCs manage to 
allocate control rights and cash flow rights independently and that control is commonly 
contingent on the development of the venture. In the case of bad performance, control 
gradually shifts to the investor. Moreover, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) also confirm 
that investor control correlates with agency costs. Investor voting majority was found to 
be more common in pre-revenue firms than in post-revenue ones. 
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Bienz and Walz (2006) examine the structure and evolution of decision and control 
rights and they document that VCs adjust the structure of control rights throughout the 
relationship with their portfolio firms, even though the overall level of control rights 
remained the same.  
Summarizing, theoretical and empirical literature affirms the efficiency of a separation 
of control and cash flow rights accomplished by combining financial instruments with 
covenants. Also the allocation of control rights, designed to provide optimal 
performance incentives for both parties involved, is generally contingent on observable 
measures of venture performance.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the theoretical background and the literature review on the second 
topic addressed in this thesis, namely contract design in venture capital investments. 
Indeed, the analysis of the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has been of 
fundamental importance in order to understand the state-of-the-art of VC contracting 
and which are the main gaps in this literature stream. This preliminary study led me to 
the identification of new interesting research ideas and contributions that are object of 
the empirical research on VC contracting presented in chapter 6. 
Thus, at the beginning of this chapter, I introduce some definitions of „venture capital 
investment‟, underling its peculiarities: they are investments in privately held 
companies, with high growth rates, made by active financial investors that not only 
provide capital, but also support the development of the venture with their knowledge 
and expertise.  
Afterwards, I present the main object of my research, that is the analysis of the 
relationship between the venture capital (VC) investor (the principal that provides funds 
to a venture) and the entrepreneur (the agent with a venture that needs financing).  
In this part I point out how all these stages of the investor-investee relationship are 
characterized by considerable agency conflicts resulting from the extent of high 
uncertainty, information asymmetries and incentive problems between the two parties. 
Then, through the analysis of financial contract theory and of the existing literature I 
highlight that these agency conflicts can be mitigated in three ways: (i) pre-investment 
screening that allows the investor to choose good projects and/or (ii) structuring 
financial contracts such that cash flow rights and control rights are aligned to allow 
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optimal behaviour by the entrepreneur or decisive intervention by the principal if need 
be and/or (iii) post investment monitoring and advising.  
Hence, it follows a review of the most important contributions on the use of syndicated 
investments, on the choice of the financial instruments and on the allocation of cash 
flow and control rights in venture capital contracting practices.  
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Chapter 4 
DRIVERS INFLUENCING THE GOVERNANCE FORM CHOICE 
IN IFRs: A SURVEY IN THE ITALIAN BIO-PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a research work that aims at identifying factors affecting decision 
making on the governance mode of inter-firm relationships in the biopharmaceutical 
industry. The theoretical framework here presented is then tested through an empirical 
analysis based on a survey carried out in the Italian context, between firms associated to 
Farmindustria.  
The literature review on the drivers influencing the choice of the governance form of 
IFRs, discussed in section 2.4, reveals several interesting findings and at the some time 
points out some gaps. The reader can notice from the analysis of Table 1 how the main 
drivers studied in previous research are referable to the four theoretical perspectives 
described in Chapter 2, namely Transaction Costs Economy, Property-right Theory, 
Resource-based View and Real Option theory. These drivers are: asset specificity 
(TCE), uncertainty (TCE, RO), appropriation concern and resources‟ typology (TCE, 
PRT, RBV) and trust (TCE).  
Since all the mentioned papers considered just one or two theoretical strands, it comes 
how there is not an empirical work in the literature analysing the impact of all the above 
drivers on the selection of the governance form. This is, in my opinion, an important 
limitation in the available literature; indeed, as also stressed by recent literature on 
IFRs‟ governance structure (Leiblein, 2003; Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Patelli, 2009; 
Foss and Roemer, 2010), I strongly believe that the lack of empirical studies that 
integrate findings coming from different theoretical approaches is unfortunate for 
several reasons. First, the importance of common concepts, such as uncertainty and 
appropriation concern, suggests that important connections exist that may enhance our 
understanding of organizational governance. Also, some recent research has 
demonstrated that the failure to integrate theories of organizational governance choice 
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may lead to misleading empirical findings (Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, 2002). Thus, 
the clear separation between these theories, namely the fact that past research focused 
on just one or two theoretical strands at the same time, is in my opinion, a limitation in 
the available literature that I would like to overcome. Therefore, the first contribution of 
the present research is to develop a framework combining all the aforementioned 
drivers, contributions and theoretical perspectives coming from all past research efforts.  
Second, it should be noticed how all the reviewed researches formulate their theoretical 
frameworks (hypotheses sets) on the main drivers and afterwards they operationalize 
them; while this approach is aimed at developing a general framework, it lacks in 
capturing the specificity of a given industry. Such a problem is quite evident with the 
driver uncertainty; indeed, although the relationship between uncertainty and firm‟s 
governance decisions is stressed in much of the existing literature, empirical studies 
often found contradictory results. Depending on the typology of uncertainty considered, 
i.e. behavioural uncertainty, technological uncertainty or demand uncertainty, 
researchers have demonstrated positive/negative relationship between uncertainty and 
integrated solutions. These contradictions may be due to the different sources of 
uncertainty considered and also to the variety of measures employed by researchers 
(Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). On the contrary, the goal of this research is to formulate 
hypotheses directly on operationalized drivers, distinguishing for example between 
factors influencing relational uncertainty rather than technological uncertainty; in this 
way I‟m also able to gather factors that are very specific of the biopharmaceutical 
industry. Of course in this way I obtain a less general framework, but very focalised and 
consistent with the industry and more useful from a managerial point of view.  
Third, in the present research I introduce a new driver that is very specific of this 
industry, i.e. the level of “functional completeness” that has never been studied in 
previous research. Below I‟ll highlight the importance of this driver, especially in 
industrial context here investigated.  
Finally, the last contribution of the present research is that I analyse a dual perspective 
problem deriving from the extent of conflicting objectives and a bargaining power 
problem between biotech and pharmaceutical companies, an issue often neglected in 
literature.  
This chapter is organized as follow: in the next paragraph 4.2, I introduce the context of 
my research, i.e. the bio-pharmaceutical industry and I explain why I choose this 
industry as the field of my analysis. Then, in paragraph 4.3 I present the theoretical 
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framework consisting of a set of seven hypotheses; afterward, in paragraph 4.4 I present 
the empirical analysis concerning a survey I conducted within the Italian bio-
pharmaceutical industry and the results obtained. Finally in paragraph 4.5 I present 
discussion and conclusions.  
 
4.2 Theoretical framework developing: first set of hypotheses 
Before starting the description of the theoretical framework, it is noteworthy to clarify 
the object of this study. I concentrate my research on one single relationship between a 
pharmaceutical/biopharmaceutical and a pure biotech firm. Namely, I focus on a 
specific transaction of assets, as unit of analysis, that is the transaction of a biotech-
based compound or technology under development or already developed, that comes 
from the biotech company‟s research. In fact, the focal point of this study is on how 
established pharmaceutical firms are approaching to the new technology; thus, 
depending on the governance form selected to manage the transaction, they can: (i) get 
the licence of a product already developed (licensing agreements), (ii) share resources 
and efforts in order to jointly develop the compound (R&D alliances), (iii) create a new 
legal entity that assumes the ownership of the asset (JVs) or (iv) acquire the biotech 
firm in order to internalize the transaction and obtain the rights of all the products and 
assets of the acquired firm (M&As).  
Thus, the hereafter I consider the following governance forms: (i) unilateral contract-
based alliances, that in the bio-pharmaceutical industry, are mainly licensing 
agreements, through which the pharmaceutical firm seeks to acquire a technology 
developed by the biotech company through a legal contract, in order to gain the right to 
use that technology in exchange for royalty payments; (ii) bilateral contract-based 
alliances, such as non-equity R&D alliances, usually used to jointly research and 
develop a new compound; (iii) equity alliances and joint ventures, in which both the 
pharmaceutical and the biotech firms share resources and efforts for a common goal and 
finally, (iv) mergers and acquisitions. 
The theoretical framework here proposed is based on the literature review discussed in 
chapter 2. Indeed, the analysis of past researches leads me to detect five main drivers 
that influence the governance of IFRs: asset specificity, uncertainty, appropriation 
concern, resource typology and trust. Starting from these main drivers I identify some 
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operationalized measures that are specific of the biopharmaceutical industry, on which I 
formulate our hypotheses.  
 
4.2.1 Investment specificity 
As highlighted in the literature review, David and Han (2004) provide strong empirical 
support on how asset specificity increases transaction costs and creates a greater 
opportunism risk. In this case, TCE suggests internalizing the transaction in order to 
reduce these costs. In other respect, in order to protect strategic assets arising from 
inter-firm specific investments, also PRT suggests gaining the property of these assets.  
The above considerations lead me to the first driver significantly influencing the 
relationship, i.e. the presence of transaction-specific investment (d1); thus, I formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): If the level of transaction-specific investment (d1) is high, the 
pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance form. 
 
4.2.2. Uncertainty 
The presence of uncertainty, coming from both performance and relational risk, is a 
crucial factor in IFRs governance choice (Lo Nigro and Abbate, 2011). Specifically in 
R&D inter-firm relationships, it is quite acknowledged how the “technological 
newness” is one of the most important fonts of uncertainty (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
Moreover, as highlighted by Pisano (2006), in biotechnology R&D the levels of risk 
and uncertainty go well beyond what is entailed in normal R&D. Also, the emergence 
of biotechnology is considered a radical process innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry (Stuart et al., 1999), since the activities of chemical synthesis deployed by 
traditional incumbents are becoming quite obsolete within the new biotechnology 
paradigm. So, beyond the classical distinction between incremental innovation (drug 
enhancement) and radical innovation (new drug development) (Cardinal, 2001), the 
depth of innovation in this industry can be associated to the extent to which the new 
process paradigm, the biotech one, is used to enhance former pharmaceutical products, 
or even to develop new classes of drugs. Of course, the “technological distance”, i.e. the 
dissimilarities between the knowledge bases of the partners, contributes to the depth of 
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innovation; indeed, a pharmaceutical company that has no knowledge or experience in 
the biotechnology process, „feels‟ a higher technological distance, and therefore, a more 
radical innovation. However, while this last issue concerns the relational uncertainty, 
the former being more technical, impacts on the performance one.  
 Thus, the depth of innovation (d2) is an important driver that must be taken into 
account in order to cope with uncertainty. In this case, RO literature suggests that 
investment affected by such exogenous uncertainty might be considered as the creation 
of an option, which might be exercised at a later point in time using a more integrated 
solution; these investments should preserve their intrinsic nature of options. This means 
that, when the partner‟s technology is quite novel, the pharmaceutical firm will be more 
likely to pursue market agreements, such as non-equity alliances, in order to remain 
flexible and to reduce the failure risk maintaining the intrinsic options (Vanhaverbeke, 
et al., 2002). Pisano (1990) also suggests the use of less integrated governance forms 
under conditions of technological newness. From an RBV perspective, the deeper the 
innovation, the more the resources involved are very specific of the firm, more 
property-based (for instance patents, human resources) and less transferable; this 
occurrence increases the relational risk, since it is quite difficult to evaluate both the 
strategic value and degree of transferability of such a resource. Hence, the investing 
firm can address the high relational uncertainty surrounding new technologies through 
small initial investments, so called “learning investments” (Janney and Dess, 2004), 
which are specific of market-oriented governance forms.  
Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): If the level of depth of innovation (d2) is high, the pharmaceutical 
company will prefer a more market-oriented governance form. 
 
Another interesting driver of the technological uncertainty in biopharmaceutical 
industry is the development stage of the product/technology (d3) object of the deal. 
Indeed, failure risk is greater in the very early phases of the R&D process. The drug 
development process is composed by four macro phases prior to commercialization: the 
drug discovery phase, the preclinical development, the clinical trials (composed by three 
stages, i.e. phase I, phase II and phase III) and the approval phase. Each of these steps is 
complex and uncertain, so that the more advanced the development stage, the more 
likely the drug succeeds in reaching the market; it should be considered that even when 
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a drug has completed phase II-A of clinical studies, the expected probability of success 
does not even reach the 50 percent (DiMasi, 2001). Thus, since in early stages 
performance risk is high, while the relational one is quite low, according to RO, the 
investing firm prefers alliances to acquisitions (Lambe and Spekman, 1997). Also 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) suggest that pharmaceutical firms seeking early stage 
research may best accomplish their goal using strategic alliances. However, as projects 
move further along the development process, pharmaceutical firms give up more rights 
if they try to access those products via an alliance. Therefore, according to PRT, it may 
be more beneficial for firms to make an acquisition, in order to acquire all of the 
products rights and avoid any potential costly hold-up issues (Klein and Murphy, 1997). 
So, moving along the development stage technical uncertainty (performance risk) 
decreases and appropriation concern, due to the relational risk, increases. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): If the development of the product/technology (d3) is at a late stage, 
the pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.  
 
The reader should note that the biotech firm‟s perspective regarding d3 is instead 
opposite. Indeed, the amount invested till the agreement date to carry out a compound 
development up to a late stage will induce the biotech to put up greater resistance to an 
acquisition; indeed, if the biotech has been able to carry out the compound up to a late 
stage, it will try to complete last stages by its own in order to maintain all the compound 
rights. 
Another issue often affecting uncertainty in technology agreements is the “technological 
distance” (According to Van de Vrande et al., 2009). In fact, in this case, it might be 
difficult for the investing firm to recognize and absorb its partner‟s technological 
capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Specifically, “technological distance”, in bio-
pharma R&D relationships, may occur in two main cases: (i) when the two firms are not 
specialized in the same therapeutic areas and (ii) when the pharmaceutical firm has 
never developed biotechnology in-house. It is here noteworthy to mention that a 
pharmaceutical firm can be catalogued as a “biopharmaceutical” company or as a 
“pure” one, depending on whether the firm has developed in-house biotech 
competencies.  
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Therefore, I detect other two fundamental drivers in the governance form choice: the 
overlapping of therapeutic areas (d4) and the integration of the pharma in the biotech 
field (d5). Both drivers are signs of similarities or dissimilarities between the knowledge 
base of the two partners. Large dissimilarities lead to two types of problems. The first 
one concerns the „absorptive capacity‟ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), indeed, the 
pharmaceutical firm has a limited internal scientific capability firstly to sort out which 
projects are attractive and which are „lemons‟ (Pisano, 2006), and secondly to assimilate 
and integrate the new technology. In this case, Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest a more 
integrated governance form in order to facilitate the effective transfer of distant 
knowledge. Second, a large technological distance between partners may also lead to 
relational uncertainty and opportunistic behaviours due to information asymmetry. So, 
according to TCE higher level of integration becomes a more attractive alternative. 
These argumentations bring me to the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): If the partners are not specialized in the same therapeutic areas 
(d4), the pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.  
 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): If the pharmaceutical firm is not integrated in the biotech field 
(d5), it will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.  
 
On the other hand, other researchers, such as Pisano (1990), observe how a firm that is 
not yet familiar with the technological know-how of its partner will have first to learn 
from the partner through an arm‟s length transaction before being able to accumulate 
knowledge. Indeed, Pisano (1990) argues that a firm‟s ability to internalize new projects 
may depend on the number of its previous in-house projects in the relevant technology. 
This reasoning is consistent with the concept of “dynamic capability” in the RBV 
theoretical stream (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). As matter of fact, dynamic learning 
capabilities have been observed in the biopharmaceutical industry in contexts such as 
product development (Deeds et al., 1999), project development (Pisano, 2000) and 
international diffusion of technology (Madhok and Osegowitsch, 2000). Therefore, if a 
pharmaceutical company is integrated in the biotech field or, alternatively, is specialized 
in the same therapeutic area of its biotech partner, it has already developed internal 
knowledge-based resources in the field and therefore it will prefer a more hierarchical 
governance form, because learning occurs most efficiently inside the organization rather 
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than across organizational boundaries. On the contrary it will prefer a market 
transaction. Therefore, I hypothesize two alternatives to H4a and H5a: 
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): If the partners are specialized in the same therapeutic areas 
(d4), the pharmaceutical firm will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.  
 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): If the pharmaceutical firm is integrated in the biotech field (d5), 
it will prefer a more hierarchical governance model.  
 
4.2.3 Trust 
Several scholars highlight the importance of characteristics such as trust, reputation, 
commitment, cooperation and communication for the success of IFRs (Gulati 1995; 
Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer 2000). Delerue (2004) finds that relational risk perception is 
mitigated by trust in biopharmaceutical relations. Indeed, trust and reputation establish 
norms and expectations about appropriate behaviour, lowering the perception of 
opportunism risk. The existence of previous relations (d6) between the partners is 
generally assumed as a measure of trust in a relationship, because it allows better 
evaluating partner‟s resources, capabilities and reliability (Gulati, 1995). Thus, the 
number of previous ties influences the choice of the governance in the subsequent 
relation modifying the assessments of transaction costs associated with a specific 
alliance and limiting the fears of opportunistic behaviour. 
Authors such as Gulati (1995) and Parkhe (1993a) suggest that trust can be a substitute 
for hierarchical contracts in many exchanges and serves as an extra-contractual control 
mechanism. Therefore, the familiarity established among partners mitigates the hold-up 
risk and leads to market-oriented models. Gulati (1995) finds empirical evidence 
supporting this view. Also Ring and Van der Ven (1994) show that trust is an essential 
condition for market transactions. Santoro and McGill (2005) find that the lack of 
previous relationships, increasing the partner uncertainty, leads to more hierarchical 
governances in biopharmaceutical IFRs. Finally, trust improves the absorptive capacity 
of the partners in a relationship, reducing also the performance risk. Therefore, I posit: 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The existence of previous relations (d6) between partners will be 
positively related to a more market-oriented governance form. 
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4.2.4 Functional completeness  
Finally, beyond the drivers already analyzed in literature, I consider a new one that is 
very specific of this industry, i.e. the level of functional completeness of a firm. I refer 
to the ability of the biotechnology firm to bring products into the market, thus I 
operationalize it by the number of commercialized products (d7). This is a measure of 
the biotech‟s expertise to complete its value chain by bringing its products to the 
market, obtaining in this way cash to finance its research activity. Surely, a company 
that has already marketed products is more attractive for a possible acquisition. Indeed, 
first, the pharmaceutical company can easily evaluate the economic value of its partner, 
and secondly, by an acquisition it inherits the control of the marketed biotech products. 
In this case, being the performance risk very low, the pharmaceutical firm will try to 
minimize the relational risk, and therefore the appropriation concern, by acquiring the 
partner. This reasoning leads me to formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): The higher the number of commercialized products (d7) by the 
biotech firm, the more the pharmaceutical company will prefer a more hierarchical 
governance form. 
 
I underline, however, that the biotech company point of view is very different. Indeed, 
the higher the number of commercialized products, the more the company is 
functionally complete and able to finance new R&D projects individually. Thus, the 
biotech firm will avoid to be acquired once it has already supported costs and risks of 
products development and commercialization by his own. Therefore, due to the opposite 
objectives of the parties, the governance mode, in this case, will also depend on who has 
the greater bargaining power. 
A synthesis of the theoretical framework discussed above is reported in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Synthesis of the theoretical framework 
Operationalized driver Main driver 
Theories supporting the 
hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Empirical 
support 
d1: Transaction-specific investment Asset specificity 
TCE 
PRT 
H1 NO 
d2: Depth of innovation 
Uncertainty 
Resource typology 
RO  
RBV  
H2  NO 
d3: Development stage of the 
product/technology 
Uncertainty 
Appropriation concern 
RO 
PRT 
H3 YES 
d4: Therapeutic areas 
Uncertainty 
TCE 
Absorptive capacity 
H4a  NO 
Resource typology  RBV H4b NO 
d5: Integration of the pharma in the 
biotech field 
Uncertainty 
TCE 
Absorptive capacity 
H5a  NO 
Resource typology RBV H5b  NO 
d6: Previous relations Trust 
TCE 
Absorptive capacity 
H6  YES 
d7: Number of commercialized 
products 
Functional completeness 
Appropriation concern 
TCE 
PRT 
H7 YES 
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4.3 Empirical analyses: a survey in the Italian bio-pharmaceutical industry 
4.3.1 Research setting  
To test the above hypotheses set, I analysed the Italian biopharmaceutical sector through a 
survey that was conducted in collaboration with Farmindustria (the Italian Association of 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology companies). Farmindustria aggregates approximately 
204 companies, (biotechs, biopharmaceuticals and pure pharmaceuticals), most of which 
are Italians. Out of these 204 firms, 18 are pure biotech companies; these companies were 
not included in the survey because they were too few and, principally, because, in all those 
cases in which we expect conflicting outcomes, our hypotheses are formulated by 
expressing the biopharmaceutical company perspective. Finally, a substantial part of the 
contacted firms that are either foreign subsidiaries of big pharmas, having only sales 
departments in Italy, or small Italian biopharmaceutical companies, explained us they could 
not answer to our questionnaire because they do not make any strategic decisions about bio-
pharmaceutical agreements. Therefore, the eligible sample for our survey was reduced to 52 
companies. 
 
4.3.2 Data collection and sample 
Data collection was based on a survey that was conducted using a questionnaire that, with 
the support of Farmindustria, was pre-tested on two sample companies. Subsequently, the 
questionnaire was illustrated to a representative of each company by a phone call interview. 
Finally, each company representative returned us the completed questionnaire by e-mail. 
The duration of the investigation was of about 3 months. We received a total of 40 
questionnaires out of 52, from pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies. The 75% 
of the respondents are big Italian companies with more than 250 employees and annual 
turnover exciding 50 million of Euro. Despite the rather small size of the sample, it must be 
kept in mind that our sample represents nearly 20% of the total population (204 firms) and 
the 77% of the eligible population (52 firms). Moreover, the respondents account for the 
35% of the whole turnover of the industry and, by considering that 50% of the whole 
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turnover is due to Italian subsidiary of foreign firms only selling products in Italy, one 
recognises how our sample is representative of the Italian biopharmaceutical industry. 
From the respondents we collected data on 51 bio-pharmaceutical IFRs divided into 11 
licensing agreements, 16 non-equity R&D alliances, 4 joint ventures and 20 mergers or 
acquisitions. Finally, since a certain number of companies in the sample failed to respond 
we controlled for a non-response bias. Comparing the respondents with the non-
respondents on company sales volume and number of employees, and comparing the early 
and late respondents on the model variables, the t-tests showed no significant differences, 
suggesting that the response bias is not a significant problem in this study. 
 
4.3.3 Variables and measures 
4.3.3.1 Dependent variable 
I model the variable Governance Form, G, as a three levels nominal variable taking values 
of: „0‟ for licensing agreements, „1‟ for non-equity R&D alliances and „2‟ for joint-ventures 
and M&As. The reason of such a modelling choice is straightforward. As explained in 
chapter 2, I consider licensing agreements as a unilateral contract-based alliance that is the 
governance form closest to a pure market transaction through which the pharmaceutical 
firm seeks to gain the right to use the technology developed by the biotech company. On 
the other hand, I consider JVs and M&As as the closest to hierarchical structures, because 
of the increasing level of vertical integration. In particular in my analysis, I grouped JVs 
and M&As together because the number of JVs in our data is quite irrelevant, just four, in 
comparison with M&As. Finally, R&D bilateral contractual alliances lie in the middle 
between market and hierarchy. The reader should notice how almost every scholar 
reviewed in the literature review have adopted a quite similar modelling of the governance 
form variable addressing the same motivations of above.  
4.3.3.2 Independent variables 
The scale used for each independent variable derives from a specific question addressed in 
the questionnaire. Depending on the possible answers, the independent variables are of 
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three main types: two are based on a five-point Likert scale of importance, four are binary 
and one is a six-level ordered variable.  
The five-point Likert scale variables result from an assessment of the respondent about the 
importance of the driver for the specific agreement; thus, the value „1‟ means not important 
at all, „2‟ unimportant, „3‟ of medium importance, „4‟ important enough and „5‟ very 
important. These variables are:  
 
 Transaction-specific investment (d1); the variable expresses how much the 
respondent believes that transaction investments are idiosyncratic.  
 Depth of innovation (d2); the variable expresses how much the respondent believes 
that the object of the agreement (product or technology) is a deep innovation. As 
already discussed, the higher the extent of biotechnology process in the object of the 
agreement, the deeper has been considered the innovation. Moreover, deep 
innovations have been considered also in consideration of the “technological 
distance”. Thus, respondents have autonomously expressed their evaluation on 
innovation depth once the interviewer has clarified the above concepts.  
 
The following variables are dummy: 
 Therapeutic area (d4); the variable concerns the overlapping of the therapeutic 
areas between the two firms. It takes value „0‟ if the agreement concerns a 
therapeutic area where the pharmaceutical company is already specialized, „1‟ 
otherwise. 
 Integration of the pharma in the biotech field (d5); the variable expresses the degree 
of integration of the pharmaceutical company in the biotech field. Thus, it assumes 
value „0‟ if the pharma is a biopharmaceutical firm, „1‟ if it is a pure pharma.  
 Previous relations (d6); the variable considers if the two firms have already had 
relationships in the past. Thus, it takes value „0‟ if the two companies have never 
entered into any agreement in the past, „1‟ if they have already signed at least one 
agreement (of any type).   
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 Number of commercialized products (d7); the variable considers if the biotech 
company have commercialized products. Hence, it assumes value „0‟ if the biotech 
has never marketed any product in the past, „1‟ otherwise. 
 
Finally, the last variable is an ordinal one: 
 Development stage of the product/technology (d3): the variable analizes the 
development stage of the product/technology object of the agreement. It takes value 
„1‟, if the product/technology is in the discovery phase or preclinical development; 
„2‟, if in phase I of clinical trials; „3‟, if in phase II; „4‟, if in phase III; „5‟, if in 
approval stage and 6, if already approved or commercialized.  
 
As previously described, our sample is fairly homogeneous in terms of firms‟ size, 
typology and decision structure, so that no control variables were needed for our model. 
 
4.3.4 Results 
In order to analyse data I first conducted a descriptive statistic and a correlation analysis 
(see Table 3). Only two variables (d4 and d6) are slightly, but significantly correlated; 
therefore, we decided not to exclude any variable from the regression analysis. The 
descriptive statistic reveals a first important result concerning the transaction-specific 
investment (d1): a mean of 4.47 over a maximum of 5 indicates that no matter the 
governance form adopted, companies believe that investments are always highly 
idiosyncratic. So I do not expect significant results for this variable that, nevertheless, has 
been considered in the model.  
Then, I conducted a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the independent variables in 
order to understand if they could be reduced in a smaller number of underlying latent 
dimensions. By using a factor loading analysis based on the correlation matrix and by 
applying the varimax rotation method, we found that variables d4 and d5 have high loading 
factors in the fourth component (respectively 0.70 and 0.60). This result suggests me that 
variable d5 can be omitted by the regression analysis.  
62 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  Independent variables Mean S.D Min Max d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
d1 Transaction-specific investment 4.47 1.06 1 5             
d2 Depth of innovation 3.58 1.52 1 5 0.069           
d3 Development stage of the product 3.52 1.97 1 6 0.221 -0.130         
d4 Therapeutic area 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.223 0.038 -0.032       
d5 Integration in the biotech field 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.100 -0.177 -0.011 0.056     
d6 Previous relations 0.27 0.44 0 1 -0.143 -0.093 0.013 -0.362
**
 -0.178   
d7 N° of commercialized products 0.29 0.45 0 1 -0.166 -0.165 0.045 0.064 -0.026 0.085 
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As concern as the regression analysis, since the dependent variable is modelled as a three 
levels nominal one, I have used a multinomial logistic regression. Indeed, it allows the 
simultaneous estimation of parameters when there are more than two categories in the 
dependent variable. Thus I evaluate, as a pair comparison, the choice of each governance 
form in comparison to the base outcome, that is assumed to be G = 2, that is JVs and 
M&As
5
. The general specification of the multinomial logistic regression here applied is: 
 
Ln(Pj/Po) = A + BjXj 
 
Where Pj is the probability of an event taking place for the jth case. In this analysis the two 
possible events are: j=0 for a licensing agreement and j=1 for a R&D alliance. Po is the 
probability of the default condition, namely a JV or a M&A. Xj is the vector of the 
independent variables. Results of the regression analysis are organised in Table 4.  
As the reader can notice, results for variable d3, the development stage of the product, and 
d6, the existence of previous relations, are confirmed just at level g = 1. In particular, the 
negative coefficient for d3 (-3.071) confirms that, as hypothesised in H3, hierarchy-oriented 
governance forms, such as JVs and M&As, are more likely than non-equity alliances when 
d3 assumes high values; the same cannot be confirmed for lower values of G, i.e. G = 0. 
Also the positive coefficient for d6 (5.717) confirms, as hypothesised in H6, how the 
existence of previous relations makes non-equity alliances more likely than JVs or M&As; 
the same cannot be confirmed for licensing agreements (G = 0). 
Finally, result for d7 are confirmed, as in the hypothesis H7, even if not as expected when 
moving along the governance forms continuum; indeed, the negative value of the 
coefficient for G = 1 (-9.596) confirms that higher values of d7 are more likely associated 
with JVs or M&As, when compared with non-equity alliances; however, the increasing 
negative level of the coefficient for G = 0 (-2.739), while confirms that higher values of d7 
are more likely associated with JVs or M&As than with licensing agreements, does not 
confirm that these last governance forms are less likely than non-equity alliances. 
 
 
                                                        
5
 Note that the choice of baseline category is irrelevant for the overall estimation of the model and can be set 
according to the authors preferences. 
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Table 4. Multinomial regression analysis results 
 
G  Coef Std. Error Wald p-value  
0 Intercept 2.016 2.868 0.494 0.482  
d1 Transaction-specific investment -0.254 0.509 0.250 0.617  
d2 Depth of innovation -0.209 0.341 0.376 0.540  
d3 Development stage  -0.050 0.311 0.026 0.872  
d4 Therapeutic area -0.737 1.051 0.492 0.483  
d6 Previous relations 1.368 1.050 1.697 0.193  
d7 N° of commercialized products -2.739 1.270 4.655 0.031 
**
 
1 Intercept 11.914 5.563 4.587 0.032 
**
 
d1 Transaction-specific investment -0.415 0.602 0.476 0.490  
d2 Depth of innovation -0.908 0.737 1.518 0.218  
d3 Development stage -3.071 1.199 6.555 0.010 
**
 
d4 Therapeutic area 1.178 1.892 0.387 0.534  
d6 Previous relations 5.717 3.019 3.587 0.058 
*
 
d7 N° of commercialized products -9.596 3.965 5.857 0.016 
**
 
*
 p < 0.1; 
**
 p < 0.05; 
***
 p < 0.005.  
 
The reference category is: 2 
 
The reference category is 2 
 
McFadden ps udo R-square: 0.543; Cox and Snell pseudo R-square: 0.682 
; 
 
Log likelihood: −47.747; Chi-Square: 58.488 (p<0.01) 
 
 
 
 
Thus, in this case, I find a sort of U-shaped behaviour when moving along the governance 
forms continuum.  
 
4.4 Discussion  
This research aims at identifying factors affecting decision making on the governance mode 
of IFRs in the Italian biopharmaceutical industry. Main findings of this study are that the 
development stage of the product/technology (d3) object of the agreement, the existence of 
previous relations (d6) between the partners and the number of commercialized products 
(d7) by the biotech firm actually influence such decision.  
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As far as d3, the empirical evidence highlights that when the object of the collaborative 
agreement is a late-stage product the pharmaceutical company prefers a hierarchical 
governance form (JV or M&A). This result supports the RO and PRT view of the relation 
between technological uncertainty and governance form; indeed, through an integrated 
governance, the pharmaceutical firm can acquire the product‟s rights and avoid any 
potential costly hold-up issues. Also, this result confirms the prevalence of the 
pharmaceutical company point of view, since, as I have already stressed, the biotech 
company will have an opposite view regarding this driver. It is also quite interesting to 
notice how Santoro and McGill (2005) find an opposite result for this driver that, in the 
authors‟ view, is supportive of TCE considerations; they find that alliances in early stages 
rely on more hierarchical governance. In my opinion, this difference might be due to the 
distinct characteristics of firms in the two data sets; indeed, Santoro and McGill (2005) use 
data on US and non-US public biotech and pharma firms and surely biotech companies in 
their sample have greater bargaining power than the Italian ones, pushing the agreement 
towards a more contractual one in case of late stage products. On the contrary, Italian 
biotech companies are for the most part very small and they are not able to put up 
resistance to the excessive power of pharmaceutical companies; moreover, the limited 
development of the venture capital industry in Italy compared to the other countries 
strengthens these differences.  
Then, as far as the result for the existence of previous relations (d6), it is quite expected 
and it confirms the view that trust can be a substitute for hierarchical contracts, as in Gulati 
(1995) and Santoro and McGill (2005).  
Finally, with regard to the number of commercialized product (d7) by the biotech firm, I 
believe that the explanation of the U-shaped result for d7 comes again from the 
controversial perspective problem between the partners; indeed, there are two possible 
cases when the number of commercialized products is high: i) the pharmaceutical firm 
succeeds in integrating the biotech, acquiring all its products rights; ii) the pharmaceutical 
firm fails to achieve an integration, because the biotech‟s bargaining power is high enough 
to hold out against an acquisition, and thus the pharmaceutical part can only gets the 
products rights through licensing agreements. Thus, M&As and JVs from one side and 
licensing agreements from the other side are more likely to happen when d7 is high, being 
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M&As and JVs the most likely governance forms because, as hypothesised in H7, these are 
the governance forms preferred by the pharmaceutical company.   
Thus, the present research contributes to the existing literature on alliance governance in 
the following ways. First, I provide insights on the complementarity of transaction costs, 
resource-based, property rights and real options perspectives in explaining firm governance 
preferences, contributing to a recent literature strand that supports the integration of several 
theoretical approaches for a deeper understanding of rationales for IFRs governance 
(Leiblein, 2003; Foss and Roemer, 2010). Indeed, this is, to the best of my knowledge, the 
first empirical research in the biopharmaceutical industry integrating drivers belonging to 
different theoretical perspectives. Furthermore, my results confirm the validity of this 
integrated approach; indeed, looking at Table 2 and focusing just on the confirmed 
hypotheses, the reader can notice how several theoretical contributions (TCE, RO, PRT, the 
concept of absorptive capacity) provide explanations to the problem of the governance 
choice. This is certainly an advance regards the available literature that, mainly, provided a 
comparison in pair of the main theoretical strands. Also, I want to emphasize again the 
importance of the concept of “absorptive capacity” in explaining IFRs governance, as also 
stressed by Contractor and Ra (1992); however, up to my knowledge there is not an 
empirical study, apart from a case study analysis conducted by O‟Dwyer and O‟Flynn 
(2005), confirming the prediction that the concept of “absorptive capacity” poses on 
governance form selection. 
Second, this research highlights the importance of considering the dual perspective in bio-
pharmaceuticals IFRs, since pharmas and biotechs often have conflicting goals about the 
governance mode selection, thus, it strongly depends on their relative bargaining powers. 
I‟m aware that, in here I just pose this problem from a theoretical point of view, but I do not 
face it from an empirical point of view, since I do not have data from pure biotech firms in 
our survey. Of course, this will be a path for further development of this research.  
Third, this study empirically confirms how uncertainty, appropriation concern and trust 
influence the governance choice in biopharmaceutical IFRs, results already discussed in 
literature. However, I find that a new driver, i.e. the functional completeness of a firm, here 
measured by the number of commercialised products by the biotech company, is also 
important in determining this choice; the variable is particular significant in the analysis 
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and I think it can be a good proxy of the contractual power of the biotech company. 
Nevertheless, it has never been considered in literature, thus, the theoretical framework 
here proposed enlarges the set of drivers influencing the governance modes in 
biopharmaceutical industry beyond those most considered by the literature.  
This research has several managerial implications. First, I propose an operationalized 
framework for making governance decisions in biopharmaceutical IFRs. The advantage of 
this approach, from a managerial perspective, consists on having formulated hypothesis 
directly on operationalized measures; this makes the theoretical framework easily 
applicable in the industrial practice. Secondly, the focus on bargaining power provides 
interesting indications to managers in charge with IFRs in this industry: they must be aware 
that the industry context, the Italian one in this case, matters, indeed, in some more mature 
contexts, the contractual power between the partners could be significantly different, 
leading to different governance solutions. Then, managers need to carefully evaluate 
measure of functional completeness, such as the number of commercialized products of the 
biotech firm, when approaching IFRs in biopharmaceutical industry.  
There are limitations to this study. The most important one is that I rely solely on field-
based primary data of a specific country and that the small sample size deriving from this 
choice may undermine the reliability and generalizability of my results. The small sample 
size might provide also an explanation for the non-significance of some variables. 
Therefore, I recognise that, despite the confirmative approach used in this research, the 
theoretical framework needs a further confirmation through a larger dataset including other 
countries with a similar industry structure or through a worldwide comprehensive databank 
analysis.  
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Chapter 5 
RISK ASSESSMENT AND GOVERNANCE FORM CHOICE IN IFRs: 
A CONFIRMATIVE ANALYSIS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SAMPLE 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As pointed out in chapter 2, the scientific literature on IFRs has already received a lot of 
important contributions, but how firms choose the right governance mode for managing a 
particular relation is still not so clear. In particular, in spite of the fact that the role of risk 
has gained increasing attention in the study of inter-firm relations, few studies have deeply 
investigated the issue, some exceptions are Das and Teng works (1996, 1998, 2000, 
2001a,b) and Nooteboom‟s model (1996). Moreover, few of them are empirical research, 
except Delerue (2004), Delerue and Simon (2009) and Noteboom et al. (1997) that however 
analyze only the effect of relational risk on the governance form. 
In this part of the thesis, I propose a risk perception model for making governance decisions 
in inter-firm relationships. Firstly, according to the most influential literature on the issue, I 
identify two risk dimensions, relational risk and performance risk, and I study in which way 
the perception of each dimension separately influence the governance of the IFR. The risk 
perception model is based on two main theoretical perspectives: transaction cost economics 
(TCE) and real options (ROs). Secondly, I combine both relational and performance risk 
factors to examine how the perception of both risk‟ dimensions influence the decision-
maker choice. Third, I operationalize the developed model through the detection of specific 
drivers influencing both relational and performance risk; the operationalized framework is 
developed within a specific context that is again the bio-pharmaceutical industry. Finally, in 
order to test the hypotheses, I carry out an empirical analysis based on a secondary dataset 
consisting of 353 IFRs signed worldwide between pharma and biotech firms.  
Previous research discussing governance forms in IFR dates back to the nineties, but it is 
still limited for several reasons. First, most researchers focused on the choice between two 
or three different governance modes. For example, many authors studied the choice 
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between different kinds of alliances, mainly dividing between equity and non-equity 
alliances, such as Gulati and Singh (1998) or more recent papers such as Dunne et al. 
(2009). As concern to this limitation, I consider a full picture of how firms use external 
sources of knowledge, by analyzing all the continuum of governance forms from pure 
market transactions to hierarchical governances. Actually some authors have already tried 
to overcome such a limitation, but in most cases, such as Van de Vrande et al. (2006), these 
papers are only theoretical papers that not test empirically the developed hypotheses.  
Secondly, most prior studies about the impact of perceived risk on IFR decisions have not 
explicitly analyzed how the interaction of different risk dimensions may mitigate the trend 
to go for a pure market transaction or for a hierarchical solution. Again, some authors such 
as Das and Teng (2001a) have theorized this kind of effect; their paper is original in 
constructing a relationship between risk dimensions (performance and relational) and 
governance structures, but it has however several limitations. First, from a theoretical point 
of view, it does not provide a relation with the most acknowledged theoretical strands in 
governance structure literature such as TCE, RO or RBV; so, the way how risk dimensions 
influence the choice of the governance forms along a continuum remains not linked to the 
main research stream of the literature. Secondly, the framework remains basically a 
theoretical one, since it has never been operationalized and, overall, empirically tested.  
Finally, most prior researches have examined the governance choice decision using a 
unique theoretical perspective, mainly the TCE (Folta, 1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005). 
Following the work by Van de Vrande et al. (2006), I instead propose a theoretical 
framework mapping performance and relational risk on a continuum of governance forms 
by constructing a relation with TCE and RO theoretical strands.  
For these reasons I think this research could significantly contribute to fill a gap in the 
strategic management literature; moreover, such knowledge could represent an insight for 
managerial decision by supporting managers in making successful decisions about the 
governance of new cooperative arrangements.  
This chapter is organized as follow: in the next paragraph 5.2, I introduce the theoretical 
framework that is a risk model linking both the relational and performance risk to the
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governance form; afterward, in paragraph 5.3, I present the empirical analysis that is based 
on a secondary dataset of 353 IFRs signed worldwide between a pharmaceutical and a 
biotech company during the period 2007-2010 and the results obtained. Finally, in 
paragraph 5.4, I present discussion and conclusions of the research.  
 
5.2 Theoretical framework developing: second set of hypotheses 
As previously mentioned Das and Teng (2001a) distinguish two kinds of risk in inter-firm 
relationships: relational risk and performance risk. Relational risk is the probability and 
consequence of not having satisfactory cooperation between partner firms; it is linked to 
endogenous factors, which are embedded in the specific relationship and can be controlled 
by partners‟ actions. This risk comes from the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of 
partners. On the other hand, performance risk refers to the factors that may jeopardize the 
success of an alliance, even when the partners cooperate fully; it is related to exogenous 
factors inherent in the activity that is taking place regardless of whether partners behave as 
agreed (contract completeness) or not.  
 
5.2.1 Relational risk 
Relational risk only exists because the inter-firm relation does exist; indeed, it depends on 
the probability and consequences that a partner firm does not commit itself to the inter-firm 
relation in the desired manner (Das and Teng, 1996). This risk arises from the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour of one or both firms; since firms have their own individual interests 
that may not coincide with those of their partners (Williamson, 1975). Examples of 
opportunistic behaviour are shirking or cheating the partner, distorting or hiding 
information, getting resources and asset of the other firm and so on. This kind of behaviour 
is very common, thus firms tend to prevent it by controlling partners behaviours and 
detailing contracts with explicit deterrents.  
Accoring to Das and Teng (2001a), several factors may enhance the perception of relational 
risk, for example expected inequities regarding payoffs of the alliance (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1973; Grossman and Hart, 1986), differences in terms of bargaining power of the 
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partner firms (Williamson, 1993), the lack of trust in the partner competences and skills 
(Kale et al., 2000), the lack of confidence in the good faith of the partner (Gulati, 1995; de 
Man and Roijakkers, 2009), and also factors related to a different cultural background 
(Oxley, 1997; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Delerue and Simon, 2009). All of these elements 
lead to a higher perception of relational risk.  
 
5.2.2 Performance risk 
Performance risk depends on several factors that can lead to not achieving the strategic 
objectives of a firm, or, in this case, of an alliance, despite firms fully co-operate (Das and 
Teng, 1996). These factors include changing in the competitive environment, such as 
intensified competition and new entrants, changing in the general environment, for example 
in regulations and government policies, or finally changing in the internal environment, 
such as the lack of a particular competence due to a new technology advent. Of course, 
performance risk strongly depends on the nature of the objectives of the partners; namely, if 
they are cooperating in technology development in R&D intensive industries the 
performance risk embedded on the activity is high in itself. Thus, according to the alliance 
objectives and types there are different sources of performance risk in the inter-firm 
relationship; for example R&D risk is the most important risk component in R&D 
alliances, while commercial risk is the most important one in marketing and 
commercialization alliances. International risk is an important factor when partner firms 
belong to different countries. Thus, no matter how alliance partners behave and how is the 
level of co-operation between them, these kinds of risk will anyway be present.    
 
5.2.3 Hypotheses development 
When designing the governance form of an inter-firm relation, managers have to choose 
between different organizational modes. As highlighted in the previous section, this choice 
is strongly related to their perception of performance and relational risk.  
The literature on the governance form choice has traditionally used different theoretical 
perspectives in order to explain why managers choose, for example, a licensing agreement 
rather than an equity alliance.  
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As previously highlighted, the main reference theories are TCE (Williamson, 1991, Gulati 
and Singh, 1998), RO theory (Kogut, 1991, Folta, 1998) and RBV (Kogut and Zander, 
1992, Zollo et al., 2002). However, more and more authors are convinced that a 
combination of different perspectives is required to understand governance mode choice 
(Chen and Chen, 2003; Santoro and McGill, 2005; Van de Vrende et al., 2006; Rosiello, 
2007).  
In this part of my thesis, I focus just on TCE and RO in order to examine how the risk 
perception influence the choice of a particular governance mode. Starting with a TCE point 
of view and according to TCE scholars, transactions can take place in markets, within the 
organisation or hierarchy, or in the middle between market and hierarchy. The different 
organizational choice depends on the minimization of transaction costs of economic 
exchanges with other organizations, and these costs vary on the basis of the presence of 
transaction-specific investments, threat of opportunistic behaviour and frequency of 
interactions. Thus, on the one hand, TCE suggests that market transactions might be highly 
efficient as governance forms in different situations, since they are flexible and reversible 
forms and they minimize organizational costs of hierarchical structures, but on the other 
hand, when opportunistic behaviour is likely to occur the theory suggests to reduce this 
relational risk by choosing a hierarchical governance mode. Hence, TCE theory focuses on 
the transaction and on the costs arising from the possible opportunistic behaviours among 
the parties. It is worth noting that, also when TCE refers to uncertainty, it is seen as a 
possible source of opportunistic behaviour among the parties. Furthermore, being TCE 
focused on the design of firm boundaries, it looks at the governance structure, i.e. the 
relation structure, as the way to reduce the risk arising from the transaction.  
Thus, it is quite evident how TCE focuses on relational risk: when relational risk is high, 
namely opportunistic behaviour is likely to occur (because of asset specificity, lack of trust 
between partners, differences in terms of bargaining power etc.), firms will prefer more 
hierarchical governance modes in order to mitigate such a risk. Thus, in accordance to TCE 
reasoning I formulate our first hypothesis (Figure 1). 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): When perceived relational risk is high firms prefer more hierarchal 
oriented governance modes, (i.e. equity alliances, M&A); conversely, when this kind of risk 
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is low, firms prefer more market-oriented transactions (i.e. licensing agreements, non-
equity alliances). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The influence of relational risk on the governance form 
 
On the other respect, as suggested by the real options (ROs) literature stream, certain types 
of investment might be considered as the creation of an option, which might be exercised at 
a later point in time using a more integrated solution (i.e. Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; 
Kogut, 1991; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). Indeed, ROs are usually described as an option 
creation and an option exercise, two different investments in two different points in time; 
the first is the initial decision of investment in order to create the option and the second is 
the subsequent and not mandatory decision of exercise this option.  
However, real options reasoning has become so successful mainly because it is strictly 
related to the concepts of uncertainty and risk; indeed, ROs point of view highlights the 
value associated with the ability of a firm to react flexibly to an uncertain future. The 
theory conceptualizes firms as an aggregation of investment opportunities and emphasizes 
the value of investments that allow firms to manage risk proactively by exploiting 
uncertainty over time in a flexible fashion (Kogut, 1991). Thus, real options are specifically 
designed to enable firms to postpone the investment decision under uncertainty conditions. 
Especially, when partner firms are exploring new technologies, the investing firm first has 
to learn from the partner and build familiarity with the new technological area through 
small initial learning investments that can be seen as the creation of the option. Over time, 
after reaching a good understanding of the new technology and of its business 
opportunities, the investing firm can eventually exercise the option by expanding and 
firming up the relation, for example through an equity investment or even an acquisition.  
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As previously stated, the performance risk does not depend on partners' behaviour, but just 
on factors characterising the transaction deal; thus, when such a risk is high, RO suggests to 
postpone investments, adopting market-oriented governance forms. Thus, the presence of 
technological risk, as well as international risk and the lack of technological competences, 
lead firms to postpone some decisions in the future. Following this reasoning I formulate 
the following hypothesis (Figure 2): 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): When perceived performance risk is high firms prefer market-oriented 
governance modes, (i.e. licensing agreements, non-equity alliances); conversely, when this 
kind of risk is low, firms prefer more integrated governance forms (i.e. equity alliances, 
M&A).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The influence of performance risk on the governance form 
 
As the reader can notice, TCE and ROs theories, looking at different components of the 
risk, lead to opposite results in terms of governance form choice. However, as also 
highlighted by previous contributions (Das and Teng, 2001a; de Man and Roijakkers, 
2009), both the two typologies of risk are present in an inter-firm agreement, thus the two 
theoretical approaches influence each other. Indeed, when relational risk is high, TCE 
suggests a more hierarchical governance form to reduce it; however, if the performance risk 
is also significant, a hierarchical governance form does not reduce such a risk, because it 
does not depend on the relation, while it increases the coordination costs. Thus, the 
presence of a significant level of performance risk reduces the effect of the relational risk 
on the governance form choice (Figure 3). According to this reasoning I formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): A significant level of performance risk moderates (reduces) the 
relation between relational risk and governance form.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The influence of performance risk on the relation between relational risk and 
governance form 
 
Conversely, when the performance risk is high RO suggests choosing a flexible governance 
structure in order to reduce such a risk. However, if the relational risk is also significant, a 
market-based governance form adds some relational risk to the transaction. Thus, the 
presence of a significant relational risk reduces the effect of the performance risk on the 
governance form choice (Figure 4). According to this reasoning I formulate the following 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A significant level of relational risk moderates (reduces) the relation 
between performance risk and governance form.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The influence of relational risk on the relation between performance risk and 
governance form 
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5.2.4 Framework operationalization  
5.2.4.1 Relational risk operationalization 
According to Das and Teng (2001a) relational risk reflects decision-makers‟ concerns about 
the level of co-operation between the partners. Partners‟ co-operation level is threatened by 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviours (Williamson, 1975; Parkhe, 1993) and is made 
easier by trust and firm‟s experience with inter-firm relationships. Following previous 
researchers, I detect some the main factors leading to a high relational risk perception; they 
are: investment specificity, partners‟ asymmetry, lack of trust and lack of IFRs experience.  
 
Investment specificity: TCE emphasizes the role of transaction-specific investments in 
determining high levels of opportunistic behaviour. As defined by Williamson (1975), asset 
specificity is the extent to which the investments made to support a particular transaction 
have a higher value to that transaction than they would have if they were redeployed for 
any other purpose.  
According to TCE, the more an investment is relation-specific, the higher will be sunk and 
search costs associated with the relationship. The more such costs are not equally balanced 
over the partners, the higher is the probability that one partner will act in an opportunistic 
way, trying to usurp the counterpart rent. Thus, high relation-specific investments might 
increase the expected inequities of payoff in a relationship, and therefore, according to Das 
and Teng (2000) they are related with relational risk. David and Han (2004) provided 
strong empirical support to asset specificity in influencing transaction costs, indeed the 
extent of asset-specificity increases transaction costs and creates a greater opportunism risk 
and thus a higher relational risk. In this case, TCE suggests that the transaction should be 
internalized in order to reduce these risks. Santoro and McGill (2005) find strong empirical 
evidence to asset co-specialization in influencing governance form in the biopharmaceutical 
industry. Hence, for the aforementioned reasons, I consider investment specificity as a 
driver influencing relational risk.  
 
Partners‟ asymmetry: the presence of asymmetry between alliance partners in terms of 
relative size, different resources and bargaining power determines an increase in the 
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perceived relational risk. Several authors (Oliver, 1990; Bleeke and Ernst, 1995) observe 
that inequality between parties, which allows the stronger firm to exercise power and 
control over its partner, leads the weaker party to perceive high relational risk. Also, Bleeke 
and Ernst (1995) suggest that alliances between unequal parties are unlikely to be 
successful. Delerue (2004) finds as partners‟ asymmetry is one of the main fonts of 
relational risk in biopharmaceutical industry.  
 
Lack of trust: trust in inter-firms relationships has received a huge amount of contributions 
as a key driver influencing governance form choice (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
Relational scholars suggest that successful IFRs result from characteristics such as trust, 
reputation, commitment, cooperation and communication (Williamson, 1971; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). In particular, trust and reputation establish norms and 
expectations about appropriate behaviour, lowering the perception of relational risk. 
Authors such as Gulati (1995) and Parkhe (1993) suggest that trust can be a substitute for 
hierarchical contracts in many exchanges and serve as an extra-contractual control 
mechanism by reducing the perception of relational risk. Indeed, the familiarity established 
among partners mitigates the hold-up risk and reduces relational risk. Gulati (1995) finds 
empirical evidence supporting this view.  
Also Ring and Van de Ven (1994) show that trust is an essential condition for market 
transactions. In the same way, the lack of trust between the partners determines higher 
partner uncertainty, namely relational risk perception, increasing the need for the costly 
monitoring and control of hierarchical governance (Santoro and McGill, 2005). Trust has 
been deeply investigated as a driver influencing governance form choice in 
biopharmaceutical industry (Santoro and McGill, 2005; Delerue, 2004; van de Vrende et 
al., 2009). 
 
Lack of IFRs experience: the collaboration propensity of a firm may influence its relational 
risk perception, indeed having a successful partnership history should determine an higher 
confidence about the success of the new relation. The experience of past alliances enables 
partner firms to accumulate valuable knowledge about alliance management (Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002). Kale and Singh (2007) find that alliances offer great learning 
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opportunities for firms to develop firm capabilities. Other research has found evidence that 
firms learn to manage alliances more effectively over time (Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997).  
I argue that IFRs experience has a double effect in reducing relational risk: (i) from the 
point of view of the company that has experienced several inter-firm relationships, it 
increases its confidence about capabilities in managing such relationships; (ii) from the 
partner point of view, the higher the number of relationships the counterpart has been 
involved, the higher is its reputation in being a good partner for a relationship.  
Villalonga and Mcgahan (2005) show how former alliances and acquisitions experience 
increases the number of the same typology of inter-firm agreements. Lai and Chang (2010) 
point out how firm‟s attributes, such as alliances experience, significantly influence the 
relationships between the governance structure and performance. Teng and Das (2008) 
show how previous alliances experience, by reducing the relational risk, leads to more 
market oriented alliances.  
At the same time, I evaluate how the lack of IFRs experience determines a higher perceived 
relational risk, leading to more structured and integrated governance forms. Zollo et al. 
(2002) by analysing a biopharmaceutical sample, have empirical showed how general 
experience accumulation at the partnering-firm level positively influences alliance 
performance. Finally, both van de Vrande et al. (2009) and Santoro and McGill (2005) have 
used firm‟s experience in previous relationship as control variable in studying the choice of 
the governance mode in biopharmaceutical industry. Up to now, IFRs experience has not 
been related to relational risk in any empirical study involving biopharmaceutical industry. 
Figure 5 summarizes the relationship among the former discussed measures and the 
relational risk. 
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Figure 5. Relational risk operationalization 
 
5.2.4.2 Performance risk operationalization 
 
According to Das and Teng (2001a), performance risk, in strategic alliances, is the 
probability and consequences that a firm‟s strategic objectives are not achieved, despite full 
co-operation, i.e. when the relational risk is assumed to be non-existent. Performance risk 
arises from factors such as commercial and technological risks, R&D risk, international 
risk, corporate risk, and strategic risk. Thus in line with above, I operationalize 
performance risk through the following drivers: technology/product newness, technological 
distance, nationality. 
 
Technology/product newness: technology/product newness is one of the main fonts of 
performance risk. The newer is the technology involved in the agreement, no matter the 
level of cooperation among the partners, the higher is the risk of not gaining the expected 
results. Indeed, uncertainty on the market feasibility of products or technologies cannot 
easily be reduced by the investing firm. In particular, when a technology is in an early stage 
of development, its basic concepts stem from practice, thereby raising the uncertainties 
associated with it (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001); however, the risk typically decreases over 
time as the technology matures or the investing firm acquires more knowledge about it. 
This is particularly true in the biopharmaceutical industry, where specific applications from 
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chemistry, functional genomics, and bioinformatics are combined to target and test new 
molecules, making applications in therapeutics more uncertain than those in diagnostics, as 
indicated by systematic financial market variances among therapeutic, diagnostic, and other 
biotechnology sub-fields (Folta, 1998). According to this, Lambe and Spekman (1997) find 
that early stages of a biotech compound development makes performance risk particularly 
high. Also Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) suggest that pharmaceutical firms seeking early 
stage research may incur in high performance risk. Finally, also van de Vrande et al. (2009) 
find technology newness as one of the main fonts of performance risk in biopharmaceutical 
industry. Hence, I consider the newness of the technology/product object of the agreement, 
measured as the development stage of the product/compound, as a driver of performance 
risk. 
 
Technological distance: I refer to the distance between the technological knowledge bases 
of the two partners; indeed, the extent of strong dissimilarities between their knowledge 
bases might have significant implication on the perceived performance risk. Large 
dissimilarities could lead to a limited capability to detect, assimilate and integrate the 
partner‟s technology. This problem is related to the concept of absorptive capacity of a firm 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), i.e. the more dissimilar the knowledge bases of two partners, 
the larger the probability that the absorptive capacity of the investing firm falls short, 
affecting the extent to which a firm can recognize and absorb its partner‟s technological 
capabilities. This, of course, increases performance risk. Moreover, Colombo (2003) 
observes how opportunistic behaviour is not a real threat as long as the business potential of 
the technology is not crystallized into a viable business model. Also, greater technological 
distance makes unintended spill-over of knowledge less likely, decreasing the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, Oxley and Sampson (2004) argue that high 
technology dissimilarities, increasing the performance risk, reduce the broadness of 
alliances‟ scope. Conversely, Villalonga and McGahan (2005) argue how greater 
relatedness between the two parties implies a lower cost of integration, because of 
economies of scale within the organization, and therefore reduces performance risk. 
Authors, such as Folta (1998), found empirical evidence in the biopharmaceutical industry 
showing that when knowledge bases of the firms are dissimilar, companies are more likely 
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to use less integrated governance forms in order to reduce the performance risk. Also 
Pisano (1990) finds that uncertainty coming from technological distance plays a critical role 
in pharmaceutical firms‟ decision to acquire biotechnology R&D from outside; he observes 
that a firm, that is not yet familiar with the technological know-how of his partner, reduces 
the performance risk by first learning from the partner through arm‟s length transactions 
before being able to accumulate knowledge. Moreover, the greater the knowledge base 
dissimilarities, the longer it will take before the problem of transaction risk is solved, 
making an integration solution less attractive. Hence, I examine the effect of technological 
distance in increasing performance risk. 
 
Nationality: international alliances are exposed to an additional risk called international 
risk, which has its roots in national differences in terms of distances, cultures, regulations, 
technological standards and business practices (Brouthers, 1995). Several authors, such as 
McCutchen et al. (2008), analyse alliances risk both in domestic and international alliances, 
highlighting the main managerial difficulties linked to the so-called international risk 
(Miller, 1992). International risk depends on several factors: (i) distance increases 
coordination costs; (ii) partners in international alliances have different needs and offer 
different resources and capabilities (Hitt et al., 2000); (iii) different legal, institutional, 
historical and language environments (Lane and Beamish, 1990) make more difficult 
communicating and increase the chance of misunderstanding between partners; (iv) 
different managerial cultures create difficulties and lead to alliance failure (Delerue and 
Simon, 2009); (v) different economies in which partners operate entail different risks and 
uncertainties associated with politics, foreign exchange rates and local laws and regulations 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988) and (vi) finally, international differences in intellectual property 
rights protection make more difficult managing R&D collaborations and gaining common 
results such as patents (Oxley, 1999; Hagedoorn et al., 2005). As the reader can notice, 
different nationality of the partners leads an increasing level of risk no matter as the 
partners behave, thus in this research I study how different nationality of the partners 
increases performance risk. 
Figure 6 summarizes the relationship among the former discussed measures and the 
performance risk, highlighting the sign of the relation, if each driver has a positive or 
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negative effect on relational risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Performance risk operationalization 
 
5.3 Empirical analysis: a confirmative analysis in an international sample 
5.3.1 Governance forms in the market-hierarchy continuum  
 
In this part of the research I again follow the main empirical literature on the issue and I 
consider four different governance modes along the continuum between market and 
hierarchy. Starting from the governance form closer to the market that is a unilateral 
contract-based alliance, I then locate bilateral contract-based alliances, minority equity 
alliances, equity joint ventures and at last mergers and acquisitions.  
 
5.3.2 Data collection and sample 
 
In order to test the proposed framework I built my own data set by using as the main source 
of data the Biotech & Pharma Collaboration section of the BioWorld Industry Snapshot 
database. This data source was used for identifying worldwide inter-firm relationships 
among biotech and pharmaceutical companies during the period January 2007 to December 
2010. I selected the BioWorld database because it is a new and reliable source of records 
specific for the biopharmaceutical industry; it contains information about partners‟ business 
names, deal type/objective, product area and financial terms. In the period examined, 1781 
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deals were included in the BioWorld database. However, my dataset comprises 353 deals 
and it was constructed in the following way. First I collected data about all the deals signed 
in the period 2007-2010; next I excluded those agreements, 982, for which financial terms 
were not disclosed in the BioWorld data base, this because the deal value is a main issue of 
my analysis. Afterwards, I also excluded agreements involving more than two parents 
companies and those involving public research entities, such as universities. Finally, to 
ensure the quality of the dataset I checked whether the deal was actually signed between a 
pure biotech company and a pharmaceutical/biopharmaceutical firm, since this is a main 
assumption of my research; many deals were excluded because they were signed between 
two biopharmaceutical companies.  
In this way I obtained the final dataset consisting of 353 agreements divided in 90 unilateral 
contract-based alliances (licensing and supply agreements), 126 bilateral contract-based 
alliances (R&D alliances, marketing and commercialization alliances), 41 equity alliances 
(minority equity alliances and joint ventures) and 93 between mergers and acquisitions.  
Once the main information about the agreements was collected, I completed the dataset by 
integrating information such as nationality, number of employees, age of the partners and 
main NACE codes from the Orbis Database, that is a global database containing profiles 
and financial information of over 80 million companies.  
 
5.3.3 Variables and measures 
5.3.3.1 Dependent variable 
I indicate with G the governance form that is the dependent variable of the analysis; again, 
according to a TCE rationality of the market-hierarchy continuum, I code G through an 
ordered basis as it follows: unilateral contract-based alliances = „1‟; bilateral contract-based 
alliances = „2‟; equity alliances = „3‟ and M&A = „4‟. 
 
5.3.3.2 Independent variables 
Independent variables are all related to factors influencing the two typologies of risk 
discussed in paragraph 3.2. Concerning relational risk we identify the following variables.  
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Investment specificity 
As a proxy of the investment specificity I consider the log value of the up-front payment the 
pharmaceutical company pays to the biotech in all the types of alliances. In case of M&A I 
consider the overall log value of the transaction. I assume that, the higher is the value of 
such payments the higher is the investment specificity.  
 
Partners‟ asymmetry 
As a proxy of partners‟ asymmetry I develop a measure of the different size of the firms 
involved in the agreement. I first group firms into five different classes basing on their size: 
„1‟ for micro firms (i.e. from 1 to 10 employees), „2‟ for small firms (from 11 to 50), „3‟ for 
medium firms (from 51 to 250), „4‟ for big firms6 (pharmaceutical firms from 251 to 750 
employees; biotech firms from 251 to 500 employees), and „5‟ for big enterprises (number 
of employees bigger than 500 for biotech firms and 750 for pharmaceutical firms). 
Afterwards, I calculate the size difference obtaining in this way, an ordinal variable ranging 
from 0 to 4 measuring partners‟ asymmetry.   
 
Lack of trust 
As commonly encountered in literature I assess the lack of trust between the same partners 
through the absence of previous ties. Based on BioWorld data availability I count prior 
relationships between the two firms in a 7-year period prior to the agreement date. I code 
the variable lack of trust assumes value 0 if the partners reported previous relations in  vice 
versa it assumes value 1. So, when the variable increases the relational risk increases too. 
 
Lack of IFRs experience 
As concern as the measure of lack of IFRs experience, the variable is computed as: 
(Maxln(IFRs) - ln(IFRs))/ln(IFRs), being Maxln(IFRs) the maximum number of the log 
transformation of the number of alliances (any kind) signed by the pharmaceutical firms in 
a 7-year period prior to the agreement in the whole data set. Again, relational risk increases 
with the lack of IFRs experience.   
                                                        
6
 According to the US. Small Business Administration Classification. 
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Regarding performance risk we identify the following measures. 
 
Technology newness 
As a proxy of the technology newness I identify the development stage of the 
product/technology involved in the agreement. As it is well know the drug development 
process is composed by four macro phases prior to commercialization: the drug discovery 
phase, the preclinical development, the clinical trials (composed by three stages, i.e. phase 
I, phase II and phase III) and the approval phase. Each of these steps is complex and 
uncertain, so that the more advanced the development stage, the more likely the drug 
succeeds in reaching the market; it should be considered that even when a drug has 
completed phase II-A of clinical studies, the expected probability of success does not even 
reach the 50 percent (DiMasi, 2001). Thus, the development stage is a good measure of the 
technology newness in biopharmaceutical agreements. Using both BioWorld data and 
hand-collected data from public announcement of alliances and M&As available in the 
companies‟ web-sites, I develop the following ordinal measure for the development stage: 
„1‟, if the product/technology is in the discovery phase or preclinical development; „2‟, if in 
phase I of clinical trials; „3‟, if in phase II; ‟ „4‟, if in phase III; „5‟ if in approval stage or 
phase IV and „6‟, if already been approved or commercialized. Thus, as a measure of the 
technology newness I assume the value: „6 - development stage‟. In this way, technology 
newness varies from 0 to 5, so that the higher is its value the higher is performance risk.  
 
Technological distance 
As a measure of the technological distance I use a dichotomy variable assuming the value 
„0‟ if the pharmaceutical is a biopharmaceutical company, i.e. a company already integrated 
in the biotech field; in this case the low technological distance is low. On the other hand, 
the variable assumes value „1‟ in case of a „pure pharma‟, i.e. a pharmaceutical company 
that has never experienced integration in the biotech field; in this case we assume a higher 
technological distance. 
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Nationality 
Finally, the variable nationality is an ordinal variable coded „0‟ if the partners have their 
headquarters in the same country, „1‟ if they are in the same continent, but in different 
countries, „2‟ otherwise. Thus, the greater the variable value the more significant the 
international risk and thus the performance risk.  
 
5.3.3.3 Control variables 
In the empirical analysis I also include four control variables. First, I control for the effects 
of firms‟ size. Thus, I use two variables, i.e. pharma size and biotech size, measuring the 
number of employees of each partner. Since the two continuous variables present a high 
range of variability, I applied a log transformation. Controlling for firms‟ size is quite 
common in researches having our purpose (Santoro and McGill, 2005; van de Vrande et al., 
2009). 
Secondly, I control for biotech patents, namely for the number of patents registered by the 
biotech firm in the period 2004-2010. We collected patents data both from the publicly 
available NBER Patent data, described by Trajtenberg et al. (2001) for US companies and 
from Espacenet Database for European companies. This is a continuous variable for which 
we applied the log transformation. Also the influence of such a variable on governance 
form is quite known; indeed, patenting is often assumed as a measure of the knowledge 
accumulated by the biotech firm (van de Vrande at al., 2009; Bosse and Alvarez, 2010) 
and, also, as a measure of the capacity to finance its own activities (Bosse and Alvarez, 
2010; Lo Nigro et al., 2011). Both these characteristics increase the bargaining power of the 
biotech firm allowing it to resist to possible acquisition, but, from the other hand, they 
make the biotech company an interesting subject for acquisitions. 
Finally, I consider the variable n° of M&As signed by the pharmaceutical firm with any 
other partner in the period 2004-2010. Also this variable is quite considered as control 
variable in studies with the same subject (van de Vrande et al., 2009). Indeed, especially in 
the biopharmaceutical industry, the number of previous M&As signed by a pharmaceutical 
company identifies its attitude to make acquisitions as a source of external technologies, 
thus influencing the governance form choice. It should be noted how the M&A experience 
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of the pharmaceutical company does not reduce the relational risk, as discussed in relation 
to the driver called firms‟ familiarity with IFRs, rather, from the biotech point of view, 
increases it because of the attitude previously mentioned.  
 
5.3.4 Methods 
The previously discussed dataset is a cross sectional database where each unit of analysis 
represent an inter-firm relationship between a pharmaceutical and a biotech company. In 
this kind of analysis, where the dependent variable can be ordered along a continuum from 
market oriented governance forms to hierarchical ones, some researchers have used an 
ordinal logit model in order to preserve the ordered nature of the dependent variable 
(Santoro and McGill, 2005). Following other authors such as van de Vrande et al., (2009) 
and Steensma and Fairbank (1999), I have instead decided to use a multinomial logit model 
that allows for the simultaneous estimation of parameters when there are more than two 
categories in the dependent variable. Thus I evaluate, as a pair comparison, the choice of 
each governance form in comparison to the base outcome, that we assume being M&A. 
Note that the choice of baseline category is irrelevant for the overall estimation of the 
model and can be set according to the authors preferences.  
The general specification of the multinomial logistic regression applied here is: 
 
Ln(Pj/Po) = A + BjXj 
 
Where Pj is the probability of an event taking place for the jth case. In this analysis the 
three possible events are: j=1 for a unilateral contract-based alliance, j=2 for a bilateral 
contract-based alliance and j=3 for a minority equity alliance. Po is the probability of the 
default condition, namely a M&A. Xj is the vector of the independent variables. 
 
5.3.5 Results 
Table 5 provides some descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. As the reader 
can notice collinearity does not seem a problem with our data (all VIFs are further below 
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10). Due to the high correlation value between pharma size and lack of IFRs experience (-
0.57) and due to a better fitting of the models I decide to remove the variable pharma size 
from the regression analyses. 
Table 6 shows the regression results and contains three different models. Model 1 aims at 
supporting hypotheses H1 and H2, so it contains only relational and performance risk 
variables. After having tuned different models, I have reported in Table 6 the best fitting 
model according the pseudo R-square evaluation.  
Starting with control variables we find that biotech size is significant at all levels of the 
dependent variable and it also shows increasing positive coefficients. This means that the 
larger is the biotech company the less likely it will accept M&As over other forms of 
governance forms. Biotech patents is instead not significant for any of the levels of the 
dependent variable. On the other hand the N° of M&A signed by the pharmaceutical 
company is significant at all the levels of the dependent variable with negative coefficients 
(respectively -0.244, -0.180 and -0.356). This result indicates that the higher the number of 
previous M&As signed by the pharmaceutical company the more likely it will sign one 
more M&A over the other governance forms. 
Let me analyse now the results for relational risk variables (see Model 1).  
The variable investment specificity is significant for any level of the dependent variable and 
its coefficients are negative and quite constant across the levels of G; this means that when 
relational risk increases due to higher investment specificity, M&As are more likely than 
any other governance form. This result confirms the predictions in hypothesis H1.  
The variable partners‟ asymmetry is significant at any level of G with positive coefficients. 
This means that the greater the partners‟ asymmetry, the less likely are M&As if compared 
with other governance forms. This result is in contrast with my prediction that partners‟ 
asymmetry increases relational risk leading toward more hierarchical solutions; however, 
while coefficients are quite constant at levels G = 1, 2, it significantly increases when G = 
3, showing how JVs are much more likely than unilateral and bilateral contractual alliances; 
this is in line with my predictions. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dependent variable                
G (governance form) 1 4 2.40 1.13            
Control variables                
1. Pharma size (log n° employees) 0.69 11.69 9.11 2.42 2.36           
2. Biotech size (log n° employees) 0.69 9.77 4.42 1.59 3.02 0.23          
3. Biotech patents (log patents) 0 7.44 1.96 1.79 1.40 0.09 0.48         
4. N° of M&A 0 17 2.82 2.90 1.50 0.38 0.00 -0.07        
Relational risk variables                
5. Investment specificity (log of 
investment in $ million) 
0 9.69 3.78 1.88 1.14 0.14 0.08 -0.03 0.03       
6. Partners‟ asymmetry 0 4 1.90 1.08 2.96 0.26 -0.68 -0.41 0.14 0.01      
7. Lack of trust (no previous ties) 0 1 0.80 0.40 1.07 -0.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.08 -0.00 0.01     
8. Lack of IFRs experience  0 1 0.72 0.29 1.92 -0.57 -0.12 -0.06 -0.54 0.02 -0.11 0.12    
Performance risk variables                
9. Tech newness (development 
stage) 
0 5 2.85 1.61 1.23 0.24 -0.14 -0.05 0.08 -0.22 0.23 -0.01 -0.24   
10. Nationality 0 2 1.34 0.82 1.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.09 -0.12 0.04 0.05 -0.11 0.02  
11. Tech distance (pharma‟s 
integration in biotech field) 
0 1 0.52 0.50 1.07 -0.05 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.17 
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Table 6. Multinomial regression analysis results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 G=1 G=2 G=3 G=1 
 
G=2 G=3 G=1 G=2 G=3 
Const -0.812 -2.085 -1.910 0.582 1.019 -1.195 -4.245
***
 -5.747
***
 -5.971
***
 
 (1.597) (1.589) (2.212) (1.584) (1.583) (2.203) (0.887) (0.937) (1.225) 
Control variables          
Biotech size 0.612
***
 0.796
***
 0.877
***
 0.745
***
 0.941
***
 1.019
***
 0.494
***
 0.667
***
 0.768
***
 
 (0.185) (0.188) (0.253) (0.197) (0.202) (0.258) (0.166) (0.167) (0.219) 
Biotech patents 0.119 0.106 -0.148 0.168 0.147 -0.090 0.137 0.118 -0.104 
 (0.125) (0.122) (0.158) (0.133) (0.132) (0.168) (0.119) (0.116) (0.153) 
Number of M&A -0.244
***
 -0.179
**
 -0.356
***
 -0.255
***
 -0.199
**
  -0.371
***
   -0.173
**
   -0.104  -0.242
**
   
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.110) (0.085) (0.078) (0.115) (0.076) (0.070) (0.103) 
Relational risk variables          
Investment specificity -0.747
***
 -0.753
***
 -0.793
***
 -1.286
***
 -1.485
***
 -1.180
***
    
 (0.125) (0.122) (0.150) (0.241) (0.237) (0.291)    
Partner‟s asymmetry 0.730*** 0.792*** 1.184*** 0.788** 1.218*** 1.946***    
 (0.241) (0.247) (0.361) (0.316) (0.324) (0.443)    
Lack of trust 0.312 -0.231 0.816 0.991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 
1.063 1.330    
 (0.516) 
) 
(0.480) (0.696) (0.968) 
) 
(0.921) (1.177)    
Lack of IFRs experience -2.358 
***
 -2.110
**
 -4.033
***
 -3.312
**
 -4.540
***
 -7.066
***
    
 (0.909) (0.855) (1.058) (1.539) (1.460) (1.716)    
Performance risk variables          
Tech newness 0.289
**
 0.590
***
 0.437
***
    1.089
***
 1.632
***
 0.951
*
 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.168)   (0.398) (0.387) (0.103) 
Nationality 0.585
**
 0.660
***
 0.473
*
    1.295
**
 0.970
*
 0.979 
 (0.225) (0.221) (0.276)    (0.514) (0.523) (0.690) 
Tech distance 
m 
1.039
***
 0.659
*
 0.176       
 (0.380) (0.370) (0.467)       
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Table 6 (continue). Multinomial regression analysis results 
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
 G=1 G=2 G=3 G=1 
 
G=2 G=3 G=1 G=2 G=3 
Interactions          
Investment * Tech newness     0.094
***
 0.159
***
 0.144
***
 -0.051 -0.078 
-
0.027 
    (0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.051) (0.049) (0.063) 
Investment * Nationality 
Na 
 
   0.204
*
 0.177 -0.019 -0.168
*
 -0.171
*
 -0.334
**
 
    (0.121) (0.113) (0.145) (0.0.95) (0.096) (0.136) 
Investment * Tech distance       -0.475
***
 -0.432
***
 -0.387 
       (0.164) (0.159) (0.200) 
Asymmetry * Tech Newness       0.059 0.073 0.202
*
 
       (0.082) (0.079) (0.108) 
Asymmetry * Nationality       0.031 0.246 0.418
*
 
       (0.181) (0.184) (0.238) 
Asymmetry * Tech distance    -0.090
 
0.182 
-0.592
*
 -1.200
***
 0.605
**
 0.060 -0.375 
    (0.308) (0.303) (0.375) (0.300) (0.294) (0.368) 
Lack of trust * Tech newness       0.105 -0.039 0.444
*
 
       (0.171) (0.158) (0.254) 
Lack of trust * Nationality    -0.764 -1.196
**
 -0.670 -0.670   
    (0.655) (0.626) (0.772) (0.772)   
Lack of experience  * Tech newness       -0.858
***
 -0.928
***
 -1.299
***
 
       (0.320) (0.306) (0.345) 
Lack of experience * Nationality     0.533 1.088 1.305    
    (0.801) (0.775) (0.899)    
Lack of experience * Tech distance    1.771
**
 2.699
***
 4.114
***
 2.412
***
 3.264
***
 3.694
***
 
    (0.833) (0.849) (1.152) (0.910) (0.914) (1.117) 
Pseudo R square   
Pseudo R-square  
 
  
Pseudo R-square  
    
Pseudo R-square  
 
0.227 
 
  0.256 
 
  0.222   
Log likelihood −360.53 
 
  −346.95 
 
  -362.86   
Log likelihood Chi-square test [0.000]   
 
[0.000]   [0.000]   
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The variable lack of trust is not significant at any level in our dataset. 
Finally, results for the variable lack of IFRs experience is in line with H1 predictions; 
indeed, the variable is significant at all levels of G with negative coefficients. Thus, 
when the relation risk increases as a consequence of scarce familiarity of the 
pharmaceutical firm with alliances, M&As are more likely than contractual alliances, 
both unilateral and bilateral, and JVs. Also while coefficients for G = 1, 2 are quite 
similar, JVs are less likely than unilateral and bilateral contractual alliances and this is 
not according with our predictions. Summarising, a part from partners‟ asymmetry, H1 
predictions are satisfied when comparing M&As with other governance forms. When 
comparing contractual governance forms, unilateral and bilateral, and JVs, H1 
predictions depend on pairwise comparison. Concerning trust, my empirical results are 
not significant.   
Going to the estimates of performance risk variables (see Model 1), the variable 
technology newness is significant at all the levels of the dependent variable with 
positive coefficients. Thus, when performance risk arises, due to higher technology 
newness, M&As are less likely than other governance structures, and this is in line with 
expectation of H2. Also, in line with H2 predictions bilateral alliances are more likely 
than JVs; while unilateral agreements result less likely than bilateral ones and JVs, not 
confirming our expectations.   
The variable technology distance is significant at G = 1, 2 with positive and decreasing 
coefficients. These results imply that when performance risk increases as a consequence 
of a higher technology distance, unilateral contractual agreements are more likely than 
bilateral ones and both are more likely than M&As; this is fully in line with my 
predictions confirming hypothesis H2.  
Finally, the variable nationality is significant at all the levels of the dependent variable 
with positive coefficients. Again, this means that the greater the performance risk 
related to the variable nationality, the more likely is to have market-oriented governance 
forms in comparison to M&As. Also, while unilateral and bilateral agreements are quite 
equally likely, JVs are much less likely than contractual governance forms. So the 
results confirm my prediction for this variable. Summarising, H2 predictions are 
satisfied when comparing M&As with other governance forms; also, a part some 
exceptions, H2 predictions hold also along the continuum of governance forms. 
Model 2 is designed to test H3, namely the hypothesis predicting a moderating effect of 
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performance risk on the relation between relational risk and the governance form. Thus 
the model includes all main effects variables influencing relational risk, and all the 
interaction variables. VIF analysis does not highlight multi-collinearity problems for 
this model. After having tuned different models with all the possible interactions, I have 
reported in Table 6 the best fitting model according the pseudo R-square evaluation.  
Results for control variables are substantially the same of those in Model 1. Looking at 
the variables investment specificity, partners‟ asymmetry and lack of IFRs experience 
results are quite the same than in Model 1. Also, lack of trust is not significant as in 
Model 1. The moderating effect of performance risk variables on relational risk ones is 
significant for the following interactions: a) investment and technology newness (all G 
levels); b) investment and nationality (G = 1, 2); c) partners‟ asymmetry and technology 
distance (G = 2, 3); d) lack of IFRs experience and technology distance (all G levels); e) 
lack of IFRs experience and nationality (level G = 2, 3). In cases a), b), d) and e) the 
positive coefficients show how the extent of factors increasing performance risk 
moderates the effect of the relational risk variables on governance forms, reducing the 
likelihood of M&As in front of other governance forms. Furthermore, in cases b), d) 
and e) intermediate governance forms such as JVs and bilateral contractual contracts are 
more likely than other governance forms. All these results provide a strong support to 
H3. On the other hand, results for case c) are controversial; indeed, in contrast with my 
predictions, M&As are more likely than other governance forms; on the other hand, in 
line with my prediction bilateral contractual alliances are more likely than JVs when 
technology distance increases.  
Finally, Model 3 is for H4 appraisal and, therefore, it includes main effect variables 
influencing performance risk, and all the interaction variables.  
However, VIF analysis reveals high values of VIF for the variable technology distance 
(18.13), thus it has been removed from the model in order to do not incur into multi-
collinearity problems. Again, after having tuned different models with all the possible 
interactions, I have reported in Table 5 the best fitting model according the pseudo R-
square evaluation.  
Results for control variables are substantially the same of those in Model 1. Looking at 
the variables technology newness and nationality results are quite similar to Model 1. 
The moderating effect of relational risk variables on performance risk ones is significant 
in the interactions between: a) technology newness and investment (G = 2); b) 
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technology newness and absence of previous relations (G = 3); c) technology newness 
and partners‟ asymmetry (G = 3); d) technology newness and lack of IFRs experience 
(all G levels); e) nationality and investment (all G levels); f) partners‟ asymmetry and 
nationality (G = 3). In cases a) d) and e) the negative coefficients show how the 
presence of high levels of relational risk variables moderates the effect of performance 
risk variables on governance forms increasing the likelihood of M&As on other 
governance forms. In cases b), c) and f) although the coefficients are still positive 
(respectively 0.202, 0.444, 0.418), they are all lower than coefficients of the technology 
newness (0.951) and the nationality (0.980) still evidencing the moderating effect of the 
relational risk variables. All these results in Model 3 provide a strong support to H4. 
 
5.4 Discussion  
The main contribution of this research is to bring theoretical and empirical support to 
risk-evaluation in the choice of inter-firm relationships governance. Indeed, in spite of 
the fact that the role of risk has gained increasing attention in the study of inter-firm 
relations, few studies have deeply investigated the issue, some exceptions are Das and 
Teng works (1996, 1998, 2000, 2001a) and Nooteboom‟s model (1996). Moreover, few 
of them are empirical researches, except Delerue (2004), Delerue and Simon (2009) and 
Noteboom et al. (1997) that however analyze only the effect of relational risk 
perception on the governance form decision. 
According to Das and Teng (2001a), the design and the structure of the relationship 
stems from risk perception; thus, my theoretical model applies TCE and RO theories in 
a discriminated fashion in order to shed new light on IFRs governance by identifying 
and distinguishing among factors influencing the perception of a relational risk and 
those influencing the perception of a performance risk in undertaking a new relation. 
My theoretical model seems to be strongly supported by empirical evidences. In 
particular, I find support for the first hypothesis (H1) for which, in accordance to TCE, 
the perception of high levels of relational risk leads firms to choose more hierarchical 
governance forms. In particular, I find that the higher the investment specificity and the 
lack of IFRs experience, factors determining a higher perception of relational risk, the 
more likely firms will choose an integrated and structured governance, such as a joint 
venture or even an acquisition. Unfortunately, I didn‟t find significance for the variable 
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lack of trust. Furthermore, I find support also for the second hypothesis (H2) according 
to which, following a RO logic, the extent of high levels of perceived performance risk 
pushes firms to remain flexible through a more market-oriented governance, as they 
possibly delay a more binding choice. I find that the higher the newness of the 
technology object of the relationship, the higher the technological distance between the 
partners and the more different are the partners‟ nationalities, the more likely firms will 
go for a flexible and market-oriented relationship, such as a unilateral or bilateral 
contract-based alliance.  
Moreover, I add to theory by providing evidence that a moderating effect between 
relational and performance risk factors does exist; namely, as hypothesized in H3 and 
H4, the extent of high levels of both relational risk and performance risk factors reduces 
both the tendency to move toward totally integrated governance forms, such as M&As 
and toward pure market transactions, such as licensing agreements, leading in practice 
to hybrid forms, such as equity and non-equity alliances. In particular, my findings 
suggest that the extent of drivers influencing performance risk, such as the technological 
newness and the partners‟ different nationality, moderates the relationship between 
investment specificity and hierarchical governance; this indicates that the higher risks 
associated with early-stage products or with partners‟ differences in terms of 
nationalities make less important the extent of investment specificity in the governance 
form choice.  
Again, a moderating effect has been found for the relationship between the lack of IFRs 
experience and hierarchical governance when the technological distance and the 
different nationality also assume high values. Also the extent of technological distance 
seems to moderate the relationship between partners‟ asymmetry and hierarchical 
governance forms. On the other hand I find support also for the opposite, namely the 
extent of relational risk factors, such as the investment specificity, the lack of previous 
relations, the partners‟ asymmetry and the lack of IFRs experience, mitigate the 
relationship between performance risk factors, such as technological newness and 
nationality, and market-oriented governance modes.  
Thus, this research contributes to the existing literature on IFRs governance in the 
following ways. First, I provide insights on the complementarities of TCE and RO 
theories in assessing the risk of an inter-firm relationship. Indeed, this is, to the best of 
my knowledge, the first empirical research that tests how factors related to relational 
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risk perception and those related to performance risk perception influence together the 
governance choice. Moreover, as explained before, this is the first work that provides 
empirical evidences of the interaction effect existing between different kinds of factors. 
Santoro and McGill (2005) already tested a moderating effect of partner uncertainty in 
the relationship between task uncertainty and hierarchical governance, but they limit 
their analysis only to this interaction.  
Second, this analysis shows that relational and performance risk are multidimensional 
risks since each of them depends on several factors, namely managers have to 
simultaneously consider several factors that may contribute to risk perception. Of 
course some of them are more important than others.  
Third, my results reinforce the importance of investment specificity as an important 
factor in determining the governance choice, as most prior empirical research have not 
considered it as a driver of the choice.  
The study has several managerial implications. First, as already suggested but not tested 
by Das and Teng (2001a), the model here proposed and its empirical confirmation 
recognize that the perception of strategy-makers substantially influence inter-firm 
strategic decisions, namely managers tend to make decisions based on their evaluation 
of both relational and performance risk. Also, I propose a general and comprehensive 
framework for making governance decisions in inter-firm relationships that is easily 
adaptable to any industry.  
Thus, from a managerial perspective, it may represent a tool for decision supporting 
when managers have to undertake a new relation with another firm, by specifically 
analyze drivers of relational and performance risk in each situation. At the some time 
my results are very specific of a particular industry, namely they can be used 
immediately as guidelines for relationships between pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies.   
While the study makes contributions to the alliance literature, several potential 
limitations should be noted. First, I rely solely on secondary data in the 
biopharmaceutical industry; these data could be supplemented with field-based primary 
data of firms in this and other sectors to increase generalizability. Second, this research 
is based on a cross-sectional data and this provides limited insight into the temporal 
aspects of relational and performance risk in inter-firm relationships.  
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Chapter 6 
CONTRACT SETTINGS IN VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VC INVESTMENTS IN US AND 
EUROPE 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As pointed out in chapter 3, the scientific literature on venture capital contracting has 
received important contributions especially in the last decade, but this literature strand 
still suffers from the relative opaqueness of the industry. On the one hand, a large body 
of literature have addressed the incentive-optimal design of venture capital contracts in 
a theoretical context. On the other hand, empirical literature is much more limited and 
shows a discrepancy between theoretical models and observed contracting practices. For 
a long time, empirical work largely had to rely on survey data yielding a rich picture 
regarding general market assessment, but a potentially very subjective view of specific 
investments given the reliance on self-reporting. Moreover, while venture capitalists in 
the US seem to structure their contracts consistent with optimal characteristics predicted 
by the theory (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; 2004), contracts in the rest of the world 
seem to be much more heterogeneous (Bascha and Walz, 2002; Bottazzi et al., 2004; 
Cumming, 2005b, 2008). Still today there are no empirical studies on VC contracting 
across the different European countries. Empirical analyses outside the US are country-
based studies mainly coming from Germany or Canada.  
In this research I investigate venture capital contracting practices looking at how VCs 
mitigate principal agent conflicts between them and entrepreneurs. I showed in Chapter 
2 that according to financial contract theory and empirical research VCs try to mitigate 
agency conflicts in three ways: (i) pre-investment screening that allows the investor to 
choose good projects and/or (ii) structuring financial contracts such that cash flow rights 
and control rights are aligned to allow optimal behaviour by the entrepreneur or decisive 
intervention by the principal if need be and/or (iii) post investment monitoring and 
advising (Hart, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). 
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Not surprisingly some empirical research has focused on the interaction and 
complementarity of these activities, for example between the design of cash-flow and 
control rights in contracts and post investment activities such as monitoring (e.g. 
Hellmann and Puri, 2002). However, no research has focused on how the use of these 
mitigatory mechanisms such as pre-investment screening and design of financial 
contract provisions is associated to the perceived degree of agency conflict. It is also not 
clear how pre-investment screening activities such as syndication (e.g. Manigart et al, 
2006; Tykvova, 2007) are better used alongside or as a substitute to the design of 
contractual rights and post investment activities. Another issue that has not been 
examined is how better selection of ventures through syndication relates to the 
subsequent design of financial contracts provisions such as use of higher ranking equity 
financial instruments, cash flow and control rights in financial contracts. Also I ask if 
superior screening coming from the use of syndication results in the use of covenant 
rights as complements or substitutes.  
In order to give an answer to the above described research questions I firstly develop a 
theoretical model that analyzes how venture capitalists manage adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems in the investor-investee relation depending on the level of 
agency conflicts. Following past studies, I model the level of agency conflict in the 
investor-investee relation to be related to the venture development stage at which the 
investment occurs (e.g. Podolny, 2001; Gompers, 1995). Following Podolny (2001), I 
use three financing stages namely: first (seed and start up), second (early stage) and 
third financing stage (expansion and recapitalization).  
In particular, the first part of the research investigates how pre-investment screening 
activities, the use of equity financial instruments, the allocation of cash flow and control 
rights are employed with respect to each development stage of the venture at which the 
investment occurs. I also examine how these mechanisms interact, i.e. as complements 
or as substitutes.  
Then, the developed hypotheses are tested by analyzing contractual practices actually 
used in a sample of 265 venture capital investments in 127 portfolio companies by 90 
different lead VCs both in the United States and in European countries.  
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This is to the best of my knowledge the first empirical work that assesses this kind of in-
depth information across the largest VC markets in Europe and also the first dataset 
covering the US together with non-US countries.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section 6.2 provides the 
theoretical framework and develops a set of hypotheses that show how VCs mitigate 
agency problems through the use of syndication, financing instruments, cash flow and 
control rights. I then present the methodology in section 6.3. In section 6.4 I discuss the 
results obtained from the empirical investigation and finally section 6.5 is on discussion 
and conclusions.  
 
6.2 Theoretical framework developing: third set of hypotheses 
Potential investments by VCs in prospective promising entrepreneurs give rise to 
principal agent conflicts because of the high information asymmetry, high uncertainty 
and incentive problems involved in the interaction between the two parties. These 
agency conflicts may generate two kinds of problems: adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
The first problem is adverse selection. VCs as investors are not quite certain which 
projects are good or bad and face the risk of suboptimal allocation of funds to really 
good projects, in the belief that entrepreneurs withhold really good projects anyway, a 
situation first described by George Akerlof as the „market for lemons‟ (Akerlof, 1970). 
VCs can mitigate this problem by gaining competences in due diligence and ensuring 
they hire executives with deep industry experience. However, due to high risk and 
uncertainty arising from high information asymmetry, during the projects pre-
investment screening phase, VCs are further aided by either (i) syndication (e.g. Lerner, 
1994) and/or (ii) looking for signals, such as the willingness of the entrepreneur to ex-
ante accept penalties for mal-performance as a vote of their confidence in the quality of 
their ideas (Amit et al., 1990), i.e. the use of higher ranking equity financing 
instruments such as preferred equity. In paragraph 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 I investigate how 
VCs use syndication and equity instruments as mechanisms to manage adverse selection 
issues. 
At the same time, the contractual interactions between VCs and the entrepreneur are 
also subject to a moral hazard problem. On investment, the VC takes on part of the risk 
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and the potential surplus from the project. The moral hazard problem is that the 
entrepreneur may exert less effort than he would if he had full control of the project.  
Moreover, there is the danger that the entrepreneur, left to themselves, may take on 
more risk or waste the invested resources. The literature suggests that VCs mitigate 
moral hazard problems by including control rights such as staged financing provisions 
and sitting on the board of directors (Lerner, 1995; Gompers, 1997). Despite the control 
rights that the VCs may exercise, some features of the entrepreneur‟s business will 
remain unobservable or unverifiable. This situation is expected to improve as the VCs 
get access to the firm more and more over time. In paragraph 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 I 
investigate the use of standalone cash flow covenants, such as staging investments, and 
control rights, i.e. board rights, as instruments to reduce moral hazard problems.   
 
6.2.1 Pre-investment screening mechanism: the use of syndication 
In paragraph 3.3.1 of this doctoral thesis I reviewed the most important literature on the 
rationales for syndication highlighting that one of the motives for syndication of VC 
investment is that it is used as a pre-investment screening mechanism that mitigates 
agency problems. Indeed, ex-ante, company specific risk is generally high due to 
information asymmetry and incentive problems, and VCs syndication can lead to a 
better assessment and selection of the project in which to invest.  
Thus, I follow the syndication literature that supports the selection hypothesis, 
according to which there is an advantage derived from having more than one VC in the 
evaluation of the project before it is selected for investment (Lerner, 1994; Lockett and 
Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2006). Moreover, by syndication, VCs not only have 
access to potentially better quality information obtained through the social networks of 
other VCs, they also have potentially increased information processing capacity through 
the involvement of more and different decision makers (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986).  
Thus, syndication is particularly important for information sharing when the problem of 
information asymmetry is particularly high and an informed second opinion enhances 
the chances that the VC reaches a better decision (Lerner, 1994). The pre-investment 
screening through syndication results in VCs identifying what they perceive to be 
performance risks in the project (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004). Past empirical research 
has identified management risk as the major performance risk that arises out of pre-
investment screening.  
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Accordingly the value of an informed second and maybe third opinion increases with 
increased perceived degree of agency problems or information asymmetry problems. 
Finally, consistent with earlier work on the rationale underlying the decision to 
syndicate, Cumming (2006) finds empirical evidence supporting the conjecture that 
syndication mitigates problems of adverse selection.  
Adverse selection is a problem that VCs face when evaluating proposals for start-ups. 
However once a VC makes an investment, it has privileged access to information about 
the venture and accordingly the uncertainty around a reinvestment decision is relatively 
lower than the initial investment decision, hence I posit that:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher (lower) the degree of syndication used, the more likely 
the investment stage is associated with higher (lower) perceived venture selection risk. 
 
6.2.2 Signalling venture quality: preferred equity 
The second way of mitigating adverse selection problems is for VCs to design 
incentive-optimal investment contracts. From the entrepreneurs‟ point of view, their 
primary incentive is substantial equity ownership of a company that successfully 
commercializes their ideas. Their fortunes are tied up to the company‟s development 
and therefore are exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of the venture. This risk is increased 
when their stake is subordinated to that of the VC investors in that they receive no 
payoff until VC claimants have received prescribed payoffs in the event of exit.  
When entrepreneurs accept VCs to have higher-ranking equity stakes, they signal the 
confidence they have in their ideas in that they are willing to accept an incentive 
structure that punishes future mal-performance. In addition, most VC backed 
entrepreneurs receive submarket salaries during the start-up phase to induce self-
selection among applicants for venture capital funding because only applicants with 
confidence in their ideas can accept negative pay-offs as designed (Hall and Woodward, 
2010).  
Higher-ranking financing instruments used include preferred equity, convertible 
preferred equity and participating preferred equity. These financing instruments raise 
the seniority of VCs‟ equity and allow them to secure increased dividend, liquidation 
and subscription rights relative to the founder in the event of mal-performance (Ippolito, 
2006).  
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As the venture develops, adverse selection is expected to decrease as uncertainty around 
the investment reduces, hence I posit that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The higher (lower) the use of preferred equity instruments, the 
more likely the investment stage is associated with higher (lower) perceived venture 
selection risk. 
 
The pre-investment screening through syndication results in VCs identifying what they 
perceive to be performance risks in the project. For example, past empirical research has 
identified management risk as the major performance risk that arises out of pre-
investment screening (e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). I therefore expect VCs that 
use pre-screening mechanisms such as syndication to also employ higher ranking 
financing instruments such as preferred equity to mitigate against perceived 
management risk etc., hence I posit that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): A higher (lower) use of syndication will be used alongside 
higher (lower) use of preferred equity instruments in investment stages associated with 
higher (lower) perceived venture selection risk. 
 
6.2.3 Contractual rights: standalone cash flow covenants 
On the other hand, VCs face a moral hazard problem in that they are unable to monitor 
or specify the efforts of entrepreneurs in commercializing their ideas. When VCs 
commit to an investment, they face the risk that the entrepreneur exerts suboptimal 
effort, or takes on too much business risk or even squanders the firm‟s resources, 
because the risk is now borne or shared by the investor. VCs may mitigate this risk by 
continuously controlling the firm through contractual rights such as cash flow and 
control rights to influence the general operational and strategic direction of the venture 
(Lerner, 1995; Gompers, 1997). VCs tend to allocate control rights contingent on 
observable measures of the venture performance. Thus in case of bad performance 
control gradually shifts to the investor (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). 
Standalone covenants are used in practice to bolster the incentive optimal cash flow 
allocation through the use of cash flow rights and covenants. The use of further cash 
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flow rights (in addition to financing instruments), which are costly for the VC to write 
and enforce is an indicator of the higher level of agency conflict potential observed by 
the VC (Gompers and Lerner, 1996). 
Cash flow related covenants are generally intended to secure the VC‟s purely financial 
stakes from hold up problems rather than selection problems. They are applied as a 
downside protection for the VC to prevent a dilution or reduction of his investment 
value and as a measure to maintain control over the constitution and duration of his 
share in the portfolio firm.  
As already pointed out in paragraph 3.3.3 VCs can use a range of covenants as follows: 
(i) staged financing, to make cash investments conditional on specific milestones; (ii) 
conversion option,s to protect minimal interests in case of distress and have the option 
to claim high returns when they occur; (iii) redemption rights, that provide a VC the 
right to back down from an agreement after a certain period of time; (iv) exit rights, that 
provide a VC the right to force an exit if and (v) safeguards against events that they may 
dilute the VCs‟ ownership position. In particular, the literature review has highlighted 
how several authors (such as Neher, 1999; Wang and Zhou, 2004) have studied the role 
of staged financing in reducing moral hazard and uncertainty. Also, empirical research 
shows how staging is very widespread, but more prevalent for investments with high 
agency costs, since it mitigates moral hazard and hold-up by both parties and motivates 
the entrepreneur to exert optimal effort (Gompers, 1995).  
The potential misallocation of effort by the founder who has an incentive to accumulate 
private benefits at the expense of the VC investor is likely to increase as the venture 
develops. As the venture grows, the entrepreneurs have more resources under their 
control and they increase in confidence as they obtain superior information on the firm‟s 
substance and prospects. Moral hazard problems also stem from potentially diverging 
interests that worsens over time between VCs and entrepreneurs, especially from 
imbalanced financing structures and the fact entrepreneurs associate substantial non-
monetary benefits with their role in the company and with the existence of the company 
as a whole (Bergemann and Hege, 1998). Hence, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The higher (lower) the use of standalone cash flow covenants, the 
more likely the investment stage is associated with higher (lower) perceived venture 
moral hazard risk. 
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6.2.4 Contractual rights: control rights 
Finally, VCs can use their role as value adding investors to ensure they have the ability 
to influence the operational and strategic activities and direction of the venture they are 
investing in. Control rights provide VCs with the ability to enforce certain behaviour by 
the entrepreneur. As pointed out in paragraph 3.3.4 control rights can be divided 
between decision rights and veto rights (Tikvova, 2007). Decision rights mainly relate 
to the VC rights on the venture‟s supervisory board, namely board rights and board 
seats, voting rights, and management replacement clauses. Veto rights concerns instead 
a number of important strategic, financial or operative decisions, such as veto on 
changes to shareholder‟s agreement, asset sales, sales of shares, capital structure, 
business plan, etc.  
In empirical literature the most investigated control rights are board and voting rights, 
mainly because of the extensive use of these rights in real world contracting practices 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  
Control rights are important in the early stages of the venture, when the venture is at its 
most premature stage and it needs managerial support and direction. However, control 
rights become relatively more important as the venture matures, and requires more 
resources from the investors. Moreover, as the venture matures, the bargaining power of 
the entrepreneur increases, thus the possibility of opportunistic behaviour increases.   
Hence, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The higher (lower) the use of board control rights, the more 
likely the investment stage is associated with higher (lower) perceived venture moral 
hazard risk. 
 
Moreover, contracting practice shows that VCs use control rights alongside cash flow 
rights covenants. VCs are able to allocate control independent of the amount of cash-
flow rights and very often they retain control rights, which are often disproportionately 
larger than the size of their equity investment (Tikvova, 2007). Hence I posit: 
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): A higher (lower) use of standalone cash flow covenants will be 
used alongside higher (lower) use of board control rights in investment stages 
associated with higher (lower) perceived venture moral hazard risk. 
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6.3 Empirical analysis: an investigation on VC contracting practices in US and 
Europe 
6.3.1 Dataset and data collection 
The dataset used to empirically test the above described hypotheses consists of hand-
collected details on international VC financing contracts for a sample of 265 
investments in 127 portfolio companies by 90 different lead VCs in the United States, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, France, Scandinavia and a few other European 
countries. The analyzed investments took place between 1997 and 2008.  
To collect the data, a number of VC partnerships have been approached and asked them 
to provide details of their original investment contracts. The sample includes both small 
and large VCs and those with a national and/or international investment focus. The 
selection of target countries was motivated by a lack of contracting research in Europe
7
, 
together with the ambition to capture contracting practices from largely developed VC 
markets. To ensure that country-based results are not driven by outliers, country 
subsamples are of at least 20 investments for all major countries in the sample.  
The data collection process itself considered a wide range of contractual information to 
include all possibly relevant elements for this study. Where available, financing 
structures were collected together with information on covenants and both VC and 
portfolio firm characteristics. In light of the industry‟s very high confidentiality 
standards, all contracts were accessed at the VCs‟ offices, and all data was encoded 
anonymously upon receipt. Overall, collected information cover five broad areas:  
 
 general investment information, such as round number, date of investment, 
financing phase;  
 portfolio firm information, i.e. country and industry;  
 investment details, information such as investment timing (staging) and 
syndication;  
 security design, i.e. investment amounts by financing instrument, equity vs. 
debt financing;  
                                                        
7
 Due to a very fragmented and opaque VC industry, only very few researchers have been able to analyze 
European contracting with hand-collected cross-country samples. The only exceptions are Cumming 
(2008) and Cumming and Johan (2008), who analyze the interdependency of contracts and venture 
capital exits. Moreover, most of the data by Kaplan et al. (2007) stems from European countries. 
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 specific VC control rights, mainly information about VCs voting and board 
rights.  
 
Overall, the dataset has several advantages over most others used in previous studies in 
the field. First, data collection by hand eliminates a common bias from survey-based 
studies, which implies a high quality of data and a large degree of detail. Second, the 
information used in this study is quite comprehensive and goes beyond what is 
customarily analyzed in other studies with hand-collected data.
8
 Third, I‟m the first to 
access this kind of in-depth information across the largest VC markets in Europe. 
Moreover, this is also the first dataset on VC contracts details covering the US together 
with non-US countries.  
 
6.3.2 Dataset summary  
Table 7 below gives an overview of the major data characteristics in the sample. Panel 
A in Table 7 displays information by financing stage and shows that contracts cover all 
stages of the venture capital investment cycle from seed to recapitalization
9
. The 
investment stages are divided into first, second and third stage investments.  
First-stage investments include seed and start-up financing. In seed investments capital 
is provided to research, assess and develop an initial concept before a business has 
reached the start-up phase either before or immediately after founding. Start-up 
financing is provided to companies for product development and initial marketing. 
Companies may be in the process of being set up or may have been in business for a 
short time, but have not sold their product commercially.  
Second-stage investments cover other early stage financings that are provided to 
companies in final development (product testing and pilot production) and initial market 
entry and establishment stages that may or may not be generating revenue.  
                                                        
8
 The scope of examined documents exceeds that of most other studies. For example, Antonczyk et al. 
(2007a,b) and Cumming (2008) limit their analyses to investment agreements, while Lerner and 
Schoar (2005) analyze only investment agreements, investment memoranda and business plans. Our 
data is most similar in scope to work by Kaplan and omberg (2003), Bienz and Walz (2006) and 
Kaplan et al. (2007). 
 
9
 Our stage classification has been adapted from Cumming et al. (2010), who use an adjusted version of 
the EVCA definitions. Few other studies report summary statistics on the distribution of their 
contracts across stages. Ours is similar to the distribution in those studies that do (compare Bienz and 
Walz, 2006; Antonczyk et al., 2007a). 
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Third-stage investments include expansion and recapitalization. Expansion financing is 
provided to companies in need of development capital for the growth and expansion of 
a company, which may or may not break even or trade profitability. Capital may be 
used to finance increased production capacity, develop new markets or products or 
provide additional working capital. Recapitalization financing is provided to 
recapitalize more mature companies that have traded profitability in the past.  
Panel A shows that nearly 39% of investments were for first-stage financing where the 
company had not begun any production. About 40,4% of investments were for second-
stage financing and 20,6% of the investments were for expansion or recapitalization. 
Moreover, the figures on average investment amounts yield an interesting picture. 
Average investment amounts decrease going from first to third investments. This 
indicates that investors provide largest amounts of funds per capita in very early 
investment stages, when the portfolio firm has not yet delivered any proof-of-concept 
and when the financing need is obviously higher.  
Panel B displays information by country; I divided data in three subsamples, namely 
investments from Europe, US and Other countries. The biggest subsample stems from 
Europe with a total of 198 investments (66% of the total). The reader should know, even 
if it is not displayed in the summary information table, that within Europe, Germany has 
the highest number of investments (81), followed by United Kingdom (34), Scandinavia 
(30) and France (19). Moreover, 67 investments are from US (25,3% of the total) and 
23 investments (8,7%) are from Israel. With the UK, France, Sweden and Germany, the 
sample includes data from the largest venture capital markets in Europe (at least in 
absolute terms). Including contracts from the US enables direct comparisons between 
US and European data, which no study to date has been able to accomplish.  
Panel B also shows that contracts have been structured by a number of different lead 
investors in all major countries in the sample. This ensures that country results are not 
dominated by contracting practices of individual VCs. The figures also show a 
significant difference in the investment amount between countries. Larger investment 
amounts are found in US.  
The contracts are from a range of different industries (see Panel C) and are distributed 
fairly evenly over time (Panel D).
10
                                                        
10
 All investments in our sample took place between 1997 and 2008. Except for the first and last two 
years of this period, the collected investments are distributed evenly with a little peak only in the 
years 2000 and 2001. 
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Table 7. Summary information on the analyzed VC investments 
 Investment Rounds Portfolio Firms First Round Only 
Roundsize 
(in € 1,000) 
Mean 
Overall Sample 265 100% 127 100% 60 100% 7,322 
Panel A: Investments by Investment Stage      
First-stage financing 100 38.91%   41 68.34% 9,191 
Second-stage financing 104 40.47%   12 20.00% 7,585 
Third-stage financing 53 20.62%   7 11.66% 3,439 
Panel B: Investment by Country      
Europe 198 66.04% 91 71.66% 50 83.34% 7,846 
United States 67 25.28% 26 20.47% 8 13.33% 11,634 
Other countries 23 8.68% 10 7.87% 2 3.33% 4,123 
Panel C: Investment by Primary Industry      
Life Science 66 24.91% 32 25.19% 16 26.67% 9,663 
ICT 186 70.19% 86 67.72% 40 66.67% 6,444 
Other industries 13 4.90% 9 7.09% 4 6.66% 8,644 
Panel D: Investments by Investment Year      
1997 2 0.75% 2 1.57% 1 1.67% 15,529 
1998 4 1.51% 4 3.15% 3 5.00% 1,865 
1999 18 6.79% 14 11.02% 6 10.00% 6,588 
2000 42 15.85% 24 18.90% 14 23.33% 9,172 
2001 40 15.09% 20 15.75% 9 15.00% 9,354 
2002 27 10.19% 17 13.39% 8 13.33% 7,270 
2003 33 12.45% 11 8.66% 4 6.67% 5,498 
2004 34 12.83% 8 6.30% 2 3.33% 5,313 
2005 30 11.32% 13 10.24% 8 13.33% 5,726 
2006 26 9.81% 10 7.87% 2 3.33% 7,489 
2007 8 3.02% 3 2.36% 2 3.33% 8,880 
2008 1 0.38% 1 0.79% 1 1.67% 24,790 
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Major industries in our sample include IT/software, semiconductors and 
communication, that were grouped under the term „ICT‟ (70%), followed by biotech 
and medical technology, that were grouped under „Life Science‟(25%).11 The remainder 
5% is composed of firms operating in „Other industries‟, such as media, F&B services 
and traditional industries. Not very surprisingly, the figures indicate that companies in 
relatively less complex and capital-intensive industries such as IT, software and other 
ICT require lower round amounts. Life Science firms, on the other hand, have very 
large round sizes in our sample. It can be observed that the average investment size 
peaked in the years 2000 and 2001, even though especially 2000 contained a lot of first 
rounds. This is in line with the overall phenomenon of very high valuations in the pre-
2001 run-up. 
 
6.3.3 Variables and measures 
6.3.3.1 Dependent variable: financing stage 
The dependent variable used in this study is a measure of the degree of information 
asymmetry between the investor (VC) and the investee (entrepreneurial firm) at the time 
of the investment. Following the work of Podonly (2001), I assume that the degree of 
information asymmetry between investor and investee is related to the firm‟s 
development stage at the time of the investment. I therefore denote the degree of 
information asymmetry by the development stage that the investment is taking place in. 
Thus, the dependent variable, Financing Stage, is an ordinal variable taking values: „1‟ 
for first stage financing; „2‟ for second stage financing and „3‟ for third stage financing.  
 
6.3.3.2 Independent variables 
N° of VCs in syndication 
Several researches have treated syndication as a dummy variable, either syndication 
occurs, or it does not occur. In this research I decided to treat syndication more 
comprehensively (as in Brander et al. 2002), as I know the number of syndicating 
venture capitalists associated with each venture. In this way I can evaluate the degree of 
                                                        
11
 Although these studies report slightly different industry categories, this distribution is fairly similar to 
those found in previous samples by for example Kaplan and omberg (2003), Bienz and Walz 
(2006), Antonczyk et al. (2007b) and Kaplan et al. (2007). 
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syndication. The variable, N° of VCs in Syndication, is a count variable denoting the 
number of additional VC investors involved and assuming value „0‟ where syndication 
is not involved.  
 
Preferred Equity  
I analyse the use of all forms of Preferred Equity, i.e. straight preferred equity, 
convertible preferred equity, and participating preferred equity securities. A central 
advantage of equity securities is that investors participate in the upside development of 
the firm. Preferred equity differs from common stock mainly through its superior 
dividend, liquidation and subscription rights. In this analysis I consider preferred equity 
securities since they are the primary financing instruments used in VC investments. As 
observed from the literature review in section 3.3.2, empirical research, in the US, leave 
no room for doubt that convertible preferred equity is the prime financing instrument in 
VC investments (see for example Sahlman, 1990; Trester, 1998; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2003). On the other hand, in European VC investments, researchers find a more 
heterogeneous picture, however equity securities, especially common, straight preferred 
and convertible preferred stock, are used in almost 50% of cases (Cumming, 2005a; 
Cumming 2005b; Bottazzi et al., 2004). Hence, our variable Preferred Equity is coded 
with value „1‟ when the VC used either preferred equity or convertible preferred equity 
or participating preferred equity as a financing instrument of the investment or “0” 
otherwise.  
 
Cash-Flow rights  
Cash-flow related covenants are generally intended to secure the VC‟s financial stakes. 
They are applied as a downside protection for the VC to prevent a dilution or reduction 
of his investment value and as a control mechanism. As discussed in earlier sections, 
VCs can use a range of cash flow rights. In the empirical analysis I include one of the 
most used cash-flow rights in the literature, that is Staged Financing. This choice was 
also related to data availability. Through staged financing the VC investor can make 
future cash flows conditional on the achievement of specific milestones. The variable is 
coded „1‟ where the VC used this right and „0‟ where it is not.  
 
Control rights  
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VCs use control rights to secure their influence in the portfolio firm. These rights allow 
VCs to enforce certain behaviours by the entrepreneur and exert influence in important 
operational and strategic decisions.  
Control rights are mainly related to the VC supervision on the venture‟s board and may 
include voting rights and also veto rights for a number of important strategic, financial 
and operative decisions. In this empirical analysis, mainly because of data availability, I 
use the variable Board Rights of the VCs that measures the total percentage of rights of 
all the VCs on the board of the entrepreneurial firm.  
 
6.3.3.3 Control variables 
I include five control variables in the analysis. First, I include the variable Date, that is a 
categorical variable ranging from 1997 to 2008 in order to control for temporal trends in 
investments. I also control for cross-country differences in contracting practices by 
using the variables Europe and US, that are dummy variables assuming value „1‟ 
whether the entrepreneurial firm is European or US. Then, I control for size as a motive 
for syndicating by the use of the variable Average Investment. Average investment is 
obtained by dividing the overall value of the investment by the number of VCs 
syndicating. Finally, I control for industry effects by including the two control variables 
ICT and Life Science; that are dummy variables assuming value „1‟ whether the 
entrepreneurial firm is operating in one of those industries.  
 
6.3.4 Methods 
I assessed the association between the use of syndication, senior equity financial 
instruments and contractual rights AND the degree of information asymmetry as 
represented by the three firm‟s development and financing stages, (first stage, second 
stage and third stage financing), with a multinomial logistic regression. The general 
specification of the multinomial logistic regression applied here was: 
 
Ln(Pj/Po) = A + BjXj 
 
Where Pj is the probability of an event occurring for the jth case. The two possible 
events here are defined as investment occurring in stage one (seed or start-up) i=1; or 
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investment occurring in stage two (early stage investment) i=2. Po is the probability of 
the investment occurring in stage 3 (expansion). Xj is the vector of independent 
variables. 
 
6.3.5 Results  
Table 8 reports the basic descriptive statistics and correlations for both the dependent 
and independent variables included in this study. The average of N° of VCs in 
Syndication is 3 although there is considerable variability with a relatively high standard 
deviation of about 3. About 48% of VC contracts on average use Staged Financing. 
Preferred Equity is used as financing instrument in 55% of investments. Finally, VCs 
dominate the Board Rights with a mean of 56%. The standard deviation of this variable 
is relatively small at 0.2 indicating that this practice is much more generally employed.  
The average investment amount is €1812000, although there is considerable variability 
with a standard deviation of €1810000. The correlations show high values between 
some of the control dummy variables, such as the value -0.79 between the variables 
Europe and US and -0.92 between ICT and Life Science; this might indicate possible 
multicollinearity problems. Therefore a collinearity test was performed to analyze the 
extent each of the individual regressors were dependent on the other regressors. The 
variance inflation factors (VIF) are much lower than 10 for all the variables, thus we 
assumed that multicollinearity is not a problem for the data.  
Table 9 present the results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis. These results 
provide a detailed assessment of the contractual mechanism firms use in making 
investments at each development or financing stage (first, second or third stage). Each 
model estimates coefficients for the likelihood of the mechanisms allowing VCs to 
manage adverse selection and moral hazard problems to be employed at the first and 
second financing stages against the default category of the third financing stage of the 
venture. Model 1 shows control variables only. Model 2 contains control variables and 
the first independent variable of syndication. Model 3 shows control variables and the 
second independent variable of preferred equity. Model 4 shows control variables, both 
syndication and preferred equity independent variables and the interaction effect 
between syndication and preferred equity. Model 5 shows control variables and the third 
independent variable of staged financing. Model 6 shows control variables and the forth 
independent variable of board rights. 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variable Mean S.D.  Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Financing Stage 1.81 0.74 1 3          
1. Europe 0.66 0.47 0 1          
2. US 0.24 0.43 0 1 -0.79
**
         
3. Date 2002 2.38 1997 2008 -0-14 0.14        
4. Av. Investment (in €1000) 1812.45 1819.79 24.14 15450 0.01 0.01 -0.12*       
5. ICT 0.70 0.45 0 1 -0.16
**
 0.17
**
 0.04 -0.17
**
      
6. Life Science 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.20
**
 -0.20
**
 -0.01 0.14
*
 -0.88
**
     
7. N° of VCs in Syndication 3.53 3.38 0 25 -0.30
**
 0.36
**
 0.14
*
 0.08 -0.01 0.03    
8. Preferred Equity 0.55 0.49 0 1 -0.33
**
 0.26
**
 0.18 0.25
*
 -0.03 0.04 0.36
**
   
9. Staged Financing 0.48 0.50 0 1 -0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.14  
10. VC‟s Board Rights  0.56 0.21 0 1 0.09 -0.01 0.39* 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.32** 0.22** 0.17** 
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Table 9. Multinomial regression analysis results: models 1 - 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 stage=1 stage=2 stage=1 
phase=2 
stage=2 stage=1 stage=2 stage=1 stage=2 
Const 900.52
***
 724.61
***
 1002.38
***
 835.70
***
 981.45
***
 744.06
***
 1040.17
***
 851.28
***
 
 (183.75) (175.41) (192.03) (184.18) (190.63) (179.22) (198.46) (189.57) 
Europe 0.518
 
 
-0.453 0.621 -0.344 0.982
 
 
-0.282 0.945
 
 
-0.304 
 (0.728) (0.599) (0.740) (0.619) (0.754) (0.639) (0.773) (0.673) 
US 0.888 -0.037 0.462 -0.550 0.956 0.023 0.562 -0.419 
 (0.787) (0.654) (0.823) (0.699) (0.785) (0.661) (0.857) (0.746) 
Date -0.450
***
 -0.361
***
 -0.501
***
 -0.417
***
 -0.491
***
 -0.371
***
 -0.520
***
 -0.425
***
 
 (0.092) (0.087) (0.095) (0.092) (0.095) (0.089) (0.099) (0.095) 
Av. Investment -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ICT 1.446 0.643 1.022 0.137 1.257 0.602 0.935 0.212 
 (0.987) (0.806) (1.017) (0.844) (1.007) (0.819) (1.022) (0.855) 
Life Science 4.132
***
 2.514
***
 3.674
***
 1.970
*
 3.848
***
 2.399
**
 3.557
***
 1.994
**
 
 (1.187) (1.045) (1.215) (1.075) (1.202) (1.056) (1.222) (1.091) 
N° of VCs in Syndication   0.234
***
 0.267
***
   0.101 0.327
***
 
   (0.086) (0.083)   (0.161) (0.140) 
Preferred Equity     1.137
**
 0.274 0.698 0.169 
     (0.450) 
) 
(0.417) (0.655) 
) 
(0.642) 
Syndication*Pref Equity       0.099 -0.091 
       (0.194) (0.176) 
Pse 
Pseudo R-square Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 stage
=1 
stage=2 stage=1 
phase=2 
stage=2 stage=1 stage=2 stage=1 stage=2 
Const 900.52
***
 724.61
***
 1002.38
***
 835.70
***
 981.45
***
 744.06
***
 1040.17
***
 851.28
***
 
 (183.75) (175.41) (192.03) (184.18) (190.63) (179.22) (198.46) (189.57) 
Europe 0.518
 
 
-0.453 0.621 -0.344 0.982
 
 
-0.282 0.945
 
 
-0.304 
 (0.728) (0.599) (0.740) (0.619) (0.754) (0.639) (0.773) (0.673) 
US 0.888 -0.037 0.462 -0.550 0.956 0.023 0.562 -0.419 
 (0.787) (0.654) (0.823) (0.699) (0.785) (0.661) (0.857) (0.746) 
Date -0.450
***
 -0.361
***
 -0.501
***
 -0.417
***
 -0.491
***
 -0.371
***
 -0.520
***
 -0.425
***
 
 (0.092) (0.087) (0.095) (0.092) (0.095) (0.089) (0.099) (0.095) 
Av. Investment -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
udo R-Square 
0.107  0.128  0.128  0.148  
Log likelihood -243.79  −237.90  -237.90  -232.44  
LR Chi-square [Prob.] (12) 58.40 [0.000] (14) 70.17 [0.000] (14) 70.17 [0.000] (18) 81.10 [0.000] 
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Table 10. Multinomial regression analysis results: models 5 - 8 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 stage=1 
 
stage=2 stage=1 
phase=2 
stage=2 stage=1 stage=2 stage=1 
 
stage=2 
Const 888.31
***
 735.70
***
 884.26
***
 802.50
***
 903.87
***
 810.02
***
 1011.93
***
 876.32
***
 
 (186.35) (176.75) (210.21) (202.85) (215.70) (205.73) (229.04) (217.92) 
Europe 0.512 -0.465 0.749 -0.435 0.724 -0.453 1.425
*
 -0.076 
 (0.739) (0.599) (0.764) (0.626) (0.778) (0.627) (0.833) (0.704) 
US 0.906 -0.051 1.251 0.300 1.207 0.265 0.945 -0.133 
 (0.797) (0.655) (0.833) (0.691) (0.848) (0.693) (0.887) (0.739) 
Date -0.444
***
 -0.367
***
 -0.442
***
 -0.400
***
 -0.451
***
 -0.404
***
 -0.505
***
 -0.437
***
 
 (0.093) (0.088) (0.105) (0.101) (0.107) (0.103) (0.114) (0.109) 
Av. Investment -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ICT 1.507 0.643 0.949 0.807 0.684 0.760 0.306 0.206 
 (1.000) (0.808) (1.112) (1.008) (1.157) (1.021) (1.273) (1.125) 
Life Science 4.276
***
 2.493
**
 3.736
***
 2.843
**
 3.629
***
 2.776
**
 3.065
**
 2.093 
 (1.200) (1.044) (1.303) (1.220) (1.340) (0.024) (1.444) (1.315) 
N° of VCs in syndication       0.255
**
 0.291
***
 
       (0.106) (0.103) 
Preferred Equity        1.080
**
 0.145 
       (0.541)  (0.507)  
Staged Financing -0.965
**
 0.025   0.151 0.480 -1.050
**
 -0.058 
 (0.391) (0.363)   (1.418) (1.378) (0.455)  (0.429) 
VC‟s Board Rights    -0.018* -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.033** -0.019* 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) 
StagedFin*BoardRights     -0.022 -0.007   
     (0.022) (0.021)   
Pseudo R-square  
 
 
-square  
    
Pseudo R-square  
 
0.129  0.119 
 
 0.151  0.184  
Log likelihood -237.70  −217.73  -209.87  -201.65  
         
LR Chi-square [Prob.] (14) 70.59 [0.000]  (14) 58.93 [0.000]  (18) 74.65 [0.000]  (20) 91.08 [0.000]   
 
 −217.73  -209.87  -201.65  
LR Chi-square [Prob.] (14) 70.59 
[0.000] 
 (14) 58.93 
[0.000] 
 (18) 74.65 
[0.000] 
 (20) 91.08 
[0.000] 
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Model 7 shows control variables and both staged financing and boards rights variables 
and the interaction effect between staged financing and board rights. Using results from 
Model 8 (the one with all the independent variables), we interpret the likelihood of each 
independent variable being associated with the first and second financing stages relative 
to the third financing stage. 
Model 1 includes the control variables only. The results show that the variables Date 
and Life Science have a significant relation with the financing stage of the venture at 
both the levels of the dependent variable. For example, being negative the coefficients 
of Date (-0.45 and -0.36 respectively for stage=1 and stage=2), with the increase of the 
variable, namely going on in the years, it becomes less likely to have first-stage 
financing and second-stage financing relative to third-stage ventures. Also, the positive 
and big values of the coefficients of Life Science at both stage=1 (4.13) and stage=2 
(2.51) indicate that in this industry it is much more likely to have a first-stage financing 
and a little less likely to have a second-stage relative to third-stage financing. The rest 
of the control variables are not significant.  
Turning to independent variables, Hypothesis 1 (H1) associates the high use of 
syndication as occurring at financing stages with high degrees of information 
asymmetry. In model 2, the variable, N° of VCs in syndication is significant at both 
stage=1 and stage=2 (p<0.01) with positive coefficients equal to 0.23 and 0.26.  
In particular the positive coefficient at stage=1, namely seed and start-up phase, 
indicates that it is more likely to have a higher number of VCs in syndication in early 
stages in comparison to later stages; moreover, since the coefficient increases at second-
stage financing it is much more likely to have a higher number of VCs in syndication in 
early growth stages rather than in expansion and recapitalization stages. This result is in 
line with my expectations in Hypothesis 1 (H1) and holds true in the full model 8 as 
well. 
Model 3 analyzes the use of Preferred Equity financing; the variable is significant only 
at stage=l (p<0.05) and the coefficient is positive and equal to 1.13. Thus, the use of 
preferred equity instruments is more likely in seed or start-up investments relative to 
expansion or recapitalization investments. Namely, this result supports Hypothesis 2a 
(H2a) that suggests that the high use of preferred equity instruments is more likely to be 
associated with investment stages that have high information asymmetry problems, 
namely early-stages. This result is confirmed also in the full model 8.  
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Model 4 includes both the aforementioned variables, N° of VCs in syndication and 
Preferred Equity plus a new variable that represent the interaction term between the 
two, Syndication*PrefEquity. This model has been developed in order to test 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b) that suggests a complementary use of the two mechanisms in 
investment stages associated with a high venture selection risk. The interaction term is 
not statistically significant; thus, I conclude that no interaction exists between the two 
variables. This result seems to confirm the conjecture in Hypothesis 2b (H2b) that the 
two variables are used as complements.  
Model 5 includes the variable Staged Financing which is significant only at stage=1 
(p<0.05), with a negative coefficient equal to -0.96. This result suggests that VCs use 
the provision to stage the capital infusions more frequently in late-stage venture, namely 
in expansion or recapitalization, relative to early stages. This confirms Hypothesis 3 
(H3) predicting that the high use of cash flow rights, in this case of staged investments, 
is more likely to be associated with investment stages that have high moral hazard 
problems, namely late stages. Again, the hypothesis is confirmed also in the full model 
8 where the variable is still significant at stage=1 and the coefficient is still negative.  
In model 6, I enter the variable Board Rights of the VCs which shows up as significant 
at stage=1 (p<0.1). The coefficient (-0.018) is small and negative and indicates that 
there is a higher likelihood to have a higher percentage of VC‟s board rights in late 
stages relative to early stages. The result confirms Hypothesis 4a (H4a), which predict a 
high use of control rights to be more likely to be associated with investments stages that 
have high moral hazard problems. In the full model, the variable Board Rights of the 
VCs become significant also at stage=2; thus we can confirm Hypothesis 4a (H4a) at 
both the levels of the dependent variable.   
Model 7 uses both Staged Financing and VC‟s Board Rights and the interaction term 
between the two StagedFin*BoardRights. Because of the non-significance of the 
interaction variable, I suggest that the result confirms Hypothesis 4b (H4b). Namely no 
interaction exists between the use of cash flow and control rights, thus they are used as 
complements.  
 
6.4 Discussion  
This research sheds some light on some of the factors that underlie how VCs mitigate 
the considerable but varied principal agent conflict that takes the form of adverse 
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selection and moral hazard problems in their investor-investee relation with prospective 
entrepreneurs. Using a typology of three investment and venture development stages of 
first financing stage (seed and start-up), second financing stage (early stage) and third 
financing stage (expansion and recapitalization), the extent of principal agent conflict 
embedded in this relation is modelled as a function of the degree of information 
asymmetry and incentive problems being faced by both parties at each investment stage.  
I found that the use of pre-investment screening mechanisms and higher ranking 
financing instruments could predictably be linked to the degree of adverse selection risk 
at each investment or financing stage. Similarly, we also found that the use of cash flow 
rights and control rights can predictably be linked to the degree of moral hazard risk at 
each stage of investment or financing stage. By directly modelling the use of these sets 
of pre-investment screening and contractual mechanisms and how they are associated to 
the separate constituents of the principal agency risk of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, I provide some insight into the multiple logics behind the choice of what gets 
included in VC contracts design.  
The results provide strong support for the importance of syndication, as a pre-
investment screening mechanism, and higher ranking financing instruments, such as 
preferred equity, as levers VCs employ to manage adverse selection problems. These 
two levers are important in their own right as they had a direct and persistent association 
with the perceived level of adverse selection risk at each investment stage. However, 
additionally, the two levers also tend to be used alongside each other in a 
complementary manner rather than as substitutes.  
The important finding on syndication as a means to improve pre-investment selection is 
supportive of a number of existing studies in general that support syndication as 
promoting better decision making in selection of investments and have argued that:  (i) 
syndicates are a way to better access information about portfolio companies and (ii) 
VCs in syndicates make use of additional resources from syndicate partners (Manigart 
et al, 2006; Tykvova, 2007). This study highlights that the deliberations on the rationale 
for use of syndication are not dominated by other reasons such as risk sharing, loan size, 
deal flow access etc (Manigart et al, 2006; Lerner, 1994).  
I also examined the prevalence of preferred equity in VC contracts and how likely their 
use is linked to selection risk. I confirm the findings from previous studies (i.e. Trester, 
1998) that the use of preferred equity is a mechanism to mitigate adverse selection in 
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particular and that its use is associated with the perceived degree of venture selection 
risk (Gompers, 1995). This important finding confirms the second mechanism that VCs 
employ to mitigate risk, i.e. signalling the quality of the venture by the entrepreneur‟s 
willingness to accept an incentive structure that punishes them in the event of mal-
perfomance (Hall and Woodward, 2010; Ippolito, 2006). An interesting contribution by 
our study is that the signalling effect is not diminished by the use of syndication as a 
pre-investment selection mechanism alongside higher ranking financing instruments 
(Lerner, 1994). This link merits serious consideration because the use of pre-investment 
selection mechanisms may unearth the presence of specific types of risk (e.g. 
managerial performance risk) which information in turn is used to choose the specific 
financing instrument to use alongside syndication. Although out conjecture provides a 
compelling reason why the two mechanism may be used as complements, this is an 
exciting area for on-going future research. 
I also examined the likely use of cash flow rights in investment stages associated with 
moral hazard risk. Cash flow rights are a set of standalone covenant provisions that can 
be included in VC contracts to control the downside risk of loss of VC future cash flow 
position. The results are supportive of the predictions that the writing of cash flow rights 
is mainly to mitigate moral hazard problems. In drawing up the normative argument, I 
hypothesize that the relative contribution of moral hazard problems over adverse 
selection problems to the total agency risk perceived at each investment stage increases 
with each stage of investment. Even though the overall agency risk reduces with each 
investment stage, the main effective perception of moral hazard risk is that it increases 
over time. This means that adverse selection risk dominates the early stages of 
financing, but diminishes in importance relatively quickly with each investment stage. 
This research provides some empirical evidence that, although adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems are usually both present in the VC-entrepreneur relationship, 
since they are not mutually exclusive, their relative importance differs over time. Thus, 
the effects of the former are salient at early stage investments when information 
asymmetry and uncertainty are higher, whilst the latter seems to be more important at 
later stage investments. This has important practical implications for contract design 
and for pre- and post-investment project‟s evaluation activities. 
This argument is supported by the findings on board rights and how they are used in VC 
contracts when related to investment stages. The higher percentage of the VCs‟ board 
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rights employed are in later stages of financing such as expansion or recapitalization 
investments relative to seed or start up.  
Finally, the important finding that a mix of cash flow and control rights are used 
alongside each other rather than as substitutes points to the complex nature of achieving 
control in a risky venture. Whilst cash flow rights allow the VC to control against 
potential downside risk of diluting their stake against various potential scenarios related 
to moral hazard problems that induce opportunism and therefore malperformance, board 
rights are a form of direct control used to shape and align the on-going strategy of the 
venture. 
There is also reason to hypothesize how one type of control right may influence another, 
concurrently. For example, as the VC seats on the board and gets more information 
regarding the performance of the venture, this may in turn inform on future decisions 
regarding the potential use of staged financing or other similar types of cash flow rights. 
These findings have practical implications for the design of VC contracts because they 
present robust theory and empirical arguments why certain provisions should be 
included in VC contracts. 
Finally, this research has several limitations that at the same time present opportunities 
future research. First, I have only considered a few of the most prevalent financing 
instruments and contractual rights. Future research can investigate other financing 
instruments such as debt, other cash flow rights such as those listed in the theory section 
of this study and other control rights (e.g. conversion options, redemption rights, exit 
rights, voting rights, board seats etc). Future research can also look at VC contract 
practice and link to performance data. Ultimately, best practice must be related to 
successful outcomes.  
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Chapter 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter aims at drawing together the studies presented in this thesis and their 
main contributions. From a global point of view, this thesis deals with the analysis of 
two different phenomenon that strongly characterize the turbulent and competitive 
environment in which nowadays firms try to foster innovation. On the one hand, the 
more and more frequent formation of relationships between separate firms that seeks to 
exploit their complementarities in order to achieve a goal. On the other hand, the 
diffusion of external financial backers, such as Venture Capitalists (VCs), that finance 
start-up firms that usually are the engine of innovation fostering and developing.  
This thesis looks at both topics from a strategic management perspective using the most 
influential theoretical approaches of the organization theory, namely transaction cost 
economics, resource-based view, property right theory, real options theory and agency 
theory. 
Over the chapters of this thesis, I explained how the interest in these issues and the 
identification of some gaps in the existing literature, led me to focus on particular 
aspects of the two research topics; on the one hand, I addressed the issue of the choice 
of the governance of inter-firm relationships, and on the other, I studied the choice of 
the most suitable contract design in venture capital investments.  
Main results of such researches are now presented and discussed, together with the 
identification of main contributions and limitations.  
 
7.2 Contributions 
This thesis makes both scientifically and managerially significant contributions.  
As far as the governance of IFRs, as widely discussed in Chapter 2, 4 and 5, there is a 
growing interest on the topic arising from both academic and industry world and a 
substantial body of literature still exists. The matter under discussion is how managers 
could determine the most suitable governance form for a particular relationship among 
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two or more firms, considering both the goals that such relationship seek to achieve and 
trying to reduce the possibility of opportunistic behaviours between the partners 
resulting from the presence of information asymmetry.  
In Chapter 4, I addressed the problem of choosing the governance form of IFRs by 
looking for factors that could be discriminatory for such a decision with a particular 
focus at bio-pharmaceutical relationships. Hereinafter I briefly summarize the 
contributions of this research: 
 
 From a theoretical point of view, this is the first work that formulates a 
framework that considers simultaneously different theories in order to identify 
the main drivers of the governance form decision in biopharmaceutical 
relationships. Thus, I provide insights on the complementarities of transaction 
costs, resource-based, property rights and real options perspectives in explaining 
firm governance preferences, contributing to a recent literature strand that 
supports the integration of several theoretical approaches for a deeper 
understanding of rationales for IFRs governance. Moreover, this study 
contributes to understand the importance of considering a dual perspective in 
bio-pharmaceuticals IFRs, since pharma and biotech firms often have conflicting 
goals about the governance of their relationship; thus, the selected governance 
mode strongly depends on their relative bargaining powers. 
 
 From an empirical point of view, this is the first research in the 
biopharmaceutical industry that integrates drivers belonging to different 
theoretical perspectives and confirms the validity of this integrated approach. I 
empirically confirm how uncertainty, appropriation concern and trust influence 
the governance choice in the Italian biopharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, I 
demonstrate the importance of a new driver that is the functional completeness 
of a firm, in determining this decision.  
 
 From a managerial point of view, results of this research enhance the 
understanding of the decision making process on IFRs governance. This study 
can help managers to make more aware decisions regarding the choice among 
different governance structures when they are approaching new relationships.  
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Moreover, the advantage of having formulated hypothesis directly on 
operationalized measures, that are specific of a particular industry, makes the 
theoretical framework easily applicable in the industrial practice. Also, the focus 
on firms‟ bargaining power provides interesting indications to managers in 
charge with IFRs in this industry: they must be aware that the industry context, 
the Italian one in this case, matters, indeed, in some more mature contexts, the 
contractual power between the partners could be significantly different, leading 
to different governance solutions. Finally, managers need to carefully evaluate 
measures of functional completeness of their partner firms, such as the number 
of commercialized products of the biotech firm, when approaching IFRs in 
biopharmaceutical industry.  
 
In Chapter 5, I approached the same research issue concerning the governance of IFRs, 
but using a different point of view. In this research I focused on the managers risk 
perception in evaluating the governance. Thus, I construct a second theoretical model 
that studies how the perception of both a relational risk and a performance risk 
influence such a decision. Hereinafter I briefly summarize the contributions of this 
research: 
 
 From a theoretical point of view, I contribute to the literature by bringing a 
comprehensive theoretical framework that supports risk-evaluation in the choice 
of inter-firm relationships governance. In particular, my theoretical model 
applies TCE and RO theories in a discriminated fashion in order to shed new 
light on IFRs governance by identifying and distinguishing among factors 
influencing the perception of a relational risk and those influencing the 
perception of a performance risk in undertaking a new relation. Moreover, I add 
to theory by providing evidence that a moderating effect between relational and 
performance risk factors does exist; namely, the extent of high levels of both 
relational risk and performance risk factors reduces both the tendency to move 
toward totally integrated governance forms, such as M&As and toward pure 
market transactions, such as licensing agreements, leading in practice to hybrid 
forms, such as equity and non-equity alliances. 
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 From an empirical point of view, this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first 
empirical work that provides evidence of both the influence of relational and 
performance risk factors. I find support for the fact that the investment 
specificity and the lack of IFRs experience, that are relational risk drivers, lead 
firms to choose more hierarchical governance forms. On the contrary, I find that 
the newness of the technology object of the relationship, the technological 
distance between the partners and the different partners‟ nationalities, by 
influencing the perceived performance risk, push firms to market-oriented 
governance modes. Finally, this is the first empirical study that demonstrate how 
several interactions between performance risk and relational risk factors are 
significantly important in the governance choice; namely, several moderating 
effects have been found significant: (i) the technological newness and the 
partners‟ different nationality, moderates the relationship between investment 
specificity and hierarchical governance; (ii) the relationship between the lack of 
IFRs experience and hierarchical governance is moderated by the technological 
distance and the different nationality; (iii) the extent of technological distance 
seems to moderate the relationship between partners‟ asymmetry and 
hierarchical governance forms; (iv) the investment specificity, the lack of 
previous relations, the partners‟ asymmetry and the lack of IFRs experience, 
mitigate the relationship between technological newness and nationality, and 
market-oriented governance modes.  
 
 From a managerial point of view, the model here proposed and its empirical 
confirmation recognize that the perception of strategy-makers substantially 
influence inter-firm strategic decisions, namely managers tend to make decisions 
based on their evaluation of both relational and performance risk. Also, I 
propose a general and comprehensive framework for making governance 
decisions in inter-firm relationships that is easily adaptable to any industry. 
Thus, from a managerial perspective, it may represent a tool for decision 
supporting when managers have to undertake a new relation with another firm, 
by specifically analyze drivers of relational and performance risk in each 
situation.  
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At the same time my results are very specific of a particular industry, namely 
they can be used immediately as guidelines for relationships between 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies.   
 
As far as the second research topic addressed in this thesis, namely venture capital 
contracts design, presented in Chapter 6, it aimed at investigating how venture 
capitalists mitigate agency conflicts in the investor-investee relationship. In particular, I 
developed a set of hypotheses linking the level of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems with pre-investment and contractual mechanisms that VCs may use in order to 
mitigate such problems. Hereinafter I briefly summarize the contributions of this 
research: 
 
 From a theoretical point of view, this research contributes to the available 
literature by sheding some light on the factors that underlie how VCs mitigate 
the principal agent conflicts that takes the form of adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems in their investor-investee relation with prospective 
entrepreneurs. In particular, this is the first research that studies how pre-
investment screening mechanisms, financial instruments and contractual rights 
are used depending on the degree and type of perceived agency conflicts.  
 
 From an empirical point of view, this research provides some empirical 
evidence that, although adverse selection and moral hazard problems are 
usually both present in the VC-entrepreneur relationship, since they are not 
mutually exclusive, their relative importance differs over time. My empirical 
analysis shows that the effects of the former are salient at early stage 
investments when information asymmetry and uncertainty are higher, whilst the 
latter seems to be more important at later stage investments. Also, the results 
provide strong support for the importance of pre-investment screening 
mechanism, such as syndication, and higher ranking financing instruments, 
such as preferred equity, as levers VCs employ when they have to manage 
higher adverse selection problems.  
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On the other hand, the results show the likely use of cash flow and board rights 
in later investment stages that are associated with higher moral hazard risk. 
Additionally, I find that syndication, and preferred equity tend to be used 
alongside each other in a complementary manner rather than as substitutes. In 
the same way, I also provide another important finding that points to the 
complex nature of achieving control in a risky venture, namely a mix of cash 
flow and control rights are used alongside each other rather than as substitutes.   
 
 From a managerial point of view, the findings of this study have several 
practical implications for the design of VC contracts, because they present 
robust theory and empirical arguments why certain provisions should be 
included in VC contracts. For example, important practical implications for 
contract design and for pre- and post-investment project‟s evaluation activities 
derive from the finding that the relative importance of adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems vary along the venture development stage. Also, other 
important managerial suggestions come from the evidence that VCs tend to use 
in a complementary manner, namely alongside each other, both (i) pre-
investment activities, such as syndication, and the use of higher ranking 
financing instruments, such as equity securities, and (ii) cash flow and control 
rights.  
 
7.3 Limitation of the study and future research  
It is important to consider the entire previous findings in the light of several limitations 
associated with the studies. At this point, several limitations have been seen.  
 
The first consideration is related to the research presented in Chapter 4, namely the 
analysis of the drivers influencing the governance form of biopharmaceutical IFRs. The 
most important limitation is linked to the dataset I used in order to test the hypotheses, 
since I rely solely on field-based primary data of a specific country, i.e. Italy. Indeed, as 
a consequence of the fact that Italian biotech companies are few and for the most part 
very small, I collected few data on inter-firm relationships in my country.  
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Thus, the small sample size deriving from this choice could undermine the reliability 
and generalizability of my results. Therefore, I recognise that, despite the confirmative 
approach used in this research, the theoretical framework needs a further confirmation. 
Future research can replicate the analysis by using a larger dataset including for 
example firms from other countries with a similar industry structure or through a 
worldwide comprehensive databank analysis.  
 
The second consideration concerns the research presented in Chapter 5, namely the 
study of the risk evaluation in IFRs governance form choice. As already explained the 
developed theoretical framework is potentially adaptable to any industry, thus future 
research can replicate the study within another industrial context different from the 
biopharmaceutical one; this in order to see if it will be confirmed also in a different 
context and also in order to evaluate how sectoral differences may determine a different 
risk perception. Moreover, future research can also use field-based primary data in order 
to increase the generalizability of my framework. 
 
Finally, the third consideration is related to the research in chapter 6 on venture capital 
investments contracts. I think that the most important issue comes from the fact that I 
have only considered a few of the most prevalent financing instruments and contractual 
rights, due to data availability. Hence, future research can investigate other financing 
instruments such as debt, other cash flow rights such as those listed in the theory section 
of this study and other control rights (e.g. conversion options, redemption rights, exit 
rights, voting rights, board seats etc). Future research can also look at VC contract 
practice and link to performance data.  
 
Acknowledging these limitations and insisting on the conclusions, I believe that this 
thesis offers significant contributions to the relevant literature on both inter-firm 
relationships and venture capital contracting.  
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